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

A

DISSERTATION

UPON

PARTIES;

In Several Letters to

CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

Dedicated to the Right Honourable

Sir ROBERT WALPOLE,

Multa Me debortantur à vobis, Quirites, *nî Studium Reipublicæ omnia superet; Opes Factionis, vestra Patientia, Jus nullum, ac maximè, quod Innocentiæ plùs Periculi, quàm Honoris est. Nam illa quidem piget dicere, his Annis XV. quàm Ludibrio fueritis Superbiæ paucorum; quàm fædè, quámque inulti perierint vestri Defensores; utì vobis Animus ab Ignaviâ atque Socordiâ corruptus sit; qui ne nunc quidem, obnoxiis Inimicis, exsurgitis, atque etiam nunc timetis Eos, quibus vos decet Terrori esse. Sed quanquam hæc talia sunt; tamen obviam ire Factionis Potentiæ, Animus subigit. Certè Ego Libertatem, quæ mihi a Parente meo tradita est, experiar; verum id fruſtrà, an ob Rem faciam, in vestrâ Manu situm est*, Quirites. *Neque Ego vos hortor, quod sæpe Majores vestri fecere, uti contrà Injurias armati eatis. Nihil Vi, nihil Secessione opus est. Necesse est, suomet ipsi more præcipites eant.* Sallust. Bell. Jugurth. in Memmii Orat.

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

To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

Sir ROBERT *WALPOLE*,

KNIGHT of the moſt noble Order of the GARTER, Chancellor and Under-Treaſurer of the EXCHEQUER, firſt Commiſſioner of the TREASURY, and one of his MAJESTY's moſt honourable PRIVY COUNCIL, *&c.*

SIR,

AS ſoon as the Demand of the Publick made it neceſſary to collect the following Papers together, and to prepare a ſecond Edition of them, I took the Reſolution of addreſſing them to *You*. The *Style* of my Dedication will be very different from That, which is commonly employed to Perſons in your Station. But if you find nothing agreeable in the *Style*, you may find perhaps ſomething uſeful, ſomething that will deſerve your ſerious Reflection, in the *Matter* of it. I ſhall compare you neither to *Burleigh*, nor *Godolphin*. Let me not prophane the Tombs of the Dead, to raiſe Altars to the Living. I ſhall make you no Compliments on the Wiſdom of your *Adminiſtration*, nor on the Wonders you have perform'd, to

the Honour and Advantage of this Kingdom, in the Courſe of *fourteen*, or *fifteen Years*, either at home, or abroad. I ſhall leave theſe copious Themes to others, and ſhall confine my ſelf to Reaſons of another Kind, that induced me to *this Dedication.* If theſe Reaſons prove ſufficient to convince the Publick of the extreme Propriety of it, I have all that I propoſe to my ſelf.—Give me Leave to preſent to you, in one ſhort View, the general Deſign of theſe little Eſſays.

They are deſign'd then to expoſe the Artifice, and to point out the Series of Misfortunes, by which We were divided formerly into *Parties*, whoſe Conteſts brought even the fundamental Principles of our *Conſtitution* into Queſtion, and whoſe Exceſſes brought *Liberty* to the very Brink of Ruin.

They are deſign'd to give true Ideas of *this Conſtitution*, and to revive in the Minds of Men the true Spirit of it.

They are deſign'd to aſſert and vindicate the Juſtice and Honour of the *Revolution*; of the *Principles* eſtabliſhed, of the *Means* employed, and of the *Ends* obtained by it.

They are deſign'd to explode our *former Diſtinctions*, and to unite Men of all Denominations in the Support of *theſe Principles*, in the Defence of *theſe Means*, and in the Purſuit of *theſe Ends.*

They are deſign'd to ſhew how far *theſe Ends* were anſwered at the *Revolution*, or have been anſwered ſince; and by Conſequence how much, or how little is wanting, to render that glorious Work compleat, according to the original Plan, and agreeably

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to the Engagements taken, at that Time, with the Nation.

Let me now appeal to You, *Sir*. Are Theſe Deſigns, which any Man, who is born a *Briton*, in any Circumſtances, in any Situation, ought to be aſhamed, or afraid to avow? You cannot think it. You will not ſay it. That never can be the Caſe, until We ceaſe to think like *Freemen*, as well as to be *free*. Are theſe Deſigns in Favour of the *Pretender*? I appeal to the whole World; and I ſcorn, with a juſt Indignation, to give any other Anſwer to ſo ſhameleſs, and ſo ſenſeleſs an Objection. No; they are Deſigns in Favour of the *Conſtitution*; Deſigns to ſecure, to fortify, to perpetuate that excellent Syſtem of Government. I court no other Cauſe; I claim no other Merit.

Stet Fortuna Domûs, et Avi numerentur Avorum.

Let the *illuſtrious and royal Houſe*, that hath been called to the Government of theſe Kingdoms, govern them till Time ſhall be no more. But let the Spirit, as well as the Letter of the *Conſtitution*, they are intruſted to preſerve, be, as it ought to be, and as We promiſe ourſelves it will be, the ſole Rule of their Government, and the ſole Support of their Power; and whatever happens in the various Courſe of human Contingencies, whatever be the Fate of particular Perſons, of Houſes, or Families, let the *Liberties of Great Britain* be immortal.

They will be ſo, if *that Conſtitution*, whoſe genuine Effects they are, be maintained in Purity and Vigour. A perpetual Attention to this great Point is therefore the Intereſt and Duty of every Man

Man in *Britain*; and there is ſcarce any Man, who may not contribute to the Advancement of it, in ſome Degree. The old may inform the young, and the young may animate the old. Even They, who are moſt retired from the Scene of Buſineſs, may be uſeful, in this Cauſe, to Thoſe, who are in it; to Thoſe, who are heated by the Action, diſtracted by the Cares, or diſſipated by the Pleaſures of the World. I ſay, They may be uſeful; and I add, that They ought to be ſo to the utmoſt, that their Situation allows. *Government* is the Buſineſs of Thoſe, who are appointed to govern, and of Thoſe, who are appointed to controul Them. But the *Britiſh Conſtitution* is the Buſineſs of every *Briton*. It is ſo more particularly, indeed, of Perſons raiſed, like *You*, to the higheſt Poſts in the Government. *You* lye under particular Obligations of this Kind, beſides the general Engagements of Intereſt and Duty, that are common to All; and a Neglect in *others* would be a Breach of Truſt in *You*. We ſay that *our Kings can do no Wrong*. The Maxim is wiſely eſtabliſhed, and ought to be followed, no Doubt, as far as the Conduct of *Princes* renders the Obſervance of it practicable. But from the Eſtabliſhment of this Maxim reſults the Neceſſity of another, without which the Exerciſe of the *executive Power* would remain under no Controul. Though *our Kings can do no Wrong*, and though They cannot be call'd to Account by any Form our *Conſtitution* preſcribes, their *Miniſters* may. *They* are anſwerable for the *Adminiſtration of the Government*; *each* for his *particular Part*, and the *prime*, or *ſole Miniſter*, when there happens to be one, for the *whole*. He is ſo the more, and the more juſtly, if He hath affected to render Himſelf ſo, by uſurping on his

his *Fellows*; by wrigling, intriguing, whiſpering, and bargaining Himſelf into this dangerous Poſt; to which He was not call'd by the *general Suffrage*, nor perhaps by the deliberate Choice of his *Maſter* himſelf. It follows then that *Miniſters* are anſwerable for every Thing done to the Prejudice of the *Conſtitution*, in the ſame Proportion as the Preſervation of the *Conſtitution* in its Purity and Vigour, or the perverting, and weakening it, are of greater Conſequence to the Nation than any other Inſtances of *good*, or *bad Government*.

Believe me, *Sir*, a Reverence for the *Conſtitution*, and a conſcientious Regard to the Preſervation of it, are in the political, like *Charity* in the religious Syſtem, a Cloak to *hide a Multitude of Sins*; and as the Performance of *all other religious Duties* will not avail in the Sight of God, without *Charity*, ſo neither will the Diſcharge of *all other miniſterial Duties* avail in the Sight of Men, without a faithful Diſcharge of *this principal Duty*. Should a *Miniſter* govern, in various Inſtances of *domeſtick* and *foreign Management*, ignorantly, weakly, or even wickedly; and yet pay this Reverence, and bear this Regard to the *Conſtitution*, He would deſerve certainly much better Quarter, and would meet with it too from every Man of Senſe and Honour, than a *Miniſter*, who ſhould conduct the Adminiſtration with great Ability and Succeſs, and ſhould at the ſame Time procure and abet, or even connive at ſuch indirect Violations of the Rules of the *Conſtitution* as tend to the Deſtruction of it, or even at ſuch Evaſions as tend to render it uſeleſs. A *Miniſter*, who had the ill Qualities of both Theſe, and the good ones of neither; who made his *Adminiſtration* hateful

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in ſome Reſpects, and deſpicable in others; who ſought that Security by ruining the *Conſtitution*, which He had forfeited by diſhonouring the *Government*; who encouraged the profligate, and ſeduced the unwary, to concur with Him in this Deſign, by affecting to explode all *publick Spirit*, and to ridicule every Form of our *Conſtitution*; *ſuch a Miniſter* would be look'd upon moſt juſtly as the Shame and Scourge of his Country; ſooner or later He would fall without Pity; and it is hard to ſay what Puniſhment would be proportionable to his Crimes.—— To conclude this Head therefore; ſince the Obligations of Intereſt and Duty on every Man, eſpecially on every *Miniſter*, and more eſpecially ſtill on a *prime*, or *ſole Miniſter*, to reverence the *Conſtitution*, to conform his Conduct to it, and neither to invade, nor ſuffer it to be invaded by others, are ſo undeniable, and ſo ſtrong; and ſince the Means, which the *Miniſter's* Power gives Him to preſerve it in Purity and Vigour, or to corrupt and weaken it, are ſo many; nothing could be more proper than a Dedication to one, in your exalted Station, of *Papers*, that are written to explain this Intereſt, and to enforce this Duty, and to preſs them on the Underſtanding and Conſcience of every Man in *Britain*; but of *Him* moſt, who is moſt concern'd.

After the general Reaſons, that have been given, and ſuggeſted, for addreſſing this Dedication to *You*, give me Leave to deſcend into ſome, that are a little more particular, and that regard the *Man*, as well as the *Miniſter*.

If the *Principles of the Revolution*, and the *Means* employed in it, have not been vindicated by *Me*,

Me, with as great Force of Reaſon and Eloquence, as they were by *You*, in a famous Oration you made at *Sacheverel*'s Tryal, they have been vindicated however to the beſt of my Power. The *Cauſe* is the ſame, though the *Performances* are not equal; and ſince the *Cauſe* is the ſame, the *Cauſe* will recommend *my Writings* to your good Opinion, how little ſoever you may like the *Advocate*. But I have ſomething more to urge in my own Favour. You had a *Sermon* to condemn, and a *Parſon to roaſt*, (for That, I think, was the decent Language of the Time) and, to carry on the Allegory, you *roaſted Him at ſo fierce a Fire, that you burnt yourſelves*. Your Arguments being confin'd to the Propoſitions *this Preacher* had advanc'd, you may ſeem rather to have juſtify'd *Reſiſtance*, or the *Means* employ'd to bring about the *Revolution*, than the *Revolution*; for though the *Principles of the Revolution* were, and muſt for ever remain true, and though the *Means* were juſt, and will for ever be ſo, in Caſes of the like Nature; yet *true Principles*, and *juſt Means*, require to be farther ſanctify'd by their *Ends*. The Man, who ſhould affect the greateſt Zeal for the *Principles* then eſtabliſhed, and the *Means* then uſed, would deſerve, I think, to be rank'd among the *falſe Brethren*, and would prove Himſelf a treacherous, and a mercenary Friend to the *Revolution*, if He ſhew'd any Indifference about the *Ends* obtain'd, or endeavour'd in any Manner to defeat Thoſe, that were intended to be obtain'd by it. The People, who run ſo great a Riſque, and bring about ſo great an Event, in order to reſtore their *Conſtitution*, and to ſecure their *Liberties* againſt Dangers of every Kind, and eſpecially againſt Thoſe, which recent Experience hath taught Them to apprehend,

have ſurely a good Right to the whole Benefit of *ſuch a Revolution*; and They cannot be deprived of any Part of this Benefit, or left expoſed to any Shadow of the ſame Dangers, by any Rule of Juſtice, or good Policy.

Such Conſiderations as Theſe made Me think that, to aſſert and vindicate fully the *Honour and Juſtice of the Revolution*, it was neceſſary that the *Ends of the Revolution* ſhould be inſiſted upon in *my Arguments*, whether they were ſo or not in *yours*; and that the Importance of the *Subject*, as well as the Difference of the *Occaſions*, (for the whole lay open before me) would be a ſufficient Reaſon for ſupplying in the *Copy* what was wanting in the *Original*. I have endeavour'd therefore to ſhew how much our *Conſtitution* hath been improved, how far our *Liberties* have been better ſecur'd by the *Revolution*, and how little is wanting to compleat that glorious Deſign, and to render the *Britiſh Conſtitution* the moſt perfect Syſtem of a free Government, that was ever eſtabliſhed in the World. If *all the Ends of the Revolution* are already obtain'd, it is not only *impertinent* to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious Deſigns* might be imputed, and the Name of *Incendiary* be apply'd with ſome Colour, perhaps, to any one, who ſhould perſiſt in preſſing this Point. On the other Hand, if *any of theſe Ends* have not been fully obtain'd, the Reproach of *Faction* and the Title of *Incendiary* will belong to every Perſon, who raiſes a Conteſt by his Oppoſition to theſe Inſtances, and who endeavours to make the *Friends of the Conſtitution* paſs for *Enemies to the Government*. Thus it is eaſy to join Iſſue; and when Iſſue is once join'd, it cannot be difficult to decide.

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If a *principal End of the Revolution* was to ſecure the Nation for the future againſt all the Dangers, to which *Liberty*, as well as *Religion*, had been expoſed before the *Revolution*; if one of theſe Dangers aroſe from the *Corruption*, that had been employ'd to create a *Dependency of the two Houſes of Parliament on the Crown*; if *this Corruption* might have ſucceeded very probably then, had the *Means* been ſufficient to ſupport it; if no Proviſion was made, at the *Revolution*, to ſecure the *Independency of the two Houſes*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, againſt *Corruption*; if no Proviſion hath been made againſt this Danger, ſince the *Revolution*, proportionable to that Increaſe of the *poſſible Means of Corruption*, which hath happened ſince the *Revolution*, by the Increaſe of the *Revenue of the Crown*, of *Debts*, of *Taxes*, and of *Officers*, and *Powers* to raiſe *theſe Taxes*; if all This be ſo, (and the whole Merits of the Cauſe may be ſafely reſted there) how can it be pretended that *all the Ends of the Revolution* have been already obtained? They have not moſt certainly. When, and in what Manner, they ſhall be obtained, it would be Preſumption in any *private Perſons* ſo much as to inſinuate. They may repreſent ſuch Things as They judge to be of uſe to the Publick, and may ſupport their Repreſentations by all the Reaſons, that have determin'd their Opinions. Thus far their Province extends. All beyond This belongs to their *Superiors*; and, in the Caſe before us, to the Wiſdom of the Nation aſſembled in *Parliament*. This however I would add; that as a Conſiſtency of Character ſeems to exact from *You* a Zeal for obtaining *all the Ends of the Revolution*, ſuitable to That, which you have expreſs'd for the *Principles* it eſtabliſhed, and the *Means* it employ-

ed; ſo the particular Obligations *You* lye under to promote the Honour and Intereſt of *his preſent Majeſty*, and of his *royal Family*, ſeem to exact the ſame; for, after all, the *Revolution* is the Foundation of the *preſent Settlement*; whatever ſtrengthens the *Foundation*, ſtrengthens the *Superſtructure*; and there can be no Need of going about to prove that to obtain *all the Ends of the Revolution* is to ſtrengthen *that Foundation*. The Arguments, that prevail'd formerly with many againſt the *Principles* and *Means of the Revolution*, are quite exploded; the Prejudices againſt them are quite worn out. We may therefore perſuade, without flattering ourſelves, that the Foundation of our *preſent Settlement*, and of all our future national Happineſs, is laid immoveably in theſe two Reſpects. Shall it not be ſo, and does it not become *You* in a particular Manner to endeavour that it ſhould be ſo, in every Reſpect? Could you forgive yourſelf, if you neglected the firſt Opportunity of concurring to remove the leaſt Pretence from the diſaffected, nay from the well-affected, to ſay that the *Ends of particular Men*, of *Parties*, and of *Families*, have been anſwer'd by the *Revolution*, even beyond their ſeveral Expectations; but that the *national Expectations* have not been ſo fully anſwered, nor the *Ends of the Revolution* intirely obtain'd? No Man knows better than *You* the Truth and Force of what hath been here advanced. No Man therefore is able to make a juſter Application of it to the moſt important Intereſts of *your Country*, to the true Intereſt of *your royal Maſter*, and to *your private Intereſt* too; if That will add, as I preſume it will, ſome Weight to the Scale; and if That requires, as I preſume it does, a Regard to *Futurity*, as well as to the *preſent Moment*. Upon the whole

whole Matter therefore, I cannot but expect that You ſhould receive favourably an *Addreſs*, made ſo properly, and in which, if I have preſs'd You a little warmly, yet I have done it with the Decency, that every *Gentleman* owes to *another*, at leaſt to *Himſelf*. You will allow Me, and every Friend of the *Revolution* and of *Liberty*, Leave to hope that the Time is coming, when you will not oppoſe, or ſhall not have it in your Power to oppoſe, the Endeavours of Thoſe, who promote the intire Completion of *all the Ends* propoſed by the *firſt*, and the full Security of the *laſt*. Whenever This happens; whenever the *Independency of the two Houſes of Parliament*, and the *uninfluenc'd* and *uninfluenceable Freedom of Elections*, are once effectually ſecur'd againſt the Dangers, that may ariſe poſſibly hereafter from the Growth of *Corruption*; then will all our *future Kings* be reduced to the agreeable Neceſſity of eſtabliſhing their Thrones, as We are obliged to acknowledge that the Throne is *now* eſtabliſhed, not on the narrow and ſandy Foundations of *Court-Craft*, and *unconſtitutional Expedients*, but on the *Popularity of the Prince*, and the *univerſal Affection of the Subjects*; Foundations of the *Kingly Authority* ſo evidently ſuppoſed by our *Conſtitution*, that a *King*, who will add Weight to his Scepter, muſt govern by them, or govern againſt *this Conſtitution*, againſt the very *Rule of his Government*.

I am now come to the laſt Reaſon, drawn from the Subject of *theſe Writings*, that I ſhall trouble You with, for dedicating them to *You*. The Attempt to extinguiſh the Animoſities, and even the Names of *thoſe Parties*, that diſtracted the Nation ſo long, ſo fatally at firſt, and ſo fooliſhly at laſt, intitles

titles this Volume to *your kind Reception of it*, at leaſt, as properly as the Attempt to expoſe the Dangers, that may poſſibly ariſe hereafter, from *Corruption*, to the *Independency of Parliament*, and to the *Freedom of Elections*. Whilſt a real Difference of *Principles* and *Deſigns* ſupported the *Diſtinction*, We were divided into *national Parties*; and This was Misfortune enough. It was lamented as a great one, at the Time, by every good Man of every Party. But if the *Diſtinction* ſhould remain, when the *Difference* ſubſiſts no longer, the Misfortune would be ſtill greater; becauſe They, who maintain'd the *Diſtinction*, in this Caſe, would ceaſe to be a *Party*, and would become a *Faction*. *National Intereſts* would be no longer concerned; at leaſt, on *one Side*. They would be ſometimes ſacrificed, and always made ſubordinate to *perſonal Intereſts*; and That, I think, is the true Characteriſtick of *Faction*. This Attempt therefore ought to have *your Approbation*. To dedicate it to *You* may be conſtrued to ſuppoſe that it will have *your Approbation*; and He, who ſuppoſes that it will, makes you no indifferent Compliment.

When the *Court* fomented our *national Diviſions*, the very worſt Deſigns were carried on; for to *divide* can never be an Expedient for good Purpoſes, any more than to *corrupt*; ſince the Peace and Proſperity of a Nation will always depend on *uniting*, as far as poſſible, the Heads, Hearts and Hands of the whole People, and on improving, not debauching, their Morals. *Divide et impera*, is a Maxim often quoted. How are We to apply it? There is no Place for it, in *arbitrary Governments*; for in *Them*, the Intereſt of the *Governors* requires that a *ſervile Union*, if it may be called an *Union*, ſhould be

be maintain'd by the Weight of *Power*; like That of Slaves in a *Galley*, who are united by their *Chains*, and who tug the Oar together, at the Sound of a *Whiſtle*. In *free Governments*, it can have Place as little, whilſt They who are at the Head, intend the Maintenance of *Liberty*. To what Caſe then can it be apply'd? There is but one, and That is the Caſe of *Thoſe*, who aſpire at more Power than a *free Conſtitution of Government* gives Them. *Such Governors* muſt divide and incenſe *Parties* one againſt another, that They may be always able to bribe the Paſſions of *one Side*, and ſo uſurp on *both*. But the *Prince*, who purſues this Method, riſques the Power He hath for a Power He does not want. He would be the more inexcuſeable, under *ſuch a Conſtitution as ours*; becauſe, if He could not gain Eſteem by his *great*, He might gain Affection by his *good Qualities*; and *this Principle* would carry Him, even better perhaps than the *other*, to the Power He would obtain. What can a *Prince* deſire more than to be placed at the Head of an *united People*; among whom He may have as many *Friends* as He pleaſes, and can have no *Enemies*, unleſs He creates Them, by ſuppoſing Them to be *ſuch*, and by treating Them accordingly? If the Deſigns of a *Prince*, in fomenting the *Diviſions*, are to invade the *Liberties of his People*, his Deſigns are laid in the utmoſt Iniquity; and if *Theſe* are not his Deſigns, they muſt be laid in the utmoſt Folly. When a *People* ſubmits quietly to *Government*, and is willing to obey on the *Terms*, on which alone *their Prince* hath a Right to command, how extravagant muſt his Demands be, and how unaccountable his Conduct, to *divide ſuch a People?* Shall He expect, for Inſtance, that *all his People* ſhould think like *Him* and *his Council*, about every

every Occurrence, about every Meaſure He takes, and every Man He employs; and ſince This is too much to ask of *Freemen*, nay of *Slaves*, if his Expectation be not anſwered, ſhall He form a *laſting Diviſion* upon ſuch *tranſient Motives?* Shall He proſcribe every Man, as an *Enemy to his Government*, who diſlikes the *Adminiſtration* of it? *Proſcriptions* are abominable, and inhuman, when they are back'd by a Fulneſs of *arbitrary Power*. But to hang up the *Tables of Proſcription*, without the Power of ſending *Centurions* to cut off every Head, that wears a Face diſlik'd at Court, would be Madneſs in a *Prince*. Such a Conduct cannot ſuit his *Intereſt*, however it may his *Paſſions*, in any Circumſtance whatever. There are indeed Circumſtances, wherein it may ſuit the Intereſt of a *Miniſter*. Till the Sword of *civil War* be drawn, a *Prince* can ſcarce become irreconcileable with his *People*, and be reduced, for Want of *national Strength*, to ſupport his Power and Dignity by the Force of *Faction*. But a *Miniſter* may fall eaſily, and ſoon, into this deſperate State; and after fomenting, as long as He could, the *Diviſions of Parties*, He may have no Refuge but in *Faction*. There may be ſuch a Conduct, as no *national Party* will bear, or at leaſt will juſtify. But *Faction* hath no Regard to *national Intereſts*. *Faction* therefore will bear any Thing, ſhare in any Thing, juſtify any Thing. If the *Miniſter*, who takes this Method to ſupport Himſelf, hath any Art, He will endeavour to diſguiſe his *Faction* under the Name and Appearance of a *national Party*. But even this Diſguiſe will ſoon fall off. The beſt of Thoſe, who were engaged in the *Party*, will quit the *Faction*, and then the *latter* muſt ſtand confeſs'd to publick View. But it is not only the *criminal Conduct of a Miniſter*, and the

Fear

Fear of reſting his Adminiſtration on the *national Judgment*, that may oblige Him to govern by *Diviſion*, and by *Faction*. As the moſt oppoſite Notions are often united in the Head, ſo are the moſt contrary Sentiments in the Heart of Man. *Incapacity* often begets *Sufficiency*; and yet a *Conſciouſneſs of Incapacity* often begets a *Jealouſy of Power*, grounded on a Senſe of the *ſuperior Merit of other Men*. The *Miniſter*, who grows leſs by his *Elevation*, like a *little Statue* plac'd on a *mighty Pedeſtal*, will always have *this Jealouſy* ſtrong about Him. He muſt of Courſe ſelect a *Faction* to Himſelf; and *this Faction* muſt be compos'd, to anſwer his Purpoſes, of Men *ſervilely obſequious*, or *extremely inferior to Him by their Talents*. Whenever This happens, the Reign of *Venality*, of *Proſtitution*, of *Ignorance*, of *Futility*, and of *Dulneſs* commences. The *Miniſter* will dread to ſee the *Perſons* employed, whom He *ſecretly eſteems*, for this very Reaſon, becauſe He *eſteems* Them. *Abilities to ſerve the Commonwealth* will be an Objection ſufficient to outweigh the ſtrongeſt Proofs of *Attachment to the Perſon of the Prince*, and of *Zeal for his Government*; nay, even the Merit of a *whole Life ſpent in giving theſe Proofs*. In ſhort, the very Reaſons, that ſhould determine the *Prince* to employ Men, will determine the *Miniſter* to proſcribe Them. Diſlike, or Contempt of *Him*, will paſs with his *Maſter* for Diſaffection to the Government; and, under this pompous Name of *Government*, will nothing but the paultry Intereſt, or Humour, of the *Miniſter* be couch'd. The *Miniſter* will reap, perhaps, (for even That may be doubtful) the immediate Benefit of *dividing*, or maintaining the *Diviſions of the Nation*, and of nurſing up *Faction*, by continuing longer in Power, his ſole Security,

and by deferring, if not eſcaping, the *evil Day*, the *Day of Account and Retribution*. But the *Prince* will reap, in this Caſe, the permanent Miſchief of eſtabliſhing *Diviſion* and *Faction*; and may poſſibly make the lamentable Exchange of his *own Popularity*, for his *Miniſter's Impunity*. I need not finiſh up this Picture of Imagination, ſince I write to *You*, who know ſo much better than I pretend to do the *Characters of Men*, and the *Arts of Government*. It is ſufficient that I have hinted at the general Cauſes and Effects of the Endeavours, that are ſometimes uſed, and to which *Great Britain* hath not been a Stranger, to foment *national Diviſions*, and to govern by the *Faction of a Miniſter*, arm'd with the Power of the *Prince*, againſt the Senſe and Spirit of a *Nation*, and the Intereſt of the *Prince* himſelf. This may ſerve, and it is all I ſhall ſay, to beſpeak your Approbation of the Papers that follow, on Account of the *Matter* they contain.

But, *Sir*, the Reaſons I have given, how pertinent ſoever they may be, are not the only Reaſons I had for addreſſing myſelf, in this Manner, and upon this Occaſion, to *You*. There are Reaſons of another Kind; Reaſons, that come ſtill more home to *Yourſelf*; Reaſons, that appear very important to *Me*, and that will appear ſo to *You*, perhaps, when You have reflected duely on them, and have weigh'd impartially the Conſequences of them. I ſhall preſs theſe Reaſons with all the Plainneſs and Force, that Decency permits, in ſo publick, and perſonal an Application; becauſe, though *Truth* may ſometimes offend, I am very indifferent to Offences taken with *Truth* on my Side. If You hearken to *Truth*, which Men in your Station ſel-

dom

dom hear, You may be the better for it. If You do not, the *Author of this Dedication* cannot be the worſe; for I will add, upon this Occaſion, that whoever He is, He is one You cannot impoſe upon, in your *private Capacity*, neither as a Man, nor as a Gentleman; and that you can as little do it, in your *publick Capacity*. You cannot diſappoint Him; becauſe the Temper of his Mind gives You no Hold on Him. He hath neither *Avarice* to make Him deſire *Riches*, nor *Ambition* to make Him deſire *Power*, nor *Vanity* to make Him deſire *Honours*. You cannot oppreſs Him; becauſe He is free from *Guilt*, and from every *probable* (for no Man is free from every *poſſible*) *Imputation of Guilt*. The *Laws of his Country* are his Protection; and they are ſufficient to protect every *Briton*, who reverences and obeys them, in how *peculiar a Situation* ſoever He may be found. They, who act againſt *theſe Laws*, and They alone, may have Reaſon to fear, let their *Situation be never ſo high*, or their *preſent Power never ſo great*.

Having ſaid This, I proceed to obſerve to You, that You are in the right moſt certainly to retort by *Yourſelf*, or *Others*, in the beſt and ſmarteſt Manner that *You*, or *They* can, whatever the Writings publiſhed in the *Craftſman* may contain, which You judge to be injurious to *Yourſelf*, or reflecting on *your Adminiſtration*. The Publick will judge uprightly upon the whole Matter. The Laughers will be for Thoſe, who have moſt *Wit*, and the ſerious Part of Mankind for Thoſe, who have moſt *Reaſon* on their Side. Again. As to Affairs of Peace, or War, publick Occurrences, domeſtick Management, foreign Negotiations, in ſhort, the News of the Day, and the current Buſineſs of the

Time, *weekly* and *daily Papers*, or *more elaborate*, *anniverſary Treatiſes*, are properly employ'd by You to explain, in your own Favour, the Series of your Conduct; to refute *Caleb*; or, which is ſtill more eaſy, and by ſome thought as uſeful, to keep up the Cavil on *one Point*, till a *new one* is ſtarted, that draws off the Attention of the World. All This may be call'd *fair War*; and whoever prevails in the Judgment of the Publick, the Publick will reap Information from the Conteſt, and will have Reaſon to be pleas'd with *theſe Appeals*, which preſent an Image of the Cuſtom, that obtain'd in the antient Commonwealths of *Greece*, and at *Rome*, where the greateſt Intereſts of the State were debated, and the greateſt Men in thoſe Governments were accuſed and defended, in publick Harangues, and before the whole People.

But the Writings of the *Craftſman* have not been confin'd to theſe Subjects, that are *perſonal*, or *temporary*. The Cauſe of the *Britiſh Conſtitution* hath been pleaded through the whole Courſe of *theſe Papers*; every Danger to it hath been pointed out; every Security, or Improvement of it, hath been explain'd and preſs'd.——Now here, *Sir*, begins my Complaint. I ſaid that the Cauſe of our *Conſtitution* hath been *pleaded* in the *Craftſman*; and I am ſorry that the Expreſſion is ſo preciſely juſt, that no other would come up to the Caſe. The Cauſe of the *Conſtitution* hath been *pleaded*; for the *Conſtitution* hath been *attacked*; openly, inſolently *attacked*, and is ſo every Day by Thoſe, againſt whom the *Craftſman* ſo often employs his Pen. Who could have expected (for I will give an Inſtance or two) who could have expected, at this Time, and under the *preſent Eſtabliſhment*,

ſtabliſhment, to hear the Neceſſity of maintaining *ſtanding Armies*, in Times of *Peace*, even againſt the *People of Britain*, who maintain them, contended for and aſſerted? Who could have expected to hear a *Dependency*, a *corrupt Dependency of the Parliament on the Crown*, contended for and aſſerted to be a neceſſary Expedient to ſupply a *Want of Power*, which is falſely ſuppoſed, *in the Crown*; as if our Fathers had oppoſed, and at length deſtroyed that Chimæra, call'd *Prerogative*, formerly ſo dangerous to our *Liberties*, for no other Reaſon but to furniſh Arguments for letting looſe upon us *another Monſter*, more dangerous to our *Liberties* by far? Who could have expected that Attempts to revive the Doctrines of *old Whiggiſm*, and the Principles and Spirit of the *Revolution*, in Oppoſition to ſuch manifeſt Contradictions of them all, would give any Umbrage, or cauſe any Alarm, among Men, who ſtill affect to call Themſelves *Whigs*, and pretend Zeal for a *Government*, that is founded on the *Revolution*, and could not have been eſtabliſhed without it? This could not have been expected, I think; and yet ſo it is. There are *Perſons*, who take to Themſelves the Title of *miniſterial Writers*, and have ſometimes the Front to aſſume That of *Writers for the Government*. *Theſe Perſons* are not content to ring, in daily Panegyrick, Encomiums on the Wiſdom and Virtue, the Juſtice and Clemency, the Succeſs and Triumphs of *your Adminiſtration*, and to anſwer, or to attempt to anſwer, the almoſt innumerable Objections, that have been made (it matters not here whether juſtly, or unjuſtly) to *your Conduct at home*, and *your own*, and That of *your Brother abroad*; but They take Fire, They ſhew an Alarm, and They grow angry, whenever any Thing is written,

written, nay when a Word is dropt, in Favour of the *fundamental Articles of Britiſh Liberty.* Sometimes They argue directly, and in plain Terms, againſt them. Sometimes They perplex and puzzle the Cauſe; evade what They cannot deny; and, when They cannot impoſe a Fallacy, endeavour at leaſt to hinder Men from diſcerning a Truth. Thus, *Sir*, They mingle *your Juſtification* with the *Condemnation of our Conſtitution*; and labour, as much as in Them lies, to make *your Preſervation* and the *Deſtruction of this Conſtitution* a common Cauſe. If you could poſſibly doubt the Truth of what is here advanced, I might refer you to the *particular Pamphlets* and *Papers*, which are known at leaſt by the *Anſwers*, that have been given to them; till ſuch Time as an Extract of all the Paſſages, hinted at here, be made publick, as I hope it will; and whenever it is, I dare appeal beforehand to your private Thoughts, whether the *Principles* they contain, and the *Conſequences* deducible from them, would not deſtroy, if they were to take Place, the whole Scheme of the *Britiſh Conſtitution.* It hath been ask'd, why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally harp on *Liberty*, and the *Conſtitution?* Do They mean to inſtil *Jealouſy* and *Diſtruſt*, and to alienate the *Minds of the People?* In what Inſtances have the *Laws* been broken, or hath the *Conſtitution* been invaded by Thoſe, who govern? Theſe Queſtions deſerve an Anſwer; and I ſhall anſwer the *firſt*, by asking another Queſtion. Why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally labour to explain away *Liberty*, and to diſtinguiſh us out of our *Conſtitution?* If nothing had been ſaid of *this Kind*, I am perſuaded that much leſs would have been ſaid of the *other*; and I can aſſure you, with great Truth, that the Publick had not been troubled particularly with *this*

Diſſer-

Diſſertation upon Parties. As to the *other two Queſtions*, they may be taken together. There is a plain and real Difference between *Jealouſy* and *Diſtruſt*, that may be obſerved in the preſent Caſe. Men may be *jealous*, on Account of their *Liberties*, and I think they ought to be ſo, even when They have no immediate *Diſtruſt* that the Perſons, who govern, deſign to invade them. An Opportunity of invading them opened, is Reaſon ſufficient for awakening the *Jealouſy*; and if the *Perſons*, who have *this Jealouſy*, apply to Thoſe, who govern, to help to cure it, by removing the Opportunity, the *latter* may take This, if They pleaſe, as a Mark of *Confidence*, not *Diſtruſt*; at leaſt, it will be in their Power, and ſurely it will be for their Intereſt, to ſhew that They deſerved *Confidence*, in this Caſe, not *Diſtruſt*. But it will be always trifling, and fooliſh, to ask what *Laws* have been broken, what Invaſions on the *Conſtitution* have been made; becauſe as nothing of this Sort will be done, when there are no Deſigns dangerous to the *Conſtitution* carried on; ſo when there are *ſuch Deſigns*, whatever is done of this Sort will be private, indirect, and ſo covered, that the greateſt moral Certainty may be deſtitute of Proof. Whenever any of theſe Things are done publickly, directly, and in a Manner to be eaſily proved, the Danger will be over, the *Conſtitution* will be deſtroy'd, and all Fear for it and Concern about it will be impertinent, becauſe they will come too late. If ever that old, trite Maxim, *Principiis obſta*, was well apply'd, it is ſo in the Caſe We ſpeak of here.

The Reaſons I have given for mentioning *theſe Writers* ought to excuſe me for it; at leaſt, to *You*; and even to *You* I ſhall ſay very little more about Them,

Them. The Flowers They gather at *Billingſgate*, to adorn and enliven their Productions, ſhall be paſs'd over by Me, without any Reflection. They aſſume the Privilege of *Watermen* and *Oyſter-Women*. Let Them enjoy it in that good Company, and excluſively of all other Perſons. They cauſe no Scandal; They give no Offence; They raiſe no Sentiment but Contempt in the Breaſts of *Thoſe* They *attack*; and it is to be hoped, for the Honour of *Thoſe*, whom They would be thought to *defend*, that They raiſe, by this low and dirty Practice, no other Sentiment in *Them*. But there is another Part of their Proceeding, which may be attributed by malicious People to *You*, and which deſerves for that Reaſon alone ſome Place in *this Dedication*, as it might be ſome Motive to the writing of it. When *ſuch Authors* grow ſcurrilous, it would be highly unjuſt to impute their Scurrility to any *Prompter*; becauſe They have in Themſelves all that is neceſſary to conſtitute a *Scold*; *ill Manners*, *Impudence*, a *foul Mouth*, and a *fouler Heart*. But when They *menace*, They riſe a Note higher. They cannot do This in their own Names. Men may be apt to conclude therefore that They do it in the Name, as They affect to do it on the Behalf, of the *Perſon*, in whoſe Cauſe They deſire to be thought retain'd. Many Examples of *theſe Menaces* might be quoted, and moſt of them would be found directed againſt *one particular Perſon*. After employing the whole Impotence of their Rhetorick againſt Him, and venting for many Years together, almoſt without Notice on his Part, as much Calumny as their Imaginations could furniſh, a *Pamphlet* hath been lately publiſhed, the profeſs'd Deſign of which is to call for a *vigorous Proceeding in Parliament againſt* THIS MAN. To introduce this

this Propoſal, it is preceded by a long Series of Facts; ſome notoriouſly falſe; ſome, which it is impoſſible ſhould be true; others, which it is impoſſible *this Writer* ſhould know to be true, if they were ſo; and others again, not only deſtitute of Proof, but even of Probability. Such *Accuſations* muſt be brought by ſome * *Creature, of ſo notoriouſly proſtituted a Conſcience*, that *his Evidence would be rejected in any common Cauſe*, and ſhould not be refuted therefore by Me, if I was concern'd to refute Him. But, *Sir*, if I take Notice of *this Libel*, or refer to *others of the ſame Kind*, it is not done out of Regard to *theſe Authors*, whom I deſpiſe, as I am perſuaded the *Perſon* does, againſt whom all the Virulence of their Malice is directed. My Concern, upon this Occaſion, is for *You* alone, and You will allow me to repreſent what that Concern dictates. It is poſſible that *You* may have very ſtrong Reſentments againſt *this Perſon*, and He againſt *You*. It is poſſible that You may have ſhewn *yours*, and He may have ſhewn *his*, according to the different Circumſtances you have been in, and the different Opportunities You have had. But This will not become a *Matter of State*, though you are a *Miniſter of State*. The Publick will eſpouſe *your Paſſions* no more than *his*; nor concern itſelf to enquire who gave the firſt Occaſion to *theſe Reſentments*; who hath acted the Part of a *fair*, and who of a *treacherous Enemy*. It is, I doubt, too certain that the *Publick* hath been employ'd ſometimes to revenge *private Quarrels*, and to ſerve the low Turns of *Envy*, or *Jealouſy*. But, in all theſe Caſes, the *Publick* hath been impoſed upon; *theſe Motives* have been conceal'd; *others* have been pre-

d tended;

* *See the* grand Accuſer, *&c. p.* 77.

tended; and the *others* have been of a *publick Nature* alone; becauſe the bare Suſpicion of any *private Intereſt*, or *Paſſion*, in a *publick Proſecution* is ſufficient, and moſt juſtly ſo, to create invincible Prejudices to it. The *Scribblers* I ſpeak of have laid You therefore under great Diſadvantages, notwithſtanding your *Elevation*, and your *Power*, whether you deſign any Thing againſt the *Perſon* ſo obnoxious to You, or not. They ſhould have conceal'd induſtriouſly, what They have affected to proclaim; ſince it is certain that, how great ſoever *your Popularity* in the Nation may be, They will never bring up Mankind to think that any Perſon ſhould be proſecuted by *Methods extraordinary*, or even *ordinary*, purely for your Eaſe, your Pleaſure, or your Safety. If They could prove, what They frequently throw out, that every Man is a *Friend to the Pretender*, who is not a *Friend to You*; and that He, who objects to *your Conduct in the Adminiſtration*, endeavours to pull down the *preſent Government*, and ſet up *another*; then, indeed, They might raiſe a Spirit againſt *this particular Perſon*, for aught I know; but moſt certainly againſt *many others*, of much greater Conſequence, who appear every Day, in the Face of the World, not to be *your Friends*, and who make no Scruple of objecting, with the utmoſt Freedom, to *your Conduct*. But ſuch Aſſertions as theſe will only ſerve to make Men angry, or laugh. They, who have the beſt Opinion of your *Abilities*, will no more agree that the *preſent Eſtabliſhment* is ſupported, than that it was made by *You*. They will never be wanting in their Reſpect to the *Crown* ſo much, as to confound the Cauſe of the *King* with the Cauſe of his *Miniſter*; or to ſuppoſe that the Reins of Government would grow weaker in his Majeſty's

Majeſty's Hand, if *You* was out of Power, or out of the World.——In ſhort, *Sir*, you may paſs, and I believe you do paſs juſtly, for a *Man of extreme good Parts*, and for a *Miniſter of much Experience*; but You would not deſire, I think, to be repreſented as the *Atlas*, who ſupports this State; and *your Brother* will not certainly paſs for the *Hercules*, who relieves You, and who ſuſtains, in his Turn, the important Burthen.

I know very well that ſomething is added to ſupply, if That were poſſible, this Defect, and to make the Cauſe more plauſible. It is pretended that the Writings imputed to *this particular Perſon*, and ſeveral others publiſhed in the *Craftſman*, contain Reflections of a very *extravagant*, *indecent*, and even *ſeditious Nature*; ſuch as They alone, who are capable of ſuppoſing them, are capable of making. But then theſe Reflections are to be proved by the *Conſtructions*, which the *Accuſers* make of the Expreſſions employ'd by *Thoſe*, whom They accuſe; *Conſtructions* as arbitrary, and as forc'd, as many of Thoſe, by which ſome of the beſt Men at *Rome* were brought within the Interpretation of the *Law of Majeſty*, by ſome of the worſt. Examples of much the ſame Sort have been ſet even in *Britain*, whilſt the Practice prevail'd of ſuppoſing *Innuendo's*, and *Parallels*, and *oblique Meanings*, and proſecuting and condemning Men on *Suppoſitions*, and *Interpretations*. But there is no Room to fear that any ſuch Examples ſhould be renew'd, whilſt * *a* British Spirit prevails in a British Parliament. Whilſt *that Spirit* prevails, no

* *See* ſome Conſiderations concerning the publick Funds, *&c.* p. 98.

Parliament will condemn any Man upon *Principles*, which *Parliaments* have always condemn'd as unjuſt and tyrannical. Leſs than any will They condemn Thoſe, who write in Defence of *this Conſtitution*, at the Requeſt and on the Inſtances of Thoſe, who attack it. A *Britiſh Spirit* and the *Spirit of the Britiſh Conſtitution* are one and the ſame; and therefore † *if ever there ariſes a* BRITISH SPIRIT *in a* BRITISH PARLIAMENT, of which I preſume no Doubt ought to be made at this Time, *Vengeance will* not *overtake* the *former*; it may be the *latter*.

What hath been ſaid might ſuffice to ſhew how fooliſh and vain it is to throw out Menaces againſt *Thoſe*, who have nothing to fear, at a Time, when Zeal to preſerve the *Conſtitution* in every Part inviolate ſeems daily to increaſe. But ſince I have enter'd on the Subject, and the Matter ſeems of ſome Concernment to *You*, give me Leave to add one Conſideration more, that may ſerve to ſhew how fooliſh and vain ſuch a Proceeding would be, even at any other Time. Let us ſuppoſe that the *very Perſon* pointed at was, and could be proved to be, the Author of *this Diſſertation upon Parties*, for Inſtance, which I now dedicate to You. Let us ſuppoſe that the Reſolution was taken to follow the generous and equitable Advice of the *Pamphlet-writer*, who thinks He ought to be proceeded againſt in a *peculiar Manner*. Let us even ſuppoſe that We liv'd in an Age, when *Parliaments* were brought, in ſome Degree, under that very *Dependency*, againſt which ſo much is ſaid in this *Diſſertation*. In ſhort, let us ſuppoſe that the moſt innocent Man,

† *Ib.*

Man, who was obnoxious to *Thoſe in Power*, might have reaſonable Grounds to fear an exorbitant Exerciſe of *this Power* againſt Him. But then let us make one ſingle Suppoſition on the *other Side*. Let us ſuppoſe that *this obnoxious Man* was really in earneſt; that He wrote from his Heart; and that He felt there the ſame Warmth for the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, which He expreſs'd in his Writings, and laboured to infuſe into the Breaſt of every other Man. I would ask you, *Sir*, do you think *ſuch a Man* would be aſhamed to avow, in the Face of his Country, the Contents of the *following Sheets*, or be afraid to ſuffer for them? Could any Eloquence, even *yours*, if you would employ it ſo unworthily, expect, by the Help of falſe Surmiſes, and invidious Comments, (the baſe Inventions of *little Railers*,) to make Him paſs for an *Enemy to the preſent Eſtabliſhment*, who had prov'd Himſelf a *Friend to that Conſtitution*, in Conſequence of which, and for the Sake of which alone, *this Eſtabliſhment* was made? Would his Endeavours to reconcile *Parties*, and to aboliſh *odious Diſtinctions*; would pleading for the Attainment of *all the Ends* propoſed by, and promiſed at the *Revolution*; for ſecuring the *Independency of the two Houſes of Parliament*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, as effectually againſt *Corruption*, as they are already ſecured againſt *Prerogative*; would This, I ſay, make Him paſs for the *greateſt of Criminals?* No, *Sir*, not in the Breaſts even of Thoſe, who gave Sentence againſt Him, if Men capable of giving ſuch a Sentence could be found. Among the reſt of Mankind his Innocency would be acknowledged; his Conſtancy would be applauded; his *Accuſers*, and his *grand Accuſer* in the firſt Place, would paſs alone for *criminal*. He might fall a Victim to *Power*; but

but *Truth*, and *Reaſon*, and the Cauſe of *Liberty* would fall with Him; and He, who is buried in their Ruins, is happier than He, who ſurvives them. Thus I am perſuaded the *Perſon* here intended would be found, upon Trial, to think. The Event therefore of *ſuch a Proſecution*, whatever it might be, could not turn to his Diſadvantage; and conſequently to threaten Him with it would be ridiculous, even at ſuch a Time as We have ſuppoſed, much more at the preſent. Void of all Ambition, except the Ambition of honeſt Fame, He might ſtand the Efforts of Violence in *ſuch a Cauſe*, not only with little Concern, but with much inward Complacency. Weary of the World, determined and preparing to retire totally from it, He would ſurely ſuſpend his Retreat to face the *Perſecution*; and whatever his *Perſecutors* might imagine, They would erect a Sort of *triumphal Arch* to the Man They hated. He would leave the World with more Honour than They would remain in it. By ſuffering in Defence of the *Conſtitution of his Country*, They, who had thought favourably of Him, would think that He crown'd the *Good*, and They, who had entertain'd Prejudices againſt Him, that He atoned for the *Ill*, which had been imputed to Him. Such different Judgments You know, *Sir*, will attend every Man's Character, who acts on our divided Stage; and He is happy, who can reconcile them ſo nearly. It never happens that there is a Man, of whom all *ſpeak well*; as it rarely, very rarely, happens that there is a Man, of whom all *ſpeak ill*, except Thoſe, who are hired to *ſpeak well*.

I find it hard to leave off, when I have the Honour of writing to *You*, *Sir*; but having now explain'd

plain'd the principal Reaſons, that induced Me to addreſs this Dedication to *You*, it is Time that I ſhould force my ſelf to a Concluſion, and ſhould conclude by recommending the *following Sheets* to your ſerious Peruſal. I recommend them to nothing elſe. I do not apprehend that they will want your Patronage any more than the *Perſon*, who wrote them. Let them ſtand, or fall in the publick Opinion, according to their Merit. But if You ſhould find any Thing in them, that deſerves your Notice, You will have an Obligation to *One*, from whom You leaſt expected any; to,

SIR,

Your moſt humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES.

THE

A

DISSERTATION

ON

PARTIES.

LETTER I.

SIR,

TO Corrupt and to Divide are the trite and wicked Expedients, by which *ſome Miniſters* in all Ages have affected to govern; but eſpecially ſuch as have been leaſt capable of exerting the true Arts of Government. There is however a Difference to be made between *theſe two Expedients*, to the Advantage of the *latter*, and by Conſequence between the Characters of *Thoſe*, who put them in Practice.

Every buſy, ambitious Child of Fortune, who hath Himſelf a *corrupt Heart*, and becomes Maſter of a *large Purſe*, hath all that is neceſſary to employ the Expedient of Corruption with Succeſs.

A *Bribe*, in the Hand of the moſt *blundering Coxcomb*, that ever diſgraced Honour, and Wealth and Power, will prevail as much as in the Hand of a *Man of Senſe*, and go farther too, if it weigh more. An *intriguing Chamber-Maid* may ſlip a Bank-Note into a griping Paw, as well as the moſt ſubtle Dæmon of Hell. *H——e* may govern as triumphantly by *this Expedient* as the *great Knight*, his Brother, and the *great Knight* as *Burleigh* Himſelf.

But every Character cannot attempt the other Expedient of *Dividing*, or *keeping up Diviſions*, with equal Succeſs. There is, indeed, no Occaſion for any extraordinary Genius to *divide*; and true Wiſdom deſpiſes the infamous Task. But there is need of that left-handed Wiſdom, called *Cunning*, and of thoſe Habits in Buſineſs, called *Experience*. He, that is *corrupted*, co-operates with Him, that *corrupts*. He runs into his arms at the firſt Beckon; or, in order ſometimes to raiſe the Price, He meets Him but half Way. On the other Hand, to *divide*, or to maintain and renew the *Diviſions of Parties* in a State, a Syſtem of *Seduction* and *Fraud* is neceſſary to be carried on. The *Divided* are ſo far from being acceſſory to the Guilt, that They would not be *divided*, if They were not firſt *deceived*.

From theſe Differences, which I have obſerved between the *two Expedients*, and the Characters and Means, proper to put them in Practice with Succeſs, it may be diſcovered perhaps why, upon former Occaſions, as I ſhall hereafter ſhew, the Expedient of *Dividing* proſpered ſo much better than That of *Corrupting*; and why, upon ſome later Occaſions, the Expedient of *Corrupting* ſucceeds ſo well in thoſe Hands, which are not, and, I truſt, will not be ſo lucky in maintaining, or renewing our *Party-Diviſions*.

Much

Much hath been written by you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, by your Correſpondents and others, who have drawn their Pens in the Cauſe of *Truth*, *Virtue* and *Liberty*, againſt the right reverend, as well as undignify'd, the noble, as well as ignoble Aſſertors of *Corruption*; enough ſurely to ſhame Thoſe, who have not loſt all Senſe of Shame, out of ſo ignominious a Crime; and to make Thoſe, who have not loſt every other Senſe, tremble at the Conſequences of it. We may flatter ourſelves that theſe honeſt Endeavours have had ſome Effect; and have Reaſon to hope that far greater will follow from thoſe illuſtrious Examples of Repulſes, which have been lately given to the *grand Corrupter*, notwithſtanding his frequent and inſolent Declarations that He could ſeduce whomſoever He had a Mind to gain. Theſe Hopes are farther confirmed to us by repeated Declarations of the Senſe of Parliament, and will be turn'd, we doubt not, into Certainty, whenever the Wiſdom of the two Houſes ſhall again think it proper to raiſe new Barriers of Law againſt *this encroaching Vice*.

In the mean Time, I think nothing can better anſwer the Deſign of *your Papers*, nor promote the publick Good more effectually in the preſent Conjuncture, than to put our Countrymen frequently on their Guard againſt the Artifice, which is clumſily, but induſtriouſly employed to maintain, and, if it be poſſible, to create *new Diviſions* amongſt Them. That Day, which our Fathers wiſh'd to ſee and did not ſee, is now breaking upon us. Shall We ſuffer this Light to be turn'd again into Party Darkneſs by the Incantations of *Thoſe*, who would not have paſſed for Conjurers, even in the Days of Superſtition and Ignorance? The Nation is not only brought into an Uniformity of Opinion concerning the *preſent Adminiſtration*, by the Length and the righteous Conduct of it; but We are grown

into an Unanimity about *Principles of Government*, which the moſt ſanguine could ſcarce have expected, without Extravagance. *Certain Aſſociations of Ideas* were made ſo familiar to us, about half a Century ago, and became in the Courſe of Time ſo habitual, that We ſhould not have been able, even a few Years ago, to break them, nor have been eaſily induced to believe, on the Faith of any Prediction, that *Experience* and the Evidence of *Facts* would, in a few Years more, break them for us, deſtroy all our Notions of *Party*, and ſubſtitute *new ones* in their Room.

The Power and Majeſty of the PEOPLE, *an* ORIGINAL CONTRACT, *the Authority and Independency of* PARLIAMENT, *Liberty*, *Reſiſtance*, *Excluſion*, *Abdication*, *Depoſition*; Theſe were Ideas aſſociated, at that Time, to the Idea of a WHIG, and ſuppoſed by every *Whig* to be incommunicable, and inconſiſtent with the Idea of a TORY.

Divine, *hereditary*, *indefiezable Right*, *lineal Succeſſion*, *Paſſive-Obedience*, *Prerogative*, *Non-Reſiſtance*, *Slavery*, nay and ſometimes *Popery* too, were aſſociated in many Minds to the Idea of a TORY, and deem'd incommunicable, and inconſiſtent, in the ſame Manner, with the Idea of a WHIG.

But now That, which *neither Side* would have believed, on the Faith of any Predicton, is come to paſs;

——*quod Divûm promittere nemo*
Auderet, volvenda Dies en! attulit ultro.

Theſe Aſſociations are broken; *theſe diſtinct Sets of Ideas* are ſhuffled out of their Order; *new Combinations* force Themſelves upon us; and it would actually be as abſurd to impute to the *Tories* the Principles, which were laid to their Charge formerly,

as

as it would be to aſcribe to the *Projector* and *his Faction* the Name of *Whigs*, whilſt They daily forfeit that Character by their Actions. The Bulk of *both Parties* are really united; united on Principles of Liberty, in Oppoſition to an obſcure Remnant of *one Party*, who diſown thoſe Principles, and a mercenary Detachment from the *other*, who betray them.

How *this Change for the better* comes to have been wrought in an Age, when moſt Things have *changed for the worſe*; and ſince it hath been wrought, why the *old Diſtinctions* are kept up in ſome Meaſure, will I think be accounted for in treating this Subject farther. At preſent, what ſhall We ſay to Thoſe, who publickly ſpeak of *this national Union* as impracticable and chimerical; yet privately act againſt it, with all their Might, as a practicable Thing, and a real Evil to Them? If it be as compleat and as well cemented, as I imagine it is, and as every honeſt *Briton* wiſhes it may be; nay, if there be nothing more than a ſtrong Tendency on all Sides towards it, which no Man of the leaſt Obſervation and Candour will deny; it is ſurely the Duty of every one, who deſires the Proſperity of his Country, to ſeize the Opportunity, to cultivate and improve it. If Men are to be *known by their Works*, the Works of Thoſe, who oppoſe *this Union*, denote Them ſufficiently. Wicked and unhappy Men! who ſeek their *private Safety*, in oppoſing *publick Good*. Weak and ſilly Men! who vainly imagine that *They* ſhall paſs for the *Nation*, and the *Nation* for a *Faction*; that THEY *ſhall be judged in the Right, and the* WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE *in the Wrong*——On whom would They impoſe?——How long do They imagine that ſo unequal a Conteſt can laſt?

There

There is no Complaint, which hath been more conſtantly in the Mouths, no Grief hath lain more heavily at the Hearts of all good Men, than Thoſe about our *national Diviſions*; about the Spirit of *Party*, which inſpires Animoſity and breeds Rancour; which hath ſo often deſtroy'd our inward Peace; weakened our national Strength, and ſullied our Glory abroad. It is Time therefore that All, who deſire to be eſteemed good Men, and to procure the Peace, the Strength and the Glory of their Country by the only Means by which They can be procured effectually, ſhould join their Efforts to heal our *national Diviſions*, and to change the narrow Spirit of *Party* into a diffuſive Spirit of *publick Benevolence*.

That we may be more encouraged to do ſo, it will be of Uſe perhaps to conſider, in ſome Particulars, what Advances are already made towards that *national Union*, without which no *national Good* can be expected in ſuch Circumſtances as ours.

Let us begin with the preſent Temper of the Members of the *Church of England* towards the *Diſſenters*. Thoſe Laws, by which the *latter* were debarred from ſerving God after their own Way, have not been theſe many Years a Terror to Them. Thoſe, which were deſigned to hinder the Propagation of their Principles, and Thoſe, which ſhut the Door of all publick Preferment, even to ſuch amongſt Them as *conformed occaſionally*, are repealed. Far from deſiring to impoſe any new Hardſhips upon Them, even *Thoſe*, who have been reputed their Enemies, and who have acted as ſuch on ſeveral Occaſions, acknowledge their Error. Experience hath removed Prejudice. They ſee that *Indulgence* hath done what *Severity* never could; and from the Frankneſs of *Theſe*, if I was a *Diſſenter*,

ter, I ſhould ſooner entertain Hopes of future Favour, than from the double Dealing of *Thoſe*, who lean on the *Diſſenters*, when They are *out of Power*, and who eſteem Them a Load upon Them, when They are *in it*. We are now in the true and only Road, which can poſſibly lead to a perfect Reconciliation among *Proteſtants*; to the Abolition of all their *Differences*; or to Terms of *Difference* ſo little eſſential, as to deſerve none of *Diſtinction*. Theſe happy Ends muſt be obtained by *mutual good Will*. They never can be obtained by *Force*. It is true, indeed, that *Force*, which is the Effect of a Majority and ſuperior Power, may ſupport a Rivalſhip and erect even *Counter-Eſtabliſhments*. But then, by the ſame Means, our ancient Diſputes will be revived; the Church will be thought really in Danger; and religious Feuds, which have been ſo long and ſo beneficially kept down, will once more diſturb the Peace of the State. It is a certain Truth, that our *religious* and *civil Conteſts* have mutually, and almoſt alternately, raiſed and fomented each other. *Churchmen* and *Diſſenters* have ſometimes differed, and ſometimes thought, or been made to think, that They differed, at leaſt, as much about *civil* as *religious Matters*. There can be therefore no Way ſo effectual to compoſe their Differences on the *latter*, as to improve the growing Union between Them on the *former*. *Idem ſentire de Republicâ, to think alike about political Affairs*, hath been eſteemed neceſſary to conſtitute and maintain *private Friendſhips*. It is obviouſly more eſſential in *publick Friendſhips*. Bodies of Men in the ſame Society can never unite, unleſs they unite on *this Principle*; and if They once unite on *this Principle*, They will unite on *all others*, or They will readily and chearfully make one another eaſy about them. — Let me ſpeak plainly. It becomes a Man to do ſo,

who

who means honeſtly.—In our political Diviſions of *Whig* and *Tory*, the *Diſſenters* have adhered to the *former*, and They want no Apology for doing ſo. They joined Themſelves to Thoſe, with whom They agreed, and ſtood in Oppoſition to Thoſe, with whom They differed in *Principles of Government*. There could be no Objection brought againſt Them, on this Account. They certainly did not follow *Power*. They did not act like a *Sect*, or a *Faction*, who had, and purſued an Intereſt diſtinct from the Intereſt of the whole. Their *Non-Conformity* hath nothing to do here. They concurred with *Conformiſts*; and if They had been *Conformiſts* Themſelves, as They were *Diſſenters*, They would have acted in the ſame Manner. But if *this Diviſion of Parties*, on the ſame Principles, ſubſiſts no longer; if there be in Truth neither a *Tory*, nor a *Whig*, as I have ſaid above, but a *Court* and a *Country Party* in Being; if the political Principles, which the *Diſſenters* have formerly avowed, are manifeſtly purſued on *one Side*; and Thoſe, which They have oppoſed, or others equivalent to them in their Effects, are purſued on the *other*; can the *Diſſenters* heſitate about the Option They are to make? I am perſuaded They cannot. I know that ſeveral amongſt Them do not. What might be, and certainly would be ſaid, if They made their Option to ſtand by the *M——r*, I will not ſo much as ſuggeſt. What muſt be the Conſequence of their ſtanding by the *Nation*, in Oppoſition to *Him*, (for between *theſe two Powers* the preſent Conteſt lies) it is eaſy to tell, and impoſſible to deny. They will prove, in this Caſe, to the whole World, that the *Spirit of Liberty* animates, and *Conſcience* alone determines their Conduct. They, who could never brook a *Regal*, will have the Merit of ſaving their Country from the Danger of a *Miniſterial Tyranny*; and

their

their Country will owe Them all the Acknowledgments, which are due from good and grateful Citizens of the ſame Commonwealth.

As to the other great and national Diviſion of *Whig* and *Tory*; He, who recollects what hath paſſed in *Parliament*, and obſerves what paſſes out of it, can differ very little in his Opinion from what hath been ſaid concerning it. The principal Articles of *your civil Faith*, publiſhed ſome time ago, (or, to ſpeak more properly, the *civil Faith of the old Whigs*) are aſſented and conſented to by the *Country Party*; and I ſay, upon good Authority, that if *this Creed* was made a Teſt of *political Orthodoxy*, there would appear at this Time but very few *Hereticks* amongſt us. How different the Caſe is, on the *other Side*, will appear not only from the Actions, but from the Principles of the *Court Party*, as we find Them avowed in their Writings; Principles more dangerous to *Liberty*, though not ſo directly, nor ſo openly levelled againſt it, than even any of Thoſe, bad as They were, which *ſome of theſe Men* value themſelves for having formerly oppoſed.

In ſhort, the *Revolution* is looked upon by all Sides as a *new Æra*; but the *Settlement* then made is looked upon by the whole *Country Party* as a *new magna Charta*, from whence *new Intereſts*, *new Principles of Government*, *new Meaſures of Submiſſion*, and *new Obligations* ariſe. From thence We muſt date both *King* and *People*. His Majeſty derives his Title from *Acts*, made in Conſequence of it. We likewiſe derive, not our Privileges (for they were always ours) but a more full and explicit Declaration, and a more ſolemn Eſtabliſhment of them from the ſame Period. On this Foundation all the *reaſonable*, *independent Whigs and Tories* unite. They could unite on This alone; for the

Whigs have always profeſſed the Principles, which paved the Way for the *Revolution*; and whatever the *Tories* may have profeſſed, They acted upon the ſame Principles, or They acted upon none, which would be too abſurd to aſſert, when They brought about that great Event, in Concert with the reſt of the Nation, as I ſhall ſome Time or other prove.

To this *magna Charta*, and *theſe Principles*, let us adhere inviolably, in Oppoſition to the *two Extremes* mentioned by Me at the Beginning of this Letter, viz. To *Thoſe*, who *diſown* them, and to *Thoſe*, who *betray* them.——Let neither the polemical Skill of *Leſly*, nor the antique Erudition of *Bedford*, perſuade us to put on again thoſe old Shackles of *falſe Law*, *falſe Reaſon*, and *falſe Goſpel*, which were forged before the *Revolution*, and broken to Pieces by it.—— As little let us ſuffer the arch Slyneſs of *G—on*, the dogmatical Dryneſs of *H——e*, or the ſoucing Proſtitution of *Sh—k* to ſlip new Shackles on us, which are inconſiſtent with the conſtituent Principles of our Eſtabliſhment.———Let us maintain and improve the *national Union*, ſo happily begun, and bleſs God for diſpoſing the Temper of the Nation almoſt univerſally to it.——*Such a Coalition* hath been long wanted in this Kingdom, and never more than at this important Criſis; for on This it will depend whether *They*, who not only oppoſe the Progreſs of that *growing Corruption*, which had well nigh overſpread the Land, but endeavour to extirpate it by the Roots, ſhall prevail; or *They*, who nouriſh and propagate it, who eat Themſelves, and tempt others to eat the baneful Fruit it bears.——On This it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who conſtantly inſiſt againſt the Continuance of a *ſtanding Army in Time of Peace*, agreeably to the Principles of our *Conſtitution*; or *They*, who plead for

for it, and endeavour to make it a neceſſary Part of *that Conſtitution*, though incompatible with *publick Liberty*.——On This it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who endeavour to conceal the *Frauds*, which are practiced, and to ſcreen the *Fraudulent*, at the Riſque of ruining *Credit*, and deſtroying *Trade*, as well as to monopolize in the Hands of a *Few* the whole Wealth of the *Nation*; or *They*, who do their utmoſt to bring the *former* to Light, and the *latter* to Puniſhment at a Time, when *glaring Fraud*, or very ſtrong Symptoms of *Fraud*, appear in ſo many Parts of publick Management, from ſome of the *greateſt Companies* down to the *Turnpike* at *Hyde-Park* Corner. —— On This it will depend whether *They* ſhall prevail, who deſire that *Great Britain* ſhould maintain ſuch a Dignity and prudent Reſerve in the Broils of *Europe*, as become her Situation, ſuit her Intereſt, and alone can enable Her to caſt the *Ballance*; or *They*, who are eager, on every Occaſion, to proſtitute her *Dignity*, to pawn her *Purſe*, and to ſacrifice her *Commerce*, by intangling Her not only too much with the *other great Powers of Europe*, from whom ſhe may ſometimes want reciprocal Engagements, but even with *thoſe diminative Powers*, from whom it would be ridiculous to expect any.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER II.

SIR,

WHILST I was writing my laſt Letter to you, it came into my Thoughts that nothing would illuſtrate the Subject better, nor enforce more

 ſtrongly

ſtrongly the Exhortation to an *Union of Parties*, in Support of that Conſtitution, on the Terms of which alone all Right to govern us, and all our Obligation to obey is now founded, than an Enquiry into the Riſe and Progreſs of our *late Parties*; or a ſhort Hiſtory of *Toriſm* and *Whiggiſm* from their Cradle to their Grave; with an introductory Account of their Genealogy and Deſcent.

Your Papers have been from the firſt conſecrated to the Information of the People of *Britain*; and I think They may boaſt very juſtly a Merit ſingular enough; That of never ſpeaking to the Paſſions, without appealing to the Reaſon of Mankind. It is fit they ſhould keep up this Character, in the ſtricteſt Manner, whilſt they are employed on the moſt important Subject, and publiſhed at the moſt important Criſis. I ſhall therefore execute my Deſign with Sincerity and Impartiality. I ſhall certainly not flatter, and I do not mean to offend. Reaſonable Men and Lovers of Truth, in whatever Party they have been engaged, will not be offended at Writings, which claim no Regard but on this Account, that they are founded in Reaſon and Truth, and ſpeak with Boldneſs what Reaſon and Truth conſpire to dictate. As for the *Drummers and Trumpeters of Faction*, who are hired to drown the Voice of Both in one perpetual Din of Clamour, and would endeavour to drown, in the ſame Manner, even the dying Groans of their Country, if ſhe was already brought into that extreme Condition; they ſhall not provoke me to break a moſt contemptuous Silence. The Subject is too ſolemn. They may prophane it, by writing on it. Far be it from me to become guilty of the ſame Crime, by anſwering them.

If the Enquiry I am going to make into the Riſe and Progreſs of our *late Parties* ſhould produce in any

any Degree the Good, which I intend, it will help to confirm and improve the *national Union*, ſo happily begun, by taking off ſome Remains of Shyneſs, Diſtruſt and Prejudice, which may ſtill hang about Men, who think alike, and who preſs on from different Quarters to the ſame common Point of View. It will help to unmask more effectually the wicked Conduct of Thoſe, who labour with all the Skill and, which is much more conſiderable, with all the Authority They poſſeſs, to keep up the *Diviſion of Parties*; that each of Theſe may continue to be, in its Turn, what all of them have been too often and too long, the Inſtruments and the Victims of private Ambition. It will do ſomething more. A few Reflections on the Riſe and Progreſs of our Diſtemper, and the Riſe and Progreſs of our Cure, will help us of Courſe to make a true Judgment on our preſent State, and will point out to us, better perhaps than any other Method, the ſpecifick Remedies ſtill neceſſary to preſerve our Conſtitution in Health and Vigour.——Having premiſed This, I come to the Point.

Queen *Elizabeth* deſigned, and the Nation called King *James* to the Throne, tho' the whole *Scotiſh Line* had been excluded by the Will of *Henry* the 8th, made indeed under the Authority of *an Act of Parliament*, and yet little regarded either by the *Parliament*, or the *People*. As ſoon as he was on the Throne, a flattering *Act of Recognition* paſſed; for though all Princes are flattered on their firſt Acceſſion, yet thoſe Princes are ſure to be flattered moſt, who deſerve Panegyrick leaſt. In *this Act* the *Parliament* acknowledged, *on the Knees of their Hearts*, (ſuch was the Cant of the Age) the *indubitable Right*, by which They declared that the Crown *deſcended to Him immediately*, on the Deceaſe of Q. *Elizabeth*. Of *this Act* and of the Uſe, which ſome Men,

Men, very weakly I think, endeavoured to make of it, I ſhall have Occaſion to ſpeak hereafter. I would only obſerve here that This is the Æra of *hereditary Right*, and of all thoſe exalted Notions, concerning the *Power* and *Prerogative of Kings*, and the *Sacredneſs of their Perſons*. All together They compoſed ſuch a Syſtem of Abſurdity as had never been heard of in this Country, till *that anointed Pedant* broached them. They have been ſpoken of pretty much at large in your Papers; particularly in ſome of Thoſe, publiſhed under the Name of *Oldcaſtle*. To them I refer.

To aſſert that the extravagant Principles of *Eccleſiaſtical* and *Civil Government*, which began to be propagated in *this Reign*, and were carried ſtill higher in the *next*, gave Occaſion to Thoſe of *another Kind*, or of *another Extreme*, which were taught with Succeſs, and gained by Degrees great Vogue in the Nation, would be too much. Opinions very different from Thoſe, which received the Sanction of a *legal Eſtabliſhment in Church and State*, had crept about obſcurely, if not ſilently, even whilſt the Government of *Elizabeth* laſted. But This I ſay; that the Principles, by which King *James* and King *Charles* the 1ſt governed, and the Exceſſes of *Hierarchical* and *Monarchical Power*, exerciſed in Conſequence of them, gave great Advantage to the *oppoſite Opinions*, and intirely occaſioned the Miſeries, which followed. Phrenzy provoked Phrenzy, and two Species of Madneſs infected the whole Maſs of the People. It hath coſt us a Century to loſe our Wits, and to recover them again.

If our Grievances under King *Charles* the 1ſt had been redreſſed by a ſober, regular, Parliamentary Reformation of the State; or if, the civil War happening, a new Government had been eſtabliſhed on Principles of the Conſtitution, not of Faction, of Liberty

Liberty, not of Licentiouſneſs, as there was on the Abdication of King *James* the 2d; We may conclude, both from Reaſon and Experience, that the abſurd and ſlaviſh Doctrines I have mentioned would have been exploded early. They would have been buried in the recent Grave of *Him*, who firſt deviſed them; and the Memory of *Him* and of *Them* would have ſtunk together in the Noſtrils of Mankind. But the Contrary fell out. The State was ſubverted, inſtead of being reformed; and all the Fury of Faction and Enthuſiaſm was employed to deſtroy the Conſtitution to the very Foundations. A natural Conſequence followed. If the Principles of King *James*'s and King *Charles*'s Reigns had been diſgraced by better, They would not have riſen again; but They were only kept down for a Time by worſe; and therefore They roſe again at the *Reſtoration*, and revived with the Monarchy. Thus that epidemical Taint, with which King *James* infected the Minds of Men, continued upon us; and it is ſcarce hyperbolical to ſay, that *this Prince* hath been the original Cauſe of a Series of Misfortunes to this Nation, as deplorable as a laſting Infection of our Air, of our Water, or our Earth, would have been. The Spirit of his Reign was maintained in That of his *Son*, (for how could it well be otherwiſe, when the *ſame Miniſters* were continued in Power?) and the Events of both produced the civil War. The civil War ended in the Death of the King, and the Exile of his Family. The Exile of theſe Princes reconciled Them to the Religion of *Rome*, and to the Politicks of *foreign Nations*, in ſuch Degrees as their different Characters admitted. *Charles* ſipped a little of the poiſonous Draught, but enough however to infect his whole Conduct. As for *James*,

——— *Ille impiger hauſit*
Spumantem Pateram.

He

He drank the Chalice off to the loweſt and fouleſt Dregs.

That *Principles* as abſurd as theſe in their Nature, and as terrible in their Conſequences, ſuch as would ſhock the common Senſe of a *Samojede*, or an *Hottentot*, and had juſt before deluged the Nation in Blood, ſhould come into Vogue again at the *Reſtoration*, will not appear ſtrange to thoſe, who carry themſelves back as it were to that Point of Time. The Wounds of the *civil War* were bleeding, and the Reſentments of the *Cavaliers*, who came into Power at Court and in Parliament, were at their Height. No Wonder then if few Men had, in ſuch a Ferment as This, Penetration enough to diſcern, or Candour enough to acknowledge, or Courage enough to maintain, that the *Principles* We ſpeak of were truly and primarily the Cauſe of all their Misfortunes. The Events, which proved them ſo, were recent; but for that very Reaſon, becauſe they were recent, it was natural for Men in ſuch a Circumſtance as This, to make wrong Judgments about them. It was natural for the *Royal Party* to aſcribe all their and their Country's Misfortunes, without any due Diſtinction, to the *Principles*, on which King *Charles* and even King *James* had been oppoſed; and to grow more zealous for *Thoſe*, on which the Governments of *theſe two Princes* had been defended, and for which they had ſuffered. Add to This the national Tranſport, on ſo great a Revolution; the Exceſs of Joy, which many felt, and many feigned; the Adulation employed by many to acquire new Merit, and by many to atone for paſt Demerit; and you will find Reaſon to be ſurpriſed, not that the *ſame Principles of Government*, as had threatened our *Liberties* once, and muſt by neceſſary Conſequence do ſo again, were eſtabliſhed; but

but that our *Liberties* were not immediately, and at once given up. That they were ſaved, We owe, not to *Parliament*, no not to the *Convention Parliament*, who brought the King home; but to thoſe great and good Men, *Clarendon* and *Southampton*. Far from taking Advantage of the Heat and Fervour of the Times, to manage Parliaments into *ſcandalous Jobs*, and *fatal Compliances with the Crown*, to their immortal Honour, (with Gratitude and Reverence to their Memories be it ſpoken) They broke the *Army*, ſtinted the *Revenue*, and threw their Maſter on the *Affections of his People.*— But I return.

Beſides theſe Reaſons, drawn from the Paſſions of Men, others of a more ſober Kind may be given, to account for the making a Settlement at the *Reſtoration* upon Principles too near a-kin to Thoſe, which had prevailed before the War, and which had in Truth cauſed it. Certain it is, that although the *Non-Conformiſts* were ſtunned by the Blow They had juſt received, and though their Violence was reſtrained by the Force of the preſent Conjuncture; yet They ſtill exiſted. Symptoms of This appeared, even whilſt the Government was ſettling, and continued to appear long after it was ſettled. Now, every Symptom of this Kind renewed the *Dread* of relapſing into thoſe Miſeries, from which the Nation had ſo lately recovered itſelf; and *this Dread* had the natural Effect of all extreme Fears. It hurried Men into every Principle, as well as Meaſure, which ſeemed the moſt oppoſite to thoſe of the *Perſons fear'd*, and the moſt likely, though at any other Riſque, to defeat their Deſigns, and to obviate the preſent Danger, real or imaginary. May We not fairly conjecture, for it is but Conjecture, ſomething more? In ſuch a Temper of Mind, and ſuch a Situation of Circumſtances,

might not even Thoſe, who ſaw how groundleſs and dangerous ſuch extravagant Notions about the *Right*, *Power* and *Prerogative of Kings* were, imagine however that it was a Part of Prudence to give Way to them, and to countenance them, in the preſent Conjuncture; to ſuffer the Opinions of the Nation to be bent too far on *one Side*, as They had been bent too far on the other; not that they might remain crooked, but that they might become ſtrait?.

The ſame Spirit and much the ſame Reaſons as determined our Settlement, at the *Reſtoration*, upon ſuch high Principles of *Monarchy*, prevail'd relatively to our *religious Differences*, and the Settlement of the *Church*. I ſhall ſpeak of it with that Freedom, which a Man may take, who is conſcious that He means nothing but the publick Good, hath no Bye-Ends, nor is under the Influence of ſerving any particular Cauſe.

I ſay then very frankly that the *Church* and the *King* having been joined in all the late Conteſts both by Thoſe, who attacked them, and Thoſe, who defended them, *Eccleſiaſtical Intereſts*, *Reſentments*, and *Animoſities* came in to the Aid of *Sæcular*, in making the *new Settlement*. Great Lenity was ſhewn, at the Reſtoration, in *looking backwards*; unexampled and unimitated Mercy to particular Men, which deſerved no doubt much Applauſe. This Conduct would have gone far towards reſtoring the Nation to its *primitive Temper* and *Integrity*, to its *old good Manners*, its *old good Humour*, and its *old good Nature*, (Expreſſions of my Lord Chancellor *Clarendon*, which I could never read without being moved and ſoften'd) if great Severity had not been exerciſed, immediately after, in *looking forwards*, and great Rigour uſed to large Bodies of Men, which certainly deſerves Cenſure, as neither juſt, nor politick.—— I ſay, not *juſt*; becauſe

becauſe there is, after all, a real and a wide Difference between *Moral* and *Party Juſtice*. The *one* is founded in Reaſon; the *other* takes its Colour from the Paſſions of Men, and is but another Name for *Injuſtice*. *Moral Juſtice* carries Puniſhment as far as Reparation, and neceſſary Terror require; no farther. *Party Juſtice* carries it to the full Extent of our Power, and even to the gorging and ſating of our Revenge; from whence it follows that *Injuſtice* and *Violence*, once begun, muſt become perpetual in the ſucceſſive Revolutions of *Parties*, as long as *theſe Parties* exiſt.——I ſay, not *politick*; becauſe it contradicted the other Meaſures, taken for quieting the Minds of Men. It alarmed all the *Sects* anew; confirm'd the Implacability, and whetted the Rancour of *Some*; diſappointed and damped a Spirit of Reconciliation in *Others*; united Them in a common Hatred to the *Church*; and rouzed in the *Church* a Spirit of Intolerance and Perſecution. This Meaſure was the more imprudent, becauſe the Opportunity ſeemed fair to take Advantage of the Reſentments of the *Presbyterians* againſt the *other Sectaries*, and to draw *Them*, without perſecuting the *Others*, by the Cords of Love into the Pale of the Church, inſtead of driving them back by ſevere Uſage into their antient Confederacies. But when Reſentments of the *Sort* We now mention were let looſe, to aggravate Thoſe of the *other Sort*, there was no Room to be ſurprized at the Violences, which followed; and They, who had acted greater, could not complain of Theſe, great as They were, with any very good Grace.

If we may believe * *One*, who certainly was not partial againſt *theſe Sects*, *both* Presbyterians

* *Dr.* Burnet, *afterwards Biſhop of* Salisbury, *in one of his Tracts.*

and Independents *had carried the Principles of Rigour, in the Point of Conſcience, much higher, and acted more implacably upon it, than ever the* Church of England *hath done, in its angrieſt Fits.* The ſecuring Themſelves therefore againſt *Thoſe*, who had ruined Them and the Conſtitution once already, was a plauſible Reaſon for the *Church-Party* to give, and I doubt not the true and ſole Motive of many for exerciſing, and perſiſting in the Exerciſe of great Severity. General, prudential Arguments might, and there is Reaſon to believe They did, weigh with particular Men; but They could have little Force, at ſuch a Time, on Numbers. As little could ſome other Conſiderations have then, whatever they have now. The Promiſes at *Breda*, for Inſtance, and the Terms of the *Declaration* ſent from thence, could not be urged with Force to a *Parliament*, who had no Mind, and was ſtrictly under no Obligation, to make good ſuch Promiſes as the *King* had made, beyond his Power of promiſing, if taken abſolutely; or from which, if taken conditionally, He was diſcharged, on the Refuſal of *Parliament* to confirm them. ——Thus again, the Merit pleaded by the *Preſbyterians*, on Account of the Share They had in the *Reſtoration*, which was very real and very conſiderable, could avail however but little. That they went along with the national Torrent, in reſtoring the Conſtitution of Church and State, could not be denied. But then it was remember'd too that theſe Fruits of Repentance came late; not till they had been oppreſſed by *another Sect*, who turned upon Them, wreſted the Power out of their Hands, and made them feel, what they had made others feel, the Tyranny of a *Party*.

Such Reaſons and Motives, as I have mentioned, prevailed; and worſe than theſe would have been ſufficient, when the Paſſions of Men ran

ran ſo high, to lay the *Diſſenters*, without any Diſtinction, under extreme Hardſhips. They ſeemed to be the principal Object of the Fears and Jealouſies of *Parliament*. Addreſſes were continually made, and the Edge of the Law continually whetted againſt Them, from 1660 to 1669, when the Law *for ſuppreſſing Conventicles*, and the *laſt of theſe penal Statutes* paſſed, as I remember. Experience will juſtify me for ſaying that this long and extreme Rigour was unwiſe, as well as unjuſt. It appears, indeed, from the Memorials of thoſe Times, that They, who ſuffered, had given abundant Provocation, though not ſufficient Excuſe, to the Rigour, under which They ſuffered. Some former Hardſhips, which the *Diſſenters* had endured from the *Church*, made Them more violent againſt it, when they got Poſſeſſion of an uſurped Power. Juſt ſo the Violence, which *They* exerciſed at that Time, ſtimulated the Severity they felt in their Turn, when the legal Conſtitution of the *Church* was reſtored. Notwithſtanding all which, I incline, upon very good Reaſons, to think that this Severity was not in the firſt Deſign of the *Miniſters*, nor would have been ſhewn, if *another fatal Influence* had not prevailed. The Influence I mean is that of *Popery*. It prevailed from the firſt Moments to the laſt of the Reign of King *Charles* the 2d. The *beſt Miniſters* were frequently driven off their Byaſs by it. The *worſt* had a ſure Hold on their *Maſter*, by complying with it. On the Occaſion now mentioned, *this Influence* and the Artifice of the *Popiſh Faction* work'd very fatally on the Paſſions of *Parties*, and the private Intereſts of *Individuals*; and the *Miniſters*, and the *Church*, and the *Diſſenters*, were Bubbles alike of their *common Enemy*. *Bareface'd Popery* could ask no Favour, becauſe *Popery* could expect none. *Proteſtant Diſſenters* were therefore to ſerve as ſtalking

ing Horſes, that *Papiſts* might creep behind Them, and have Hopes of being, ſome Time or other, admitted with them. The *Church Party* was halloo'd on the *Diſſenters*; whilſt the *Diſſenters* were encouraged to unite and hold out; whilſt They were flattered with an high Opinion of their own Strength, and the King's Favour; and whilſt ſome *leading Men* amongſt them, who thought it better to be at the Head of a *Sect*, than at the Tail of an *Eſtabliſhment*, were perhaps encouraged, and confirmed in that Thought, by the private Applications of the *Court*.

Theſe Arts, theſe wicked Arts (for ſuch they were) prevailed; and though the 2000 *Miniſters*, who went out of their Churches on one Day, were far from being all of the ſame Mind, or having one poſitive, conſiſtent Scheme; though many of Them muſt have loſt their Benefices, even if they had comply'd with the *Act of Uniformity*, becauſe They were *Intruders*, and in actual Poſſeſſion of Benefices legally belonging to *others*; yet, by uniting in the Point of *Non-Conformity*, they appeared as *one Body*, and in ſome Senſe they were ſo. Several of them were popular for certain Modes of Devotion, ſuited to the Humour of the Time; and ſeveral were Men eminent for true Learning and unaffected Piety. They increaſed the Zeal of their Flocks, and created Compaſſion in others. Here the *Court* began to reap the Fruits of their Management, in the Struggle for a *Toletation*. I uſe the Word, though I know it may be ſimply cavill'd at. The firſt Step made was an Application to the *King*, who declared Himſelf ready and willing to *diſpenſe*, in their Favour, with ſeveral Things in the *Act of Uniformity*; and thus the *Diſſenters* were made, by the Severity of the *Parliament* and the Intrigues of the *Court*, the Inſtruments

ments of introducing a *diſpenſing Power*. Such Attempts were made more than once; but happily fail'd, as often as made, through the vigorous Oppoſition of *Parliament*; till at laſt the Scene began to open more, and the *Diſſenters* to ſee that They were made the Tools of promoting, what They never intended, the Advancement of the *Prerogative* above *Law*, and the Toleration of *Popery* againſt it.

To conclude. By ſuch Means, as I have deſcribed, the Conſtitution of *Parties* after the *Reſtoration* preſerved unhappily too near a Reſemblance to the Conſtitution of *Parties*, before the *War*. The *Prerogative* was not, indeed, carried ſo high, in ſome Inſtances, as *James* and *Charles* the 1ſt had attempted to carry it. Nay, ſome Supports of it were bought off, and taken away; and others more dangerous, as We have obſerved, were prevented by the Virtue of the *Men at that Time in Power*. But ſtill the Government was eſtabliſhed on *Principles*, ſufficient to invite a King to exerciſe *arbitrary Power*, and ſupport Him by their Conſequences in the Exerciſe of it afterwards; ſo that, in this Reſpect, the Seeds of *future Diviſions* were ſowed abundantly. The *Diſſenters* had, indeed, loſt much of their Credit and all their Power. But ſtill They had Numbers, and Property, and Induſtry, and Compaſſion for them; ſo that here was another Crop of *Diſſentions* planted to nurſe up, and to ſtrengthen the other. They did not inflame the Conteſt, which followed, into a civil War, as they had help'd to do formerly; but I think that, without Them, and the Diſunion and Hatred amongſt *Proteſtants*, conſequent upon them, the Zeal againſt *Popery* could not have run into a Kind of *factious Fury*, as We ſhall be obliged to confeſs it did. I think that Fears of falling once

more

more under *Presbyterian*, or *Republican Power*, could not have been wrought up in the Manner they were, towards the End of this Reign, ſo as to drown even the Fear of *Popery* itſelf; ſo as to form a Party, in Favour of a *Popiſh Succeſſor*; ſo as to tranſport both Clergy and Laity into an Avowal of *Principles*, which muſt have reduced us to be at this Time *Slaves*, not *Freemen*, *Papiſts*, not *Proteſtants*, if the very Men, who had avowed *ſuch Principles*, had not ſaved Themſelves and us, in direct Oppoſition to them. —— But I am running into the Subject of another Letter, when This is grown too prolix already.

I am, SIR, Yours, &c.

LETTER III.

SIR,

THE Sum of what hath been ſaid, concerning the *Settlement of Church and State*, and the *Diviſion of Parties*, at the *Reſtoration*, amounts to This; that as the Attempts of King *James* and King *Charles* the 1ſt, againſt the Spirit of the Conſtitution, threw the Nation into a civil War, and all the miſerable Conſequences, both neceſſary and contingent, of that Calamity; ſo the Fury, Enthuſiaſm and Madneſs of *thoſe Factions*, which aroſe during that unnatural Ferment, frightened the Nation back, if not into all, yet more generally perhaps than before, into moſt of the *Notions*, that were eſtabliſhed to juſtify the Exceſſes of former Reigns. *Hereditary, indefeazable Right*,

Right, *Paſſive Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance* (thoſe Corner-ſtones, which are an improper Foundation for any Superſtructure but That of Tyranny,) were made, even by *Parliament*, the Foundation of the *Monarchy*; and all Thoſe, who declined an exact and ſtrict Conformity to the whole Eſtabliſhment of the *Church*, even to the moſt minute Parts of it, were deprived of the Protection, nay expoſed to the Proſecution of the *State*. Thus *one Part of the Nation* ſtood proſcribed by the *other*; the *leaſt*, indeed, by the *greateſt*; whereas a little before the *greateſt* ſtood proſcribed by the *leaſt*. *Roundhead* and *Cavalier* were, in Effect, no more. *Whig* and *Tory* were not yet in Being. The only two apparent Parties were thoſe of *Churchmen* and *Diſſenters*; and *religious Differences* alone, at this Time, maintained the Diſtinction.

Such was the State of *Party*, upon the Meeting of the *firſt Parliament* called by King *Charles* the 2d, and for ſome Years afterwards, as nearly as I have been able to obſerve by what I have read in Hiſtory, and received from Tradition.—How the *Notions* then in Vogue began to change, and *this Spirit* to decline, ſome Time after the *Reſtoration*; how the Zeal of *Churchmen* and *Diſſenters* againſt one another began to ſoften, and a *Court* and *Country Party* to form Themſelves; how *Faction* mingled itſelf again in the Conteſt, and renewed the former Reſentments and Jealouſies; how *Whig* and *Tory* aroſe, the furious Offſpring of thoſe inauſpicious Parents *Roundhead* and *Cavalier*; how the Proceedings of *one Party* might have thrown us back into a *civil War*, *Confuſion* and *Anarchy*; how the Succeſs of the *other* had like to have entailed *Tyranny* on the State, and *Popery* in the Church; how the *Revolution* did, and could alone, deliever us from the *Grievances*

We felt, and from the *Dangers* We feared; how *this great Event* was brought about by a formal Departure of *each Side* from the Principles objected to them by the *other*; how *this Renewal of our Conſtitution*, on the Principles of *Liberty*, by the moſt ſolemn, deliberate, national Act, that ever was made, did not only bind at leaſt every one of Thoſe, who concurred in any Degree to bring it about; (and that Deſcription includes almoſt the whole Nation) but how abſurd it is for any Man, who was born ſince *that Æra*, or who, being born before it, hath been bound by no particular, legal Tye to any *other Settlement*, to be willing to give up the Advantages of the *preſent Conſtitution*, any more than He would give up the Privileges of the *great Charter*, which was made and ratified ſo many Ages ago; all theſe Points are to be now touched in that ſummary Manner, which I have preſcribed to myſelf, and which will be ſufficient, in ſo plain a Caſe, where Men are to be reminded of what they know already, rather than to be informed, and to be confirmed, not to be convinced.

I proceed therefore to obſerve that the Nation began to be indiſpoſed to the *Court*, ſoon after the *Reſtoration*. The Sale of *Dunkirk* helped to ruin a *great* and *good Miniſter*, though it be ſtill doubtful at leaſt, notwithſtanding the Clamour raiſed, and the Negotiations with *d'Eſtrades* ſo much inſiſted upon, whether He was ſtrictly anſwerable for this Meaſure. —— Who knows how ſoon the Re-eſtabliſhment of the *ſame Port and Harbour* may be laid in Form to the Charge of *thoſe two Men*, who are ſtrictly and undeniably anſwerable for it, and who ſtagger already under the Weight of ſo many other juſt Imputations?

The *firſt Dutch War*, which was lightly and raſhly

raſhly undertaken, and which ended ignominiouſly for the Nation, augmented the publick Indiſpoſition. Nay Misfortunes, ſuch as the *Plague*, and the *Burning of London*, as well as *Miſmanagement*, had this Effect. But We muſt place at the Head of all a *Jealouſy of Popery*, which was well founded, and therefore gathered Strength daily. This ſoon heated the Minds of Men to ſuch a Degree, that it ſeems almoſt wonderful the *Plague* was not imputed to the *Papiſts*, as peremptorily as the *Fire*.

The Death of my Lord *Southampton*, and the Diſgrace and Baniſhment of my Lord *Clarendon*, made Room for new Cauſes of Jealouſy and Diſſatisfaction; and the Effects increaſed in proportion. *Theſe two noble Lords* had ſtood in the Breach againſt *Popery* and *foreign Politicks*; and what *one* of them ſaid of the *other*, That is *Southampton* of *Clarendon*, may be apply'd with Juſtice to *Both*. *They were* true Proteſtants, *and* honeſt Engliſhmen. *Whilſt They were in Place, our Laws, our Religion, and our Liberties were in Safety. When they were removed*, England *felt the ill Effects of the Change*; for when they were removed, all Theſe were in Danger. How glorious a Panegyrick is This, in which the unanimous Voice of Poſterity does and muſt agree? It is preferable ſurely to all the Titles and Honours and Eſtates, which thoſe *illuſtrious Patriots* left behind Them; and ſo I perſuade myſelf it is eſteemed by the *young Noblemen*, who are Heirs to their Virtues, as well as their Fortunes.

King *Charles*, and more than Him the *Duke* and the *Popiſh Faction* were now at Liberty to form new Schemes; or rather to purſue old ones, with leſs Reſerve, againſt the Religion and Liberty of *England*. As ſoon as the famous *Cabal* had

had the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, theſe Deſigns were puſhed almoſt without any Reſerve at all. —— I am not writing the Hiſtory of this Reign; nor have I undertaken any thing more than to make a few Obſervations on the ſeveral Turns of *Parties* in it. I need not therefore deſcend into particular Proofs of the Deſigns, which I attribute to the *Court*; nor into a Deduction of the Meaſures taken to promote them, and the Efforts made to defeat them. That theſe Deſigns were real, can be doubted of by no Man; ſince without quoting many printed Accounts, which are in the Hands of every one, or inſiſting on other Proofs, which have not ſeen the Light, (and ſuch there are) the Abbot *Primi*'s Relation of the ſecret Negotiations between the *King* and his *Siſter*, the Dutcheſs of *Orleans*, publiſhed in 1682, as I think, and immediately ſuppreſſed, as well as the Hiſtory of the Jeſuit *d'Orleans*, written on Memorials furniſhed to Him by King *James* the 2d, put the whole Matter out of Diſpute, and even beyond the Reach of Cavil. It is ſufficient for my Purpoſe to obſerve that the Tide of *Party*, which had run ſo ſtrongly for the *Court*, and had been ſeldom ſo much as ſlackened hitherto, began now to turn, and to run Year after Year more ſtrongly the *other Way*.

When *this Parliament* ſate down, (for it deſerves our particular Obſervation that *both Houſes* were full of Zeal for the *preſent Government*, and of Reſentment againſt the *late Uſurpations*) there was but *one Party* in *Parliament*; and *no other Party* could raiſe its Head in the Nation. This might have been the Caſe much longer, probably as long as King *Charles* had ſate on the Throne, if the *Court* had been a little honeſter, or a little wiſer. No *Parliament* ever did more to gain

their

their *Prince* than This. They ſeemed, for ſeveral Years, to have nothing ſo much at Heart as ſecuring his *Government*, advancing his *Prerogative*, and filling his *Coffers*. The *Grants* They made Him were ſuch as paſſed for Inſtances of Profuſion in thoſe Days; when 1,200,000 l. *a Year for the* CIVIL LIST, *the* FLEET, *the* GUARDS *and* GARRISONS, *and all the ordinary Expences of the Government*, was thought an exorbitant Sum; how little a Figure ſoever it would make in our Times, when *two Thirds of that Sum*, at leaſt, are appropriated to the Uſe of the *Civil Liſt ſingly*. But all This was to no Purpoſe; a *foreign Intereſt* prevailed; a *Cabal* governed; and ſometimes the *Cabal*, and ſometimes a *Prime-Miniſter* had more Credit with the *King*, than the *whole Body of his People*. When the *Parliament* ſaw that They could not gain Him over to his own, and to their common Intereſt; nor prevail on Him, by Connivance, Compliance, and other gentle Methods; They turned Themſelves to ſuch as were rough, but agreeable to Law and the Cuſtom of *Parliament*, as well as proportionable to the Greatneſs of the Exigency. That they loſt their Temper, on ſome particular Occaſions, muſt not be denied. They were Men, and therefore frail; but their Frailties, of this Kind, proceeded from their Love of their Country. They were tranſported, when they found that their *Religion* and *Liberty* were conſtantly in Danger from the Intrigues of a *Popiſh Faction*; and They would have been ſo tranſported, no Doubt, if *Liberty* alone had been attacked by a *Proteſtant Faction*. Then it was, that this *High-Church Parliament* grew favourable to *Proteſtant Diſſenters*, and ready to make that juſt Diſtinction, ſo long delayed, between *Them* and *Popiſh Recuſants*, that the *whole Proteſtant Intereſt*

tereſt might unite in the Common Cauſe. Then it was, that the *Prerogative Parliament* defied *Prerogative*, in Defence of their *own Privileges*, and of the *Liberties of their Country*. Then it was, that this *Paſſive-Obedience, and Non-Reſiſtance Parliament* went the utmoſt Lengths of *Reſiſtance*, in a *Parliamentary Way*; and the neceſſary Conſequence of the Steps They made, *in this Way*, muſt have been *Reſiſtance in another*, if the King had not dropt his *Miniſters*, retracted his *Pretenſions*, redreſſed *ſome* and given Expectation of redreſſing *other Grievances*. In fine, this *Penſioner-Parliament*, as is hath been ſtyled, with *ſome Corruption* in the Houſe, and an *Army* ſometimes at the Door of it, disbanded the *Army* in *England*, and proteſted againſt the *Militia*, ſettled in *Scotland* by Act of Parliament, and appointed to march *for any Service, wherein the King's Honour, Authority and Greatneſs were concerned, in Obedience to the Orders of the Privy Council*. That I may not multiply particular Inſtances, They not only did their utmoſt to ſecure their Country againſt immediate Danger, but projected to ſecure it againſt remote Danger, by an Excluſion of the Duke of *York* from the Crown, after They had endeavoured ſtrenuouſly, but in vain, to prevent his entailing *Popery* more eaſily upon us by his Miſcarriage with a *Popiſh Princeſs*; for He had declared himſelf a *Papiſt* with as much Affectation, as if He expected to grow popular by it; had already begun to approve his Zeal, and exerciſe his Talent in Converſions, by That of his *firſt Wife*; and was notoriouſly the Agent of *Rome* and *France*, in order to ſeduce his *Brother* into ſtronger Meaſures than King *Charles* was willing to take. King *Charles*, to uſe an Expreſſion of the Lord *Halliſax* of that Age, would *trot*; but his *Brother* would *gallop*.

When

When I reflect on the Particulars here mentioned, and a great many others, which might be mentioned to the Honour of *this Parliament*, I cannot hear it called the *Penſioner-Parliament*, as it were by Way of Eminence, without a Degree of honeſt Indignation; eſpecially in the *Age*, in which We live; and by ſome of *Thoſe*, who affect the moſt to beſtow upon it this ignominious Appellation. *Penſions* indeed, to the Amount of *ſeven or eight thouſand Pounds*, as I remember, were diſcovered to have been given to ſome Members of the *Houſe of Commons*. But then let it be remembred likewiſe, that this Expedient of *corrupting Parliaments* began under the Adminiſtration of that boiſterous, over-bearing, dangerous Miniſter, CLIFFORD. As long as there remained any Pretence to ſay that the *Court* was in the Intereſt of the People, the Expedient of *Bribery* was neither wanted, nor practiſed. When the *Court* was evidently in *another Intereſt*, the Neceſſity and the Practice of *Bribing the Repreſentatives of the People* commenced. Should a *Parliament of Britain* act in Complyance with a *Court*, againſt the Senſe and Intereſt of the *Nation*, Mankind would be ready to pronounce very juſtly that *ſuch a Parliament* was under the *corrupt Influence of the Court*. But, in the Caſe now before us, We have a very comfortable Example of a *Court* wicked enough to ſtand in Need of *Corruption*, and to employ it; and of a *Parliament* virtuous enough to reſiſt the Force of *this Expedient*; which *Philip* of *Macedon* boaſted that He employed to invade the *Liberties of other Countries*; and which had been ſo often employed by Men of leſs Genius, as well as Rank, to invade the Liberties of *their own*. All, that *Corruption* could do in *this Parliament*, was to maintain the Appearance of a *Court Party*, whilſt

whilſt the Meaſures of the *Court* united a *Country Party*, in Oppoſition to them. Neither *Places*, nor *Penſions* could hinder *Courtiers* in this Parliament from voting, on many ſignal Occaſions, againſt the *Court*; nor protect either *Thoſe*, who drew the *King* into ill Meaſures, nor *Thoſe*, who complyed with Him in them. Nay, this *Penſioner-Parliament*, if it muſt be ſtill called ſo, gave one Proof of *Independency*, beſides That of contriving a *Teſt*, in 1675, *to purge their Members on Oath from all Suſpicion of corrupt Influence*, which ought to wipe off this Stain from the moſt corrupt. They drove *one of their Paymaſters* out of Court, and impeached the *other*, in the Fullneſs of his Power; even at a Time, when the *King* was ſo weak as to make, or ſo unhappy as to be forced to make, on Account of *Penſions* privately negotiated from *France*, the Cauſe of the *Crown* and the Cauſe of the *Miniſter* one, and to blend their Intereſts together.

What I have ſaid to the Honour of the *long Parliament* is juſt; becauſe in Fact the Proceedings of *that Parliament* were agreeable to the Repreſentation I have given of them. But now, if ſome ſevere Cenſor ſhould appear, and inſiſt that the Dame was *chaſte*, only becauſe ſhe was not *enough tempted*; that *more Penſions* would have made *more Penſioners*; that *much Money* and *little Prerogative* is more dangerous to *Liberty* than *much Prerogative* and *little Money*; and that the *worſt and weakeſt Miniſter* King *Charles* ever had might have been abſolute in *this very Parliament*, whoſe Character I defend, if *ſuch a Miniſter* had been able to inliſt, with Places, Penſions and occaſional Bribes, not a *ſlender Majority*, which the Defection of a Few might at any Time defeat, but ſuch a *bulky Majority*, as might impoſe on itſelf;

itſelf; if any one, I ſay, ſhould reaſon in this Manner, and continue to inſiſt that *ſuch a Miniſter*, with *ſuch a Purſe*, would have ſtood his Ground, in the *Parliament* I ſpeak of, with how much Contempt and Indignation ſoever He might have been every where treated by the *People*; I ſhall not preſume to aſſert the contrary. It might have been ſo. Our Safety was owing as much, perhaps, to the *Poverty of the Court*, as to the *Virtue of the Parliament*. We might have loſt our *Liberties*. But then I would obſerve, before I conclude, that if This be true, the Preſervation of our *Religion* and *Liberty*, at that Time, was owing to theſe two Circumſtances; *firſt*, that King *Charles* was not parſimonious; but ſquandered on his *Pleaſures*, what He might have employed to *corrupt this Parliament*; *ſecondly*, that the *Miniſters*, in that Reign, fingering no Money but the *Revenue*, *ordinary and extraordinary*, had no Opportunity to filch in the Pockets of every private Man, and to bribe the Bubbles very often with their own Money; as might be done now, when *Funding* hath been ſo long in Faſhion, and the *greateſt Miniſter* hath the Means of being the *greateſt Stockjobber*, did not the eminent Integrity of the *Miniſter*, and the approved Virtue of the *Age*, ſecure us from any ſuch Danger.

We have now brought the Deduction of *Parties* very near to the Æra of WHIG and TORY; into which the *Court* found Means to divide the Nation, and by this Diviſion to acquire in the Nation a Superiority, which had been attempted ineffectually, even by *Corruption in Parliament*.——But This I reſerve for another Letter, and am,

SIR, *Yours*, &c.

LETTER IV.

SIR,

THERE is a Paſſage in *Tully* ſo extremely applicable to the miſchievous, but tranſitory, Prevalence of *thoſe Principles of Government*, which King *James* the 1ſt imported into this Country, that ſince it occurs to my Memory, I cannot begin this Letter better than by quoting it to you, and making a ſhort Commentary on it. * *Opinionum Commenta delet Dies, Naturæ Judicia confirmat. Groundleſs Opinions are deſtroyed, but rational Judgments, or the Judgments of Nature, are confirmed by Time.* It is *Balbus*, who makes this Obſervation very properly, when He is about to prove the Exiſtence of a ſupreme Being. The ſame Obſervation might have been employed as properly, on other Occaſions, againſt *Balbus* Himſelf; and the Truth of it might have been exemplified, by comparing the Paradoxes and ſuperſtitious Opinions of his *own Sect*, as well as the Tales of an *Hippocentaur*, or a *Chimæra*, with the eternal Truths of genuine Theiſm, and ſound Philoſophy. In ſhort, the Application of it might have been juſtly made then, and may be ſo now in numberleſs Inſtances, taken from the moſt important Subjects, on which the Thoughts of Men are exerciſed, or in which their Intereſt, as Men and Members of Society, are concerned.

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* *L. 2. de Nat. Deor.*

The Authority of a *Sect*, and much more of a *State*, is able to inſpire, and *Habit* to confirm the moſt *abſurd Opinions*. Paſſion, or Intereſt, can create *Zeal*. But nothing can give Stability and durable Uniformity to *Error*. Indolence, or Ignorance, may keep it floating, as it were, on the Surface of the Mind, and ſometimes hinder *Truth* from penetrating; or Force may maintain it in Profeſſion, when the Mind aſſents to it no longer. But *ſuch Opinions*, like human Bodies, tend to their Diſſolution from their Birth. They will be ſoon rejected in *Theory*, where Men can think, and in *Practice*, where Men can act with Freedom. They maintain Themſelves no longer, than the ſame Means of Seduction, which firſt introduced them, or the ſame Circumſtances, which firſt impoſed them, attend and continue to ſupport them. Men are dragged into them, and held down in them, by Chains of Circumſtances. Break but theſe Chains, and the Mind returns with a Kind of intellectual Elaſticity to its proper Object, *Truth*. This natural Motion is ſo ſtrong, that Examples might be cited of Men, embracing *Truth in Practice*, before They were convinced of it in *Theory*. There are Caſes, where *Reaſon*, freed from Conſtraint, or rouzed by Neceſſity, acts in ſome Sort the Part of *Inſtinct*. We are impelled by *one*, before We have Time to form an *Opinion*. We are often determined by the *other*, againſt our *Opinion*; That is, before We can be ſaid properly to have *changed it*. But obſerve here the Perverſeneſs of that rational Creature, Man. When This happens; when the *Judgment of Nature*, for ſo We may ſpeak after *Tully*, hath prevailed againſt the habitual Prejudice of *Opinion*; inſtead of acknowledging the *victorious Truth*, which determined Him to act, inſtead of condemning the *erroneous Opinion*, againſt which

He acted, He is too often apt to endeavour, pedantically, to reconcile his *Actions* to his *Error*; nay, to perſiſt in renouncing *true*, and aſſerting *falſe Maxims*, whilſt He reaps the Benefit, and maintains the Conſequences of the *former*.

You ſee whither We are brought by theſe general Reflections. The *abſurd Opinions*, (*fictæ & vanæ* our *Roman Orator* would have called them) about the *Right*, *Power*, and *Prerogative of Kings*, were ſo little able to take a deep Root, and to ſtand the Blaſts of Oppoſition, that Few of *Thoſe*, who drew their Swords on the Side of King *Charles* the 1ſt, were determined to it by them. I aſſert this Fact on cotemporary Authority; on the Authority even of *Some*, who were Themſelves engaged in *that Cauſe*, from the Beginning to the End of our civil Wars. A more recent Tradition aſſures us, that when the *ſame Opinions* revived at the *Reſtoration*, They did not ſink deep even then into the Minds of Men; but floated ſo ſuperficially there, that the *Parliament*, (the very *Parliament*, who had authorized them, and impoſed them, as I obſerved in the laſt Letter) proceeded a great Way, and was ready to have proceeded farther, in direct Oppoſition to them. A Tradition ſtill more recent will inform us, and That is to be the Subject of this Letter, that when *theſe Opinions* revived again, at the latter End of the ſame Reign, with an Appearance of greater Strength, and of a more national Concurrence than ever, they revived but to be exploded more effectually than ever. King *Charles* made Uſe of them to check the Ferment raiſed againſt his Government; but did not ſeem to expect that they would ſubſiſt long in Force. His *wiſer Brother* depended much on them; but his Dependance was vain. They were, at that Time, wearing out apace; and they wore out the faſter

by

by the extravagant Uſe, which was made of them. They were in the Mouths of many, but in the Hearts of few; for almoſt all Thoſe, who had them in their Mouths, acted againſt them. Thus were *theſe wicked and ridiculous Principles of Government* twice revived, and twice deſtroyed again, in leſs than thirty Years from the *Reſtoration*.

Ter ſi reſurgat Murus aheneus,
——— Ter pereat!

The *ſecond Revival of theſe Principles*, for enough hath been ſaid of the *firſt*, happened ſoon after the Diſſolution of the *long Parliament*; and there, I think, We muſt place the Birth of WHIG and TORY, though *theſe Parties* did not grow up into full Maturity, nor receive their Names, till about two Years afterwards. The Diſſolution of *this Parliament* was deſired by Men of very different Complexions; by *Some*, with factious Views; by *Others*, on this honeſt and true Maxim, *that a* STANDING PARLIAMENT, *or the* SAME PARLIAMENT LONG CONTINUED, *changes the very Nature of the Conſtitution in the fundamental Article, on which the Preſervation of our whole Liberty depends.* But whatever Motives others might have to deſire *this Diſſolution*, the Motives, which prevailed on the *King*, were probably Theſe. *This Parliament* not only grew more reſerved in their Grants of *Money*, and ſtiff and inflexible in *other Matters*, but ſeemed to have loſt that *perſonal Regard*, which they had hitherto preſerved for Him. They brought their Attacks home to his *Family*; nay, to *Himſelf*, in the Heats, which the Diſcovery and Proſecution of the *Popiſh Plot* occaſioned. That on the *Queen* provoked Him. That on his *Brother* embarraſſed Him. But That, which provoked and embarraſſed him

him both, was the Proſecution of the Earl of *Danby* in the Manner, in which it was carried on. I will not deſcend into the Particulars of an Affair, at this Time, ſo well underſtood. *This Miniſter* was turned out, and might have been puniſhed, in another Manner, and much more ſeverely than I preſume any one, who knows the Anecdotes of that Age, thinks that He deſerved to be. But the *Intention* of this Attack, according to *Rapin*, was to ſhew *that the* King, *as well as his* Brother, *was at the Head of a Conſpiracy to deſtroy the Government, and the Proteſtant Religion.* This is a very bold Aſſertion, and ſuch a one as I do not pretend to warrant. But thus much is certain; that if the Earl of *Danby*'s Impeachment had been tried, He muſt have juſtified Himſelf by ſhewing, what every one knew to be true, that the ſecret Negotiations with *France*, and particularly That for *Money*, were the *King's* Negotiations, not his.

Now, whether the *King* hoped, by diſſolving the *Parliament*, to ſtop *this Proſecution*; or to ſoften That of the *Popiſh Plot*; or to defeat the Project of excluding the Duke of *York*; his Hopes were all diſappointed. The *following Parliaments* trod in the Steps of This. How, indeed, could They do otherwiſe in thoſe Days, when the Temper of the *People* determined the Character of the *Parliament*; when an *Influence on Elections*, by *Prerogative*, was long ſince over, and private, indirect Means of gaining *another more illegal Influence* were not yet found, or the neceſſary Supports of ſuch Means were not yet acquired; when any Man, who had deſired People, who knew neither his Fortune, his Character, nor even his Perſon, to chuſe Him *their Repreſentative in Parliament* (that is to appoint Him *their Truſtee*) would have been looked upon and treated as a Madman; in ſhort,

when

when a *Parliament*, acting againſt the *declared Senſe of the Nation*, would have appeared as ſurprizing a Phœnomenon in the moral World, as a retrograde Motion of the Sun, or any other ſignal Deviation of Things from their ordinary Courſe, in the natural World.

There was indeed *one Point*, which *this Parliament* had taken extremely to Heart, and which was no longer open to the *Parliaments*, that followed; I mean the *Conduct of the* King *in foreign Affairs*, during the War between *France*, and *Holland* and her *Allies*, which ended by the Treaty of *Nimighen*. This War was not made in remote Countries. It was made at our Door. The Motives to it, on the Part of the *Aggreſſor*, were neither Injuries received, nor Rights invaded; but a Spirit of Conqueſt, and barefaced Uſurpation. The Intereſt *We* had in it was not ſuch as depended on a long Chain of Contingencies, and required much Subtlety to find out, but plain and immediate. The Security and, at one Time, the very Exiſtence of the *Dutch Commonwealth* depended on the Event of it. No Wonder then, if the Conduct of the *King*, who joined openly with *France* at firſt, and ſerved Her privately to better Purpoſe at laſt, furniſhed ample Matter to the publick Diſcontent, and helped to increaſe the ill Humours of ſucceeding Parliaments on *two other Points*, which were ſtill open, and continued to draw their whole Attention, as long as King *Charles* ſuffered any to ſit, during the reſt of his Reign.

Theſe two Points were the Proſecution of Perſons, involved in the *Popiſh Plot*, and the Excluſion of the Duke of *York*. The *firſt* of theſe had prepared Mankind for the *ſecond*. The Truth is, that if nothing, which affected the *Duke*, had been produced, beſides *Coleman*'s Letters, theſe Proofs of his

his Endeavours to ſubvert the Religion and Liberty of the People He pretended to govern, joined to ſo many others of publick Notoriety, which ſhewed the whole Bent of his Soul, and the whole Scheme of his Policy, would have afforded Reaſon more than ſufficient for ſacrificing the *Intereſt*, or even the *Right* (if you will call it ſo) of *one Man* to the Preſervation of *three Kingdoms*. I know how partial We are in the Judgments We make, concerning ourſelves, and our own Intereſts. I know that this Partiality is the immediate Effect of Self-Love, the ſtrongeſt Spring in the human, nay in the whole animal Syſtem; and yet I cannot help being ſurprized that a Man ſhould expect to be truſted with a *Crown*, becauſe he is born a *Prince*, in a Country, where He could not be truſted by Law, and ought not to be truſted in Reaſon, with a *Conſtable's Staff*, if He was born a *private Perſon*. Let me add, that ſuch an Expectation muſt be deemed more unreaſonable in a Deſcendant of *Henry* the 4th of *France*, if poſſible, than in any other Man. The hereditary Title of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, on the Extinction of That of *Valois*, was certainly as clear, and much better eſtabliſhed by the Laws and Uſages of *France*, than the hereditary Right of any Prince of the Houſe of *Stuart* to the Crown of *England*; and yet *Henry* the 4th, with all the perſonal Qualifications, which could recommend a Prince to the Eſteem and Love of his Subjects, would never have been received into the Throne by the *French Nation*, if He had not been of the *Religion of that Nation*. On what Foundation then could it be expected that a *Proteſtant* and a *free People* ſhould be leſs animated by *Religion* and *Liberty both*, than their Neighbours had been by *Religion alone*; for *Liberty* had nothing to do in that Conteſt? Our Fathers were thus animated

mated, at the Time I am ſpeaking of. The *long Parliament* projected the *Excluſion*; and if the Deſign had been carried on, in the Spirit of a *Country Party*, it would probably have been carried on with a national Concurrence, and would conſequently have ſucceeded in Effect, though not perhaps at once, nor in the very Form at firſt propoſed.

The violent and ſanguinary Proſecution of the *Popiſh Plot* was intended, no Doubt, to make the Succeſs of the *Excluſion* more ſecure, by raiſing the Paſſions of Men ſo high, that no Expedient but an *abſolute and immediate Excluſion*, in the Terms of the *Bill*, ſhould be thought ſufficient. I cannot help ſaying, on this Occaſion, that I wiſh this laudable and juſt Deſign had not been purſued, by wading through the Blood of ſo many Men; Enemies to our *Religion* and *Liberty*, indeed; but convicted, for the moſt Part, on Evidence, which could hardly have paſſed, at any other Time. I wiſh We had done nothing, which might be interpreted to the Diſrepute of our *own Religion*, whilſt We attempted to proſcribe *theirs*. In fine, I wiſh, for the Honour of my Country, that the Proſecutions, on Account of *this Plot*, and much more on Account of *another*, which was ſet up as a Kind of Retaliation for *This*, and which cauſed ſome of the nobleſt, as well as ſome of the meaneſt Blood in the Nation to be ſpilt, could be erazed out of the Records of Hiſtory. But there is ſtill a farther Reaſon to wiſh that greater Temper had been joined, at this Time, to the ſame Zeal for *Religion* and *Liberty*. Men were made to believe that the *King*, who had yielded on ſo many *other Occaſions*, would yield on *This*; that *He*, who had given up ſo many *Miniſters*, would give up his *Brother* at laſt; and that if the *Parliament* would accept nothing leſs than the *Excluſion*, in their own Way, it would

be extorted from Him. Now in *This* They were fatally deceived; and I muſt continue to ſuſpect, till I meet with better Reaſons than I have yet found to the contrary, that they were ſo deceived by the Intrigues of *two very oppoſite Cabals*; by the Duke of *York*'s, who were averſe to *all Excluſions*, whether *abſolute*, or *limited*, but moſt to the *laſt*; and by the Duke of *Monmouth*'s, who could not find their Account in any but an *abſolute Excluſion*; nor in This neither, unleſs the *Bill* paſſed without any Mention of the *Duke's Daughters*, as next in Succeſſion; to which, as Biſhop *Burnet* tells us, the Prince of *Orange* was willing to comply, on the Faith of Aſſurances He had received from hence; a Fact, which the *Biſhop* might know, and We may therefore take on his Word, as extraordinary as it ſeems. I would only obſerve that King *William*, then Prince of *Orange*, could have no Reaſon for conſenting that his *Wife's Pretenſions to the Crown* ſhould not be confirmed by an *Act*, which excluded her *Father*, except one; and That was the Neceſſity, real, or apparent, of uniting different private Intereſts in the publick Meaſure of excluding the Duke of *York*. Now, if This was his Reaſon, the ſame Reaſon proves, what ſhall be farther confirmed in the next Letter, that a *Spirit of Faction* ran through the Proceedings of Thoſe, who promoted the *Bill of Excluſion*; and when *Faction* was oppoſed to *Faction*, there is no Room to wonder, if That of the *Court* prevailed. The *King*, who had not uſed to ſhew Firmneſs, on *other Occaſions*, was firm on *This*; and the Conſequence of puſhing the *Excluſion*, in this Manner, was giving Him an Opportunity of breaking the *Country Party*; of dividing the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*; of governing Himſelf, without *Parliaments*; and of leaving the Throne open to his *Brother*, not only without

out Limitations, or Conditions, but with a more abſolute Power eſtabliſhed, than any Prince of his Family had enjoyed.

As ſoon as the *Court* had got, by Management, a plauſible Pretence of objecting a *Spirit of Faction* to Thoſe in the *Oppoſition*, the Strength of the *Oppoſition* was broken, becauſe the *national Union* was diſſolved. A *Country Party* muſt be authorized by the *Voice of the Country*. It muſt be formed on Principles of *common Intereſt*. It cannot be united and maintained on the particular Prejudices, any more than it can, or ought to be, directed to the particular Intereſts of *any Set of Men whatſoever*. A *Party*, thus conſtituted, is improperly called *Party*. It is the *Nation*, ſpeaking and acting in the Diſcourſe and Conduct of *particular Men*. It will prevail in all Struggles ſooner, or later, as long as our *Conſtitution* ſubſiſts; and nothing is more eaſy to demonſtrate than This; that whenever *ſuch a Party* finds it difficult to prevail, our *Conſtitution* is in Danger; and when They find it impoſſible, our *Conſtitution* muſt, in Fact, be altered. On the other Hand, whenever the Prejudices and Intereſts of *particular Sets of Men* prevail, the Eſſence of a *Country Party* is annihilated, and the very Appearance of it will ſoon be loſt. Every Man will reſort in this Caſe to that Standard, under which He hath been marſhalled in *former Diviſions*; to which his Inclinations lead Him; or which, though He does not intirely approve, yet diſapproves the leaſt.

Such a Diſſolution of a *Country Party* was brought about at the Period, to which We are now come in our Deduction of *Parties*, by the Paſſions, the publick Pique, and private Intereſt of *particular Men*, and by the wily Intrigues of the *Court*. The Diſſolution of *this Party*, and the new Diviſion of

the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*, brought us into extreme Danger. This extreme Danger reunited the Nation again, and a *Coalition of Parties* ſaved the whole. Such an Experience might have ſhewed Them, that how oppoſite ſoever their *Profeſſions* were, yet They really differed more on *negative* than on *poſitive Principles*; that They ſaw one another in a *falſe Light*, for the moſt Part, and fought with *Phantoms*, conjured up to maintain their *Diviſion*, rather than with *real Beings*. Experience had not this happy Effect ſoon. The Swell of the Sea continued, long after the Storm was over; and We have ſeen *theſe Parties* kick and cuff, like drunken Men, when They were both of the ſame Side.———Let us hope that this Scene of tragical Folly is over, to the Diſappointment of *Thoſe*, who are conſcious of *paſt Iniquity*, or who meditate *future Miſchief*. There are no others, who wiſh and endeavour to prolong it.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER V.

SIR,

NOTHING is more uſeful, nothing more neceſſary, in the Conduct of publick Affairs, than a *juſt Diſcernment of Spirits*. I mean here not only that *natural private Sagacity*, which is converſant about Individuals, and enables ſome Men to pry, as it were, into the Heads and Hearts of others,

others, and to diſcover within them thoſe latent Principles, which conſtitute their true Characters, and are often diſguiſed in outward Action; but I mean principally that *acquired*, *publick*, *political Sagacity*, which is of the ſame Kind, though I think not altogether the ſame Thing, as the *former*; which flows from Nature too, but requires more to be aſſiſted by Experience, and formed by Art. This is that ſuperior Talent of *Miniſters of State*, which is ſo rarely found in Thoſe of *other Countries*, and which abounds ſo happily at preſent in Thoſe of *Great Britain*. It is by This, that They diſcover the moſt ſecret Diſpoſitions of *other Courts*; and, diſcovering thoſe Diſpoſitions, prevent their Deſigns, or never ſuffer Themſelves to be ſurprized by them. It is by This, that They watch over the publick Tranquility *at home*; foreſee what Effect every Event, that happens, and much more every Step They make Themſelves, will have on the Sentiments and Paſſions of Mankind. This Part of human Wiſdom is therefore every where of Uſe; but is of indiſpenſable Neceſſity in *free Countries*, where a greater Regard is to be conſtantly had to the various Fluctuations of *Parties*; to the Temper, Humour, Opinion and Prejudices of the *People*. Without ſuch a Regard as This, thoſe Combinations of peculiar Circumſtances, which We commonly call *Conjunctures*, can never be improved to the beſt Advantage, by acting in Conformity, and in Proportion to them; and without improving *ſuch Conjunctures* to the beſt Advantage, it is impoſſible to atchieve any great Undertaking; or even to conduct Affairs ſucceſsfully, in their ordinary Courſe.

A Want of this *juſt Diſcernment of Spirits*, if I am not extremely miſtaken, defeated the Deſigns of Thoſe, who proſecuted with ſo much Vigour the

the *Popiſh Plot*, and the *Excluſion of the Duke of York*. Several of Them were Men of very great Abilities; and yet We ſhall have no Reaſon to be ſurprized that They failed in this Point, if We reflect how unfit even the greateſt Genius is to *diſcern the Spirit of others*, when He hath once *overheated his own*. All Men are fallible; but here lies the Difference. *Some Men*, ſuch as I have juſt mentioned, croſſed by Difficulties, preſſed by Exigencies, tranſported by their own Paſſions, or by the Paſſions of Thoſe, who fight under their Banner, may now and then deviate into Error, and into Error of long and fatal Conſequence. But there are *ſome Men*, ſuch as I ſhall not mention upon this Occaſion, (becauſe I reſerve Them for another and a better) who never deviate into the Road of good Senſe; who, croſſed by no Difficulties, preſſed by no Exigencies, meeting ſcarce Oppoſition enough to excite their Induſtry, and guiding a tame well-tutor'd Flock, that follow their *Bell-weather* obſtinately, but never tread on his Heels; there are *Men*, I ſay, whoſe ſpecial Privilege it is to proceed with all theſe Advantages, deliberately and ſupercilioufly, from Blunder to Blunder, from Year to Year, in one perpetual Maze of confuſed, incoherent, inconſiſtent, unmeaning Schemes of Buſineſs.

But having nothing to do with the *Men of this Character* at preſent, I return to Thoſe of the *former Claſs*; to the *Men*, who led the *Whig-Party*, at its firſt Appearance, in the Time of King *Charles* the 2d. The Foundation, upon which They built all their Hopes of Succeſs, was This; that They ſhould frighten and force the *King* into a Complyance with Them; but They did not enough conſider that the Methods They took were equally proper to frighten and force a great Part of the Nation from Them,

Them, by Reaſon of the particular Circumſtances of that Time. They did not enough conſider that when they began to put their Deſigns in Execution, ſcarce twenty Years had paſſed from the *Reſtoration*; and that the higheſt Principles, in Favour of the *Church* and the *Monarchy*, had prevailed almoſt univerſally, during one half of that Time, and very generally, during the other half; that They had the accidental Paſſions of the People for Them, but the ſettled Habits of Thinking againſt Them; that They were going off from a a *broad* to a *narrow Bottom*; from the *Nation* to a *Part of the Nation*; and This at a Time, when They wanted a more than ordinary Concurrence of the *whole Body*. They did not enough conſider that They were changing the very Nature of their *Party*, and giving an Opportunity to the *Court*, which was then become, in the ſtrict Senſe of the Word, a *Faction*, to grow up into a *Party* again, and *ſuch a Party* as would divide, at leaſt, the People with Them, upon *Principles*, plauſible in thoſe Days, and ſufficient to raiſe a Spirit, capable to diſappoint all their Endeavours.

The ſame Reſentments and Prejudices, the ſame Jealouſies and Fears, which burſt out with Violence, upon many Occaſions a few Years before, lay ſtill in the Hearts of Men; latent and quiet, indeed, and wearing out by Degrees; but yet eaſy to be revived, and to be blown up anew. If We compare the Conduct of the *long Parliament*, in 1674 and 1675, with the Attempts, which had been lately made, during the Adminiſtration of the *Cabal*; with the Secret of the *ſecond Dutch War*, and many other Deſigns and Practices of the *Court*, which were then come lately and very authentically to Light; with the State of *Scotland*, which was then ſubdued under a *real Tyranny*; and with That of *Ireland*

Ireland, where, to ſay no more, the *Act of Settlement* was but ill obſerved; if We make this Compariſon, it will not yet appear that the Proceedings of the *Houſe of Commons* were immoderate, though they were warm; nor factious, though they were vigorous; nor that any Danger could be then reaſonably apprehended from them, except to the Enemies of the Conſtitution in Church and State; and yet even then the old Reſentments, Prejudices, Jealouſies and Fears began to revive; and an Apprehenſion of falling back under the Influence of *Presbyterian* and *Republican Principles* began to ſhew itſelf in the Houſe of Lords, and in the Nation. It is true that This had no immediate Conſequence; becauſe the *Popiſh Plot* broke out ſoon afterwards like a mighty Flame, in which theſe little Fires, that began to burn anew, were loſt. This great Event made the *Church* and the *Diſſenters* continue to run into one, as They had begun to do before; and the ſole Diviſion of *Parties* was That of the *Court* and the *Country*, as long as *this Parliament* laſted. But ſtill it was evident with how delicate an Hand every Thing, that related to our *former Diſputes*, required to be touched. It was evident that the leaſt Alarm given to the *Church*, or to Thoſe, who value Themſelves on the Principles of *Loyalty* then in Faſhion, would be ſufficient to open thoſe Wounds, which were juſt skinned over, and to raiſe *two new Parties* out of the Aſhes of the *old*.

Theſe Parties were not raiſed, whilſt the *long Parliament* ſate; becauſe a general Opinion prevailed, and well enough founded on their precedent Conduct, that however angry the *King* might be with the *Parliament*, or the *Parliament* with the *King*, a few popular Steps made on *one Side*, and a little Money granted on the *other*, would ſoften Matters

Matters between Them, and diſpoſe Them to forget all former Quarrels. As hot therefore as the *Parliament* grew, and as much as ſome People might think that they exceeded their Bounds; yet ſtill it was difficult to perſuade even theſe People that a *Parliament*, like This, would puſh Things to the laſt Extremity; deſtroy the *Conſtitution* They had ſettled and ſupported with ſo much Zeal; or draw the Sword againſt a *Prince*, to whom They had borne ſo much Affection. But in the *Parliaments*, which followed, the Caſe was not the ſame; and I will ſtate as ſhortly as I can, upon Authorities, which no Man likely to contradict me muſt refuſe, what made the Difference. Theſe Authorities ſhall be That of *Burnet*, and That of *Rapin*; whom I quote, on this Occaſion, for the ſame Reaſon as I would quote my Lord *Clarendon* againſt King *Charles* the 1ſt, or *Ludlow* for Him.

In the Year 1676, before We have Grounds ſufficient to affirm that the Deſign of *(a) excluding the Duke of York* was formed, but not before We have Reaſon to ſuſpect that it might be in the Thoughts of ſeveral, Thoſe, who ſtood foremoſt in the Oppoſition to the *Court*, were very induſtrious to procure a Diſſolution of the *long Parliament*; ſo induſtrious, that They *(b)* negotiated the Affair with the *Duke*, who had concurred in a Vote for an Addreſs to diſſolve it; and They undertook *(c) that a new Parliament ſhould be more inclineable to grant the* Papiſts *a Toleration, than They would ever find This would prove.* The *Papiſts* were in Earneſt for this Meaſure; ſince *Coleman drew a Declaration for juſtifying it, and ſince their Deſign in it was*

(a) Burnet's Hiſtory of his own Times, Vol. I. p. 393.
(b) Ibid. *(c) Ibid.*

to divide the (a) King and his People. It is fair to conclude that the *Proteſtants*, who had been in it at the Time I mention, upon *Party Views*, were at leaſt as much ſo, when their Views roſe higher. *This Parliament* had puſhed a ſtrict and thorough Examination into the *Popiſh Plot*, with great Sincerity and Zeal. Nay, the Project of the *Excluſion* had been ſtarted, though not proſecuted, in the laſt Seſſion. May We not take it for granted however that They, who were now reſolved to carry the *Excluſion* in a Manner, in which They ſoon attempted to carry it, and who foreſaw by Conſequence the Difficulties, that would be oppoſed to Them, and the ſtrong Meaſures They ſhould be obliged to purſue, in order to overcome theſe Difficulties; I ſay, might not They think *this Parliament* much leſs proper than any other to engage and perſiſt in ſuch Meaſures? They thought thus, without Doubt; and ſo far They judged better than the *King*, who came into the *Diſſolution*, upon very different Motives. But as to the Conſequence of engaging a *new Parliament* in ſuch ſtrong Meaſures, the Event ſhewed that the *King* judged better than They, in the Progreſs of this Affair.

The *Diſſenters*, who had been long perſecuted by the *Parliament*, and bantered and abuſed by the *Court*, were encouraged by the Conjuncture to liſt up their Heads. They took Advantage of the Horrour and Indignation, which the Diſcovery of the *Popiſh Plot*, and the Uſe made of this Diſcovery had raiſed all over the Kingdom. They could not be more zealous in this Cauſe than the Members of the *eſtabliſhed Church* had ſhewn Themſelves to be; but They cried, perhaps, louder for it. In ſhort, whatever their Management was, or however

(a) *Burnet's Hiſtory of his own Times, Vol. I. p.* 393.

They

They were abetted, certain it is that They were very active, and very ſucceſsful too, in the Elections of the *Parliament*, which followed the *long Parliament*, according to *Rapin*, who aſſerts that many of the Members, choſen into this Houſe of Commons, were *Presbyterians*. He might have ſaid as much, upon juſt as good Grounds, of the *two Parliaments*, which followed This, and I ſhall ſpeak of Them indiſcriminately. The Leaders, who muſtered all their Forces, in order to puſh the *Bill of Excluſion*, looked on this Turn in the *Elections* as an Advantage to Them; and it might not have been a Diſadvantage, if They and the *Diſſenters* had improved it with more Moderation. But They were far from doing ſo, as *Rapin* Himſelf ſeems to own a little unwillingly, when He ſays, that *Complaiſance for the* Presbyterians *was carried, perhaps, too far in the Bill for the Comprehenſion of Proteſtant Diſſenters*. Biſhop *Burnet* ſpeaks more plainly. He owns that many began *to declare openly in Favour of the* Non-Conformiſts; *that upon This the* Non-Conformiſts *behaved Themſelves very indecently*; that *They fell ſeverely on the Body of the Clergy*; and that *They made the Biſhops and Clergy apprehend that a* Rebellion, *and with it the pulling the* Church *to Pieces, was deſigned.* Several other Paſſages of the ſame Strength, and to the ſame Purpoſe, might be collected from *this Hiſtorian*; and He, who reads them, will not be ſurprized, I think, to find that ſuch Proceedings as Theſe, both in *Parliament* and out of it, gave an Alarm to the *Clergy*, and *ſet Them to make Parallels between the late and the preſent Times*; and to infuſe the Fears and the Paſſions, which agitated *Them*, into the *Nation*. The *Biſhop* accuſes Them, indeed, of doing This with much *Indecency*. But They, who are frightened out of their Wits, will

be apt to be *indecent*; and *Indecency* begets *Indecency*.

At the ſame Time, that theſe Jealouſies of a Deſign to deſtroy the *Church* prevailed, others prevailed likewiſe of a Deſign to alter the *Government of the State*; of a Deſign not only againſt the *Succeſſor*, but againſt the *Poſſeſſor of the Crown*. *Many well-meaning Men*, ſays Biſhop *Burnet* upon one Occaſion, *began to diſlike theſe Practices, and to apprehend that a* Change of Government *was deſigned.*——*The* King *came to think Himſelf*, ſays the *ſame Author* upon another Occaſion, *levelled at chiefly, though for Decency's Sake his* Brother *was only named*. *Rapin* goes farther; for, ſpeaking of the ſame Time, He uſes this remarkable Expreſſion; that *Things ſeem'd to be taking the ſame Courſe as in the Year* 1640; *and there was Reaſon to think that the* oppoſing Party *had no better Intentions towards the* King *now than the Enemies of King* Charles *the 1ſt had towards Him*. But whatever ſome particular Men, who knew Themſelves irreconcileable with the *King*, as well as the *Duke*, or ſome others, who had ſtill about them a Tang of religious Enthuſiaſm and Republican Whimſies, might intend; I am far from thinking that the *Party*, who promoted the *Excluſion*, meant to deſtroy, on the contrary it is plain that they meant to preſerve, by that very Meaſure, the *Conſtitution in Church and State*. The Reaſon why I quote theſe Paſſages, and refer to others of the ſame Kind, is not to ſhew what was really deſigned, but what was apprehended; for as the Diſtinction of *Whig* and *Tory* ſubſiſted long after the real Differences were extinguiſhed, ſo were *theſe Parties* at firſt divided, not ſo much by *Overtacts* committed, as by the *Apprehenſions*, which each of Them entertained of the Intentions of the other. When the Reſolution

Reſolution was once taken of rejecting all Limitations, on the Belief artfully and, I think, knaviſhly propagated, that the *King* would yield, if the *Parliament* perſiſted; the neceſſary Conſequences of the *King's* adhering inflexibly to his *Brother* were Thoſe, which followed; thoſe *Fulmina Parliamentaria*, harſh Votes, angry Proceedings, Addreſſes, that were in Truth Remonſtrances, Projects of Aſſociations, Pretenſions to a Power of DISPENSING *with the Execution of Laws*, (that very *Prerogative* They had ſo juſtly refuſed to the *Crown*,) and many others, which I omit. All Theſe would have been Blaſts of Wind, *bruta Fulmina*, no more, if the King had yielded; and that they were puſhed in this Confidence by the Bulk of the *Party*, who puſhed them, cannot be doubted; ſince it cannot be doubted that the Bulk of the *Party* depended on the *King's* yielding almoſt, perhaps, even to the laſt. Some few might be willing, nay deſirous, that He ſhould not yield, and hope to bring Things into a State of Confuſion; which none but Madmen, or Thoſe, whom their Crimes, or their Fortunes render deſperate, can ever wiſh to ſee. But it would be hard, indeed, if *Parties* were to be characterized, not by their common View, or the general Tenour of their Conduct, but by the private Views imputed to ſome amongſt Them, or by the particular Sallies, into which Miſtake, Surprize, or Paſſion, hath ſometimes betrayed the beſt-intentioned, and even the beſt-conducted Bodies of Men. *Whig* and *Tory* were now formed into *Parties*; but I think They were not now, nor at any other Time, what they believed one another, nor what they have been repreſented by their Enemies, nay by their Friends. The *Whigs* were not *Roundheads*, tho' the Meaſures They purſued, being

being ſtronger than the Temper of the Nation would then bear, gave Occaſion to the Suſpicions I have mentioned. The *Tories* were not *Cavaliers*, though They took the Alarm ſo ſudden and ſo warm for the *Church* and the *King*; and tho' They carried the Principles in Favour of the *King*, at leaſt, whilſt the Heat of their Conteſts with the *oppoſite Party* laſted, higher than They had been ever carried before. The *Whigs* were not *Diſſenters*, nor *Republicans*, though They favoured the *former*, and though ſome inconſiderable Remains of the *latter* might find Shelter in their Party. The *Tories* had no Diſpoſition to become *Slaves*, or *Papiſts*, tho' They abetted the Exerciſe of an exorbitant Power by the *Crown*, and tho' They ſupported the Pretenſions of a *Popiſh Succeſſor* to it. —— Thus I think about the *Parties*, which aroſe in the Reign of King *Charles* the 2d; and as I deliver my Thoughts with Frankneſs, I hope they will be received with Candour. Some farther and ſtronger Reaſons for receiving them ſo may, perhaps, appear in a ſubſequent Letter.

I am, *SIR*, &c.

LETTER VI.

SIR,

IF King *Charles* the 2d could have been prevail'd upon to ſacrifice the chimerical divine Right of his *Brother* to the real Intereſt, and Right too, of his *People*; that happy Event would have made him ample Amends in future Eaſe and Quiet, and

and the Nation in future Security, for all precedent Diſorders, Dangers, and Fears of Danger. But inſtead of This, He was every Day confirmed in the Reſolution of not giving up, directly and in Terms, that Right to his *Brother*, which He thought reflected Strength on his own. The very Meaſures, taken to force Him to ſubmit, enabled Him to reſiſt. The *oppoſite Spirit* ſpent itſelf in Blood and Violence. The *Spirit for Him* roſe viſibly in the Nation; and He ſaw very ſoon the Time approach, when He might venture to appeal to his *People* againſt his *Parliament*. This Time was come, when Men were once convinced that a *Country Party* prevail'd no longer, but that *Faction* had taken its Place. Many Appearances, which I have not Room to enumerate, ſerved to propagate this Opinion; particularly the Behaviour and almoſt avowed Pretenſions of the Duke of *Monmouth*; which were carried on even in Defyance of the ſolemn Declaration made by the King, *that He had never married the* Duke's *Mother*.

Some of the worthieſt and warmeſt Men, who were engaged *for the Excluſion*, complained Themſelves, even from the firſt, of the private Intereſts and factious Intrigues, which prevailed amongſt Them. *I muſt confeſs* (ſays a very *conſiderable Man*, who laid down his Life for this Cauſe afterwards, and whoſe original Letter is ſtill extant) *I muſt confeſs, I do not know three Men of a Mind*; *and that a Spirit of Giddineſs reigns amongſt us, far beyond any I have ever obſerved in my Life*; and yet He had lived and acted in as factious a Time as this Nation ever ſaw. He proceeds; *Some look who is fitteſt to ſucceed.* ——*They are for the moſt Part divided between the Prince of* Orange, *and the Duke of* Monmouth. *The firſt hath plainly the moſt plauſible Title.*— *I need not tell you the Reaſons againſt*

gainſt Monmouth. *The ſtrongeſt for Him are, that whoever is oppoſed to* York *will have a good Party; and all* Scotland, *which is every Day like to be in Arms, doth certainly favour Him, and may probably be of as much Importance in the Troubles, that are now likely to fall upon us, as They were in the Beginning of the laſt. Others are only upon Negatives*, &c.

I could eaſily multiply Proofs of this Kind; but I think I need not take any Pains to ſhew that there was *ſuch a Faction* formed at this Time; nor to refute *Welwood*, who aſſerts *that the Duke of* Monmouth *was not ambitious to the Degree of aſpiring to the Crown, till after his Landing in the Weſt.* I will only remark that the Efforts of *this Faction* amongſt Thoſe, who drove on the *Bill of Excluſion*, furniſhed another Motive to the Diviſion and Animoſity of *Parties*. The *Tories*, who had divided from the *others*, on Jealouſies of Deſigns to change the *Conſtitution in Church and State*, began now to apprehend that the *oppoſite Party* might ſucceed in another View, and ſet up a *King of their own Nomination.* A Notion then entertain'd by many, *that the* worſe Title *a Man had*, the better King *He was likely to make*, did not perſuade Them. They had ſuffer'd under the Tyranny of a *Party*; many of Them had been Themſelves the Abettors of a *Party-Adminiſtration*; and They fear'd with Reaſon a *Party-King*. Thus perſonal Intereſts were mingled on *both Sides* with publick Conſiderations; and the Duke of *York* gained a great Number of Adherents, not by Affection to *Him*, but by an Averſion to *Monmouth*; which increaſed among the *Tories*, in Proportion as the *Duke's* Popularity increaſed among the *Whigs*; not by any favourable Diſpoſition in the *Tories* to *Popery* and *arbitrary Power*; but by a *Dread*, as I have obſerved already, of returning in the leaſt Degree under the

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Influence of *thoſe Principles*, and the Power of *thoſe Men*, whoſe Yoke had galled the Necks of many that were ſtill alive and active on the Stage of publick Affairs. *Men grew jealous of the Deſign* (ſays Biſhop *Burnet*, ſpeaking of *Monmouth*'s Popularity) *and fancy'd here was a new civil War to be raiſed. Upon This, they join'd with the* Duke's *Party*; meaning the Duke of *York*'s.

I ſay nothing of the Apprehenſions entertain'd on *one Side*, and the Expectations entertain'd on the *other* from *Scotland*; becauſe though there was, even in the Beginning of theſe Struggles, a Concert between Thoſe, who were oppreſs'd by the *Court* there, and Thoſe, who oppoſed it here, which grew afterwards into a cloſer Correſpondence, and became riper for Action; yet the ſeditious Spirit, that gave Occaſion to theſe Apprehenſions and Expectations, was rouzed and exaſperated by the Inhumanity of the Duke of *Lauderdale*; who, though a *Presbyterian* Himſelf, was the Butcher of *that Party*; puſh'd the warmeſt of them into unjuſtifiable Exceſſes; reviv'd their ſilly Zeal for the *Covenant*; and wrought up their Enthuſiaſm even to *Aſſaſſination* and *Rebellion*. Let me only obſerve that This was plainly the Fault of the *Court*, and could not therefore be imputed to the *Whigs*, whatever Uſe ſome of *that Party* might propoſe to make of ſuch a Diſpoſition. The Violence of the *Conventiclers* was founded high, in order to palliate the Severities exerciſed in the Government of *that Kingdom*. But the reaſonable Men of *all Parties* thought then, as They think now, and always will think, that it is the Duty of *Thoſe*, who govern, to diſcern the *Spirit of the People*; to conſider even their *Paſſions*; to have a Regard to their *Weakneſſes*; and to ſhew Indulgence to their *Prejudices*; and that *Miniſters*,

who puniſh what they might prevent, are more culpable than *They*, who offend.

As the *two Parties* were formed, ſo was their Diviſion maintain'd by mutual Jealouſies and Fears; which are often ſufficient to nouriſh Themſelves, when They have once taken Root in the Mind; and which were, at this Time, water'd and cultivated with all the factious Induſtry poſſible. The moſt improbable Reports, the moſt idle Surmiſes, carried about in Whiſpers, were ſufficient (as I might eaſily ſhew in various Inſtances) to raiſe a panick Terror in *one Party*, or the *other*. In *both*, there were but too many Perſons on the Watch, to improve and to propagate theſe Terrors, and by a frequent Repetition of ſuch Impreſſions to raiſe the Alarm and Hatred of *Parties* to the higheſt Pitch. He, who went about to allay this extravagant Ferment, was call'd a *Trimmer*; and He, who was in Truth a common Friend, was ſure of being treated like a common Enemy. Some, who voted *for the Bill of Excluſion*, were very far from being *heartily for it*; but I have ſeen good Reaſons to believe, and ſuch there are even in our publick Relations, that ſome of Thoſe, who voted *againſt it*, and declared for *Limitations*, concurred in the *End*, tho' They differ'd in the *Means*, with Thoſe, who promoted the *Bill*. And yet *ſuch Men* were conſtantly mark'd out as *Favourers of Popery* and *Enemies to their Country*. Thus in the *other Party*, Men, who had no other View but That of ſecuring their *Religion* and *Liberty*, and who meant nothing more than to force the *Court* into ſuch Complyances, as They judged neceſſary to eſtabliſh this Security, were ſtigmatiz'd with the opprobrious Names of *Fanatick* and *Republican*. Thus it happen'd in thoſe Days; and thus it happens in ours; when any Man, who declares againſt a *certain Perſon*, againſt whom the Voice

Voice of the Nation hath already declared, or complains of *Things*, which are ſo notorious, that no Man in the Nation can deny them, is ſure to be followed by the Cry of *Jacobitiſm*, or *Republicaniſm*. But there is a great Difference, God be praiſed, between the *two Caſes*. The *preſent Cry*, being void of *Pretence*, is therefore without *Effect*. It is heard in *few Places*, and believed only in *one*. —— But to return;

When the Nation was divided in this Manner, the Heat of the *Parties* increaſed as their Conteſt laſted, according to the uſual Courſe of Things. New Engagements were daily taken; new Provocations and Offences were daily given. Publick Diſputes begot private Pique; and private Pique ſupported publick Diſputes with greater Rancour and Obſtinacy. The *oppoſite Principles*, advanced by the *two Parties*, were carried higher and higher, as They grew more inflamed; and the *Meaſures* They purſued, in order to get the better each of his *Adverſary*, without overmuch Regard to any other Conſequence, became ſtronger and ſtronger, and perhaps equally dangerous. The Meeting of the Parliament at *Oxford* had a Kind of hoſtile Appearance; and as ſoon as *Parliaments were laid aſide*, which happened on the ſudden and indecent Diſſolution of This, the Appearance grew worſe. No Security having been obtained, by *Parliamentary Methods*, againſt the Dangers of a *Popiſh Succeſſion*, it is probable that They, who look'd on theſe Dangers as neareſt and greateſt, began to caſt about how They might ſecure Themſelves and their Country againſt them, by *Methods of another Kind*; ſuch as extreme Neceſſity, and nothing but extreme Neceſſity can authorize. *Such Methods* were happily purſued and attended with glorious Succeſs, a few Years afterwards, when *this Succeſſion* had

taken Place; and, by taking Place, had juſtify'd all, that had been ſaid againſt it, or foreboded of it; when the Nation was ripe for *Reſiſtance*, and the Prince of *Orange* ready and able, from a Multitude of fortunate, concurring Circumſtances, to ſupport ſo great an Enterprize. But the Attempts, which were wiſe at *one Time*, would have been deſperate at the *other*; and the Meaſures, which produced a *Revolution*, in the Reign of King *James*, would have produced, in the Reign of King *Charles*, a *civil War* of uncertain Event at beſt; I ſay of uncertain Event at beſt; becauſe it ſeems to me that whoever revolves in his Thoughts the State of *England* and *Scotland*, as well as the Situation of our *Neighbours on the Continent*, at that Time, muſt be of Opinion that if the Quarrel about the *Excluſion* had broke out into a War, the *beſt Cauſe* would have been the *worſt ſupported*. The *King*, more united than ever with his *Brother*, would have prevailed. What was projected in 1670, and perhaps more than was then intended, would have been effected; and the *Religion* and *Liberty* of *Great Britain* would have been deſtroy'd by Conſequence. We cannot ſay, and it would be Preſumption to pretend to gueſs, how far the Heads of *Party* had gone, in *Scotland*, or in *England*, into Meaſures for imploying *Force*. Perhaps, little more had paſſed, in which *They*, who became the *principal Sacrifices*, were any Way concerned, than raſh Diſcourſe about dangerous, but rude, indigeſted Schemes, ſtarted by Men of wild Imaginations, or deſperate Fortunes, and rather hearkened to than aſſented to; nay, poſſibly, deſpiſed and neglected by Them. But the *Court*, who wanted a *Plot* to confirm and increaſe their *Party*, and to turn the popular Tide in their Favour, took the firſt Opportunity of having one; which was ſoon furniſhed to Them by the imprudent

dent, but honeſt Zeal of *Some*, and by the Villany, as well as Madneſs of *Others*; and They proſecuted it ſo ſeverely, with the Help of * *forward Sheriffs, willing Juries, bold Witneſſes* and *mercenary Judges*, that it anſwered all their Ends. The Deſign of aſſaſſinating the *King* and the *Duke* was certainly confined to a few deſperate Villains; but † *too many had heard it from Them, who were both ſo fooliſh and ſo wicked, as not to diſcover Them*; and This reflected great Prejudice, though I doubt not in many Caſes very unjuſtly, againſt all Thoſe, who had acted upon better Principles, but yet were involved in theſe Proſecutions.

As *this Event* diſarmed, diſpirited and broke *one Party*; ſo it ſtrengthened, animated and united the *other*. The *Tories*, who look'd on the Dangers They apprehended from the *Whigs* to be greater and nearer than Thoſe, which They had apprehended, as well as the *Whigs*, before this new Diviſion of *Parties*, from a *Popiſh Succeſſion*, were now confirmed in their Prejudices. Under this Perſuaſion, They run headlong into all the Meaſures, which were taken for *enlarging the* KING's *Authority*, and *ſecuring the Crown to the Duke of* York. The Principles of *divine hereditary Right*, of *Paſſive Obedience*, and *Non-Reſiſtance*, were revived and propagated with greater Zeal than ever. Not only the wild Whimſies of *Enthuſiaſts*, of *Schoolmen* and *Philoſophers*, but the plaineſt Dictates of *Reaſon* were ſolemnly condemn'd, in Favour of them, by *learned* and *reverend Bodies of Men*; who little thought that in five Years Time, That is in 1688, They ſhould act conformably to ſome of the very *Propoſitions*, which at this Time They declared *falſe*, *ſeditious* and *impious*.

* *Burnt.* † *Id.*

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In ſhort, the *Guelphs* and *Gibellines* were not more animated againſt each other, at any Time, than the *Tories* and *Whigs* at This; and in ſuch a national Temper, conſiderable Steps were made, as they well might be, towards the Deſtruction of our Conſtitution. One of Thoſe, which *Rapin* enumerates, and inſiſts upon very gravely, can ſcarce be mentioned without ſmiling. The *King*, He ſays, *in order to make his* People *feel the Slavery He had newly impoſed on Them, affected to review his* TROOPS; *and theſe Troops amounted, by the Return, of the Garriſon of* Tangier, *to* 4000 *Men, effective, and well-armed.* The *Whigs*, indeed, in thoſe Days, were ſo averſe to STANDING ARMIES, that They thought even thoſe Troops, commonly called *Guards*, unlawful; and Biſhop *Burnet* argues, in his Reflections on my Lord *Ruſſel*'s Tryal, that *a Deſign to ſeize on them amounted to no more than a Deſign to ſeize on a Part of the King's Army.* But it is poſſible that the *Tories*, who had ſhewed their Diſlike of *ſtanding Armies* ſufficiently in the *long Parliament*, might think it however no unreaſonable Thing, when Deſigns of *Inſurrections*, and even of *Aſſaſſinations* had come ſo lately to Light, that a Number of *regular Troops*, ſufficient to defend the *Perſon of the King*, but not ſufficient to oppreſs the *Liberties of the People*, and five Times leſs than We have ſince ſeen kept up, in the Midſt of the moſt ſecure Tranquility, ſhould be wink'd at, till *theſe Diſtempers* were intirely over.

Another Step, which the *ſame Author* mentions, was indeed of the greateſt Conſequence, and laid the Ax to the Root of all our Liberties at once, by giving the CROWN *ſuch an Influence over the Elections of Members to ſerve in Parliament*, as could not fail to deſtroy *that Independency*, by which alone the Freedom of our Government hath been, and

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can be ſupported. I mean the Proceedings by *Quo Warranto*, and the other Methods taken to force, or perſuade, the Corporations to ſurrender their *old Charters*, and accept *new ones*, under ſuch Limitations and Conditions, as the *King* thought fit to innovate. *Theſe Proceedings* were violent, the *Judgments* upon them arbitrary, and the *other Methods* employed ſcandalous. But ſtill it was the *End*, it was the *Conſequence*, that alarm'd and terrify'd all Thoſe, who had not ſold themſelves to the *Court*, or who had not loſt, in their Zeal for *Party*, all Regard to their *Country*, much more than the *Means*, that were employed upon this Occaſion. If, inſtead of garbling Corporations by *Prerogative*, the *Court* could have purchaſed their Elections by *Money*, We may reaſonably believe that the *ſurer* and *more ſilent Way* would have been taken. But would the Alarm have been leſs among all the *Friends of Liberty?* Certainly not. They would have ſeen that the *End* was the ſame, and have diſliked *theſe Means* the more, for being leſs liable to Obſervation and Clamour. A *Prince*, aſſerting an *illegal* and *dangerous Prerogative*, and applauded for doing ſo, and ſeconded in the Attempt by a *numerous Party* in the Nation, carried no Doubt a very terrible Aſpect. But ſtill there was Room to hope, the violent Character of the Duke of *York* conſidered, (and that Hope was actually entertained by many) that the *Party*, who abetted theſe Uſurpations of the *Prerogative*, might be ſoon frightened back again from a *Court* to a *Country Intereſt*; in which Caſe, there was Room to hope likewiſe, the milder Character and better Underſtanding of the *King* conſidered, that the *Evil* might be in ſome Degree redreſs'd, and the *Conſequences* of it prevented. It was reaſonable for the *Friends of Liberty* to expect that Men, who were

were injured, would complain and ſeek Relief, on the firſt favourable Opportunity. But if They had been *corrupted*, and the Practice of *ſelling Elections* had been once eſtabliſhed, I imagine that the *Friends of Liberty* would have thought the Caſe more deſperate.——— It is certainly an eaſier Task, and there is ſomewhat leſs provoking, as well as leſs dangerous in it, to ſtruggle even with a *great Prince*, who ſtands on *Prerogative*, than with a *weak*, but *profligate Miniſter*, if He hath the Means of *Corruption* in his Power, and if the *Luxury* and *Proſtitution* of the Age have enabled Him to bring it into *Faſhion*. Nothing ſurely could provoke Men, who had the *Spirit of Liberty* in their Souls, more than to figure to Themſelves *one of theſe ſaucy Creatures of Fortune*, whom ſhe raiſes in the Extravagance of her Caprice, diſpatching his Emiſſaries, eccleſiaſtical and ſecular, like ſo many evil Dæmons, to the North and to the South, to buy the Votes of the People with the Money of the People, and to chuſe a *Repreſentative Body*, not of the *People*, but of the *Enemy of the People*, of *Himſelf*.

This was not the Caſe at the Time We are ſpeaking of. It was *Prerogative*, not *Money*, which had like to have deſtroy'd our *Liberties* then. Government was not then carried on by *Undertakers*, to whom *ſo much Power* was farm'd out for Returns of *ſo much Money*, and *ſo much Money* intruſted for Returns of *ſo much Power*. But though the Caſe was not ſo deſperate; yet was it bad enough in all Conſcience; and among all the Exceſſes, into which the *Tories* ran, in Favour of the *Crown*, and in Hopes of fixing Dominion in their *own Party*, their Zeal to ſupport the Methods of *garbling Corporations* was, in my Opinion, That, which threatened *publick Liberty* the moſt. It hath been

been reproach'd to Them by many; but if among *Thoſe*, who reproach'd Them, there ſhould be *Some*, who have ſhared ſince that Time in the more dangerous Practice of *corrupting* Corporations; *ſuch Men* muſt have Fronts of Braſs, and deſerve all the Indignation, which is due to Iniquity, aggravated by Impudence. The *Others* abetted, in Favour of a *Prerogative*, ſuppoſed *real* by many in thoſe Days, and under the Pretence at leaſt of *Law*, a Power, which gave the *Crown* too much Influence in the *Elections of Members of the Houſe of Commons*; but *theſe Men*, if there are any ſuch, have been concerned in a Practice, for the Sake of their own vile Intereſt, which ſpreads like a Gangreen over the whole Body of a Nation, and to every Branch of Government; and which hath never fail'd, in any one Inſtance, where it hath been ſuffered, to become the Bane of *Liberty*.

We have now carried the *two Parties* through that Period of Time, when the Conduct of *both* was moſt liable to the Objections made to Them by their *Adverſaries*.——The *Tories* acted on the *moſt abject Principles of Submiſſion to the King*, and, *on Thoſe of hereditary Right*, were zealous for the Succeſſion of a *Prince*, whoſe Bigotry rendered Him unfit to rule a *Proteſtant* and a *free People*. — The *Whigs* maintain'd the *Power of Parliament to limit the Succeſſion to the Crown*, and avowed the *Principle of Reſiſtance*; in which They had *Law*, *Example* and *Reaſon* for Them. But then the Fury of *Faction* was for doing That *without Parliament*, which could only be legally done *by it*; and, in order to This, the *Principles of Reſiſtance* were extended too far; and the hotteſt Men of the *Party* taking the Lead, They acted in an *extravagant Spirit of Licence*, rather than a *ſober Spirit of Liberty*; and the *Madneſs of a Few*, little inferior to

That of *Cromwell's Enthuſiaſts*, diſhonoured the whole Cauſe for a Time. ——My Intention was not to have left Them here; but to have carried theſe Obſervations on ſo far as to juſtify, notwithſtanding theſe Appearances, what is ſaid at the Concluſion of my *laſt Letter*, concerning the true Characters of *both Parties*. But either the Abundance of Matter hath deceived Me, or I have wanted Skill and Time to abridge it; ſo that I muſt defer this Part of my Task, and crave your Indulgence, as well as That of your Readers, for my Prolixity.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER VII.

SIR,

I Advanced, in the *firſt* of theſe Eſſays, ſomething to this Effect; that every *clumſy, buſy, bungling Child of Fortune*, on whom the beſtows the Means and the Opportunity of *corrupting*, may govern by this infamous Expedient; and, having gratified his Ambition and Avarice, may have a Chance to ſecure himſelf from Puniſhment, by deſtroying the *Liberties of his Country*. It was advanced likewiſe, in the *ſame Paper*, that every Character is not equally fit to govern a People, by *dividing* them; becauſe ſome Cunning, ſome Experience, nay, ſome Skill to form, and ſome Addreſs to conduct a *Syſtem of Fraud*, are neceſſary in this Caſe. I perſuade my ſelf that no Man, who read that Paper, was at a Loſs to find an Inſtance to confirm the Truth of the *firſt of theſe Propoſitions*;

tions; and we have now before us another, which may ſerve to confirm the Truth of the *ſecond*.

Though I do not think the Deſigns of King *Charles* the 2d either deeply laid, or deeply fixed in his own Mind; yet in general they were founded on *bad Principles*, and directed to *bad Ends*. He deſired indeed to be eaſy, and to make his People ſo; but then he deſired both Theſe on ſuch Conditions, as were inconſiſtent with good Government, during the whole Courſe of his Reign, and with the Security of Religion and Liberty, during the latter Part of it. We have ſeen how the intemperate Conduct of many, and the flagitious Deſigns of ſome among the *Whigs*, weakened their *own Party*, and gave new Strength and new Provocations to the *other*. But we have not yet conſidered ſome other Advantages, without which *theſe Diviſions* could neither have been fomented, nor ſupported as they were. Now theſe Advantages aroſe chiefly from the Character and Conduct of the *King* himſelf. If King *Charles* had found the Nation plunged in *Corruption*; the People chuſing their Repreſentatives for *Money*, without any other Regard; and theſe Repreſentatives of the People, as well as the Nobility, reduced by Luxury to beg the unhallowed Alms of a *Court*; or to receive, like miſerable Hirelings, the Wages of Iniquity from a *Miniſter*; if He had found the Nation, I ſay, in this Condition, (which extravagant Suppoſition one cannot make without Horrour) He might have diſhonoured her abroad, and impoveriſhed and oppreſſed her at home, tho' He had been the weakeſt Prince on Earth, and his Miniſters the moſt odious, and contemptible Men, that ever preſumed to be ambitious. Our Fathers might have fallen into Circumſtances, which compoſe the very Quinteſſence of political Miſery. They might

have *ſold their Birth-right for Porridge*, that was their own. They might have been bubbled by the fooliſh, bullied by the fearful, and inſulted by Thoſe, whom They deſpiſed. They would have deſerved to be *Slaves*, and They might have been treated as ſuch. When a *free People* crouch, like Camels, to be loaded, the next at Hand, no Matter who, mounts them, and they ſoon feel the Whip, and the Spur of their *Tyrant*; for a *Tyrant*, whether Prince, or *Miniſter*, reſembles the *Devil* in many Reſpects; particularly in This. He is often both the *Tempter* and *Tormentor*. He makes the *Criminal*, and he puniſhes the *Crime*.

But This was not the State of the *Engliſh* Nation, at the Time we ſpeak of. We were not yet *corrupted*, nor even quite ripe for *Corruption*. *Parties* there were; and the Conteſts of *theſe Parties* gave Occaſion to the Riſe and Growth of *Factions*; ſome of which ran into the moſt ſeditious Practices againſt the Government, and others into the vileſt Submiſſion to it. But ſtill a *Spirit of Liberty* remained in many, uncorrupted and unextinguiſhed, and ſuch as worked our national Deliverance in the Days of Diſtreſs, that ſoon followed. We were *Freemen* then, in the proper Senſe, and full Extent of the Words; becauſe not only the *Laws*, which aſſerted our common Rights, were maintained and improved, but *private Independency*, which can alone ſupport *publick Liberty*, under ſuch a Government as ours, was itſelf ſupported by ſome of that *ancient Oeconomy* and *Simplicity of Manners*, that were growing, but not grown, out of Faſhion. *Such a People*, as we then were, could neither be *bought*, nor *driven*; and I think King *Charles* could not have *divided* and *led* them, if he had wanted any of the Qualities he poſſeſſed, or had held another Conduct than he held,

held. Far from being proud, haughty, or brutal, * *he had not a Grain of Pride, or Vanity, in his whole Compoſition*; but was the moſt affable, beſt-bred Man alive. He treated his Subjects like *Noblemen*, like *Gentlemen*, like *Freemen*, not like *Vaſſals*, or *Boors*. Whatever Notion he had of his *hereditary Right*, he owned his Obligation for the Crown he wore to his *People*, as much as He would have been bound to do, in Reaſon, in Juſtice, in Honour, and in Prudence, if he had ſtood at the greateſt Diſtance from it, in the Courſe of lineal Succeſſion, and had been called to it from the low State, in which he was before, by the free Gift and Choice of the Nation. His Profeſſions were plauſible, and his whole Behaviour engaging; ſo that he won upon the Hearts, even whilſt he loſt the good Opinion of his Subjects, and often ballanced their Judgment of Things, by their perſonal Inclination. Theſe Qualities and this Part of his Conduct went a great Way to give him Credit with his People, and an Hold on their Affections. But This was not all. He obſerved their Temper, and he complyed with it. He yielded to Them in Points, from which he had determined, and declared too, that He would never depart. To know when to yield, in *Government*, is at leaſt as neceſſary, as to know when to loſe in *Trade*; and he, who cannot do the *firſt*, is ſo little likely to *govern a Kingdom well*, that it is more than probable he would *govern a Shop ill*. King *Charles* gave up to the Murmurs of his People, not *one* or *two ſuch Miniſters* as may be found almoſt behind every Desk; thoſe awkard Pageants of Courts, thoſe wooden Images, which Princes gild and then wor-

* Sir *William Temple*.

ſhip;

ſhip; but ſeveral *great* and *able Men*; nay, *whole Cabals of ſuch*, who had Merit with *Him*, though they had none with the *Nation*. He ſtarted often out of the true Intereſt of his People; but the Voice of his People almoſt as often reclaimed him. He made the *firſt Dutch War*; but he made the *Triple Alliance* too. He engaged with *France* in the War of 1672; but he made a ſeparate Peace with *Holland*. True it is, indeed, that neither the Repreſentations of his *Parliament*, nor the Deſires of his *People*, could prevail on him to go farther, and to enter in earneſt into the War againſt *France*. But the Confidence between *Him* and his *Parliament* was ſo broken at that Time, that They would not truſt Him, nor He Them. At This I am not ſurprized, and for that very Reaſon, I confeſs, I have always been ſo at the ſtrong and repeated Inſtances made to force Him into *that War*; ſince it cannot ſurely be better Policy to drive a Prince into a War, which He has no Inclination to make, than it would be to be drawn by Him into a War, if He had no Ability to conduct it. In *Home Affairs*, beſides his frequent Conceſſions, whenever the Nation took Umbrage at his Proceedings, He paſſed the *Teſt* and the *Habeas Corpus Bills*, and many others for the publick Benefit; and I ſcarce remember any *popular Act*, which ſtopped at the Throne in his Time, except That about the *Militia*, which he apprehended to be a dangerous Encroachment on his *Prerogative*, and another in Favour of the *Diſſenters*, which was contrived, meanly enough, to be ſtolen off the Table in the *Houſe of Lords*.

What has been touched here, and in former Papers, will be ſufficient to ſhew, in ſome Meaſure, how King *Charles* was enabled to *divide a Nation* ſo united and ſo heated as this Nation was, on the

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covery of the *Popiſh Plot*; to oppoſe ſo avowedly and ſo reſolutely the *Excluſion of his Brother*; the Proſpect of whoſe ſucceeding to the Crown was become ſtill more dreadful, even by that ſmall Part of *Coleman's* Correſpondence, which had come to Light; and yet to attach ſo numerous a Party to *Himſelf*, nay to his *Brother*; to lay aſide *Parliaments* for ſeveral Years, and not only to ſtand his Ground, but to gain Ground in the Nation, at the ſame Time. But there is ſtill ſomething more to be added. He had not only prepared for the Storm, but he acquired new Strength in the midſt of it; That is, in the Proceedings on the *Popiſh Plot*, and the *Bill of Excluſion*. He would gladly have kept the *former* out of Parliament; but when it was once there, he put on the Appearances of great Zeal for the Proſecution of it. Theſe Appearances helped him to ſcreen his *Brother*; as the ill Succeſs of the *Excluſion Bill in the Houſe of Lords*, where it was rejected by *Sixty-Three* againſt *Thirty*, helped to ſcreen Himſelf from the Violence of the *Houſe of Commons*. But That, which gave him the principal Advantage, in the preſent Conteſts, was another Management. As ſoon as the firſt preparatory Steps were made to the *Bill of Excluſion* in 1678, he declared Himſelf, in a Speech to his Parliament, ready to paſs any Bills to make his People ſafe in the Reign of his *Succeſſor*, *ſo they tended not to impeach the Right of Succeſſion, nor the Deſcent of the Crown in the true Line*. He perſiſted in his Declaration to the laſt; and if he had done nothing elſe, I imagine that he would have gained no great Popularity. When a *free People* lye under any *Grievance*, or apprehend any *Danger*, and try to obtain their Prince's Conſent to deliver them from *one*, or prevent the *other*; a flat Refuſal, on his Part, reduces Them to the melancholy Alternative of

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continuing to ſubmit to *one*, and to ſtand expoſed to the *other*, or of freeing Themſelves from *both*, without his Conſent; which can hardly be done by Means very conſiſtent with his and their common Intereſt. King *Charles* was too wiſe to puſh the Nation to ſuch an Extremity. He refuſed what his *Parliament* preſs'd on him, in the *Manner* and on the *Principle* They preſſed it; but then his *Refuſal* was followed by *Expedients*; which varyed the *Manner*, and yet might have been managed ſo as to produce the *Effect*; and which ſeemed to ſave, rather than actually ſaved, the *Principle*. Numbers concurred, at that Time, in avowing the *Principle*; and the *Teſts* had made many Perſons think *Religion* ſafe; as the *King's Offers* made them think it no Fault of his, if it was not made ſafer. The *Council* had prepared *ſome Expedients*; and the *Limitations*, and *other Proviſions* againſt a *Popiſh Succeſſor*, propoſed directly from the Throne by the *Chancellor* in 1679, went a great Way towards binding the Hands of *ſuch a Succeſſor*, and lodging the Power, taken from *Him*, in the *Parliament*. But the Scheme of *Expedients*, debated in the *Oxford* Parliament, was a real Excluſion from every Thing, but the *Title of King*. The *firſt Article* baniſh'd the *Duke of York*, during his Life, to the Diſtance of 500 Miles from *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*; and the *Tenth*, to mention no more, excluded him *ipſo facto*, if he came into any of theſe Kingdoms; directed that he ſhould ſuffer, in this Caſe, as by the *former Bill*, and that the Sovereignty ſhould veſt forthwith in the *Regent*; That is, in the Princeſs of *Orange*. Surely This was not to vote the *Lyon in the Lobby into the Houſe*. It would have been to vote him *out of the Houſe*, *and Lobby both*, and only ſuffer him to be called *Lyon* ſtill. I am not ignorant of the Refinements, urged by Sir

Sir *William Jones* and others againſt *this Scheme*; but I know that Men run into Errors from both Extremes; from That of ſeeing too much, as well as That of ſeeing too little; and that the moſt ſubtle Refiners are apt to miſs the true Point of political Wiſdom, which conſiſts in diſtinguiſhing juſtly between what is abſolutely beſt in Speculation, and what is the beſt of Things practicable in particular Conjunctures. The *Scheme*, no Doubt, was built on a manifeſt Abſurdity, and was liable to many Inconveniencies, Difficulties and Dangers; but ſtill it was the utmoſt, that could be hoped for at that Moment; and the ſingle Conſideration, one would think, ſhould have been This; whether, united under ſuch an Act of Parliament, they would not have oppoſed the Succeſſion of the Duke of *York*, with leſs Inconveniency, leſs Difficulty and Danger, than diſunited, and with the Laws againſt them. The Truth is, that as there were Men at this Time, deſirous that the *King* ſhould be on deſperate Terms with his *Parliament*, becauſe *They* were ſo Themſelves; in like Manner, there were others, who deſired, for a Reaſon of the ſame Nature, that the *Parliament* ſhould be on deſperate Terms with the *King*. Theſe were *factious Intereſts*, and they prevail'd againſt the *national Intereſt*; which required that the *King* ſhould be ſeparated at any Rate from his *Brother*, inſtead of being united to him by a Fear made common to *both*. But the Dye was thrown; and the Leaders of the *Whig Party* were reſolved * *to let all lye in Confuſion, rather than hearken to any Thing, beſides the Excluſion.* Obſtinacy provoked Obſtinacy. The *King* grew obſtinate, and ſevere too, againſt his natural Eaſineſs and former Clemency of Temper. The

* *Burn. Hiſt.*

Tory Party grew as obſtinate, and as furious on their Side, according to a natural Tendency in the Diſpoſition of all *Parties*; and thus the Nation was delivered over, on the Death of King * *Charles, à la Sottiſe de ſon Frere; to the Folly and Madneſs of his* Brother.

It was *this Folly* and *Madneſs* however, that cured the *Folly and Madneſs of Party*. As the common Danger approached, the Impreſſions of Terror, which it made, increaſed. *Whig* and *Tory* then felt them alike, and were brought by them, as drunken Men ſometimes are, to their Senſes. The Events of King *James*'s Reign, and the Steps, by which the *Revolution* was brought about, are ſo recent, and ſo well known, that I ſhall not deſcend into any particular Mention of them. A few general Remarks on the Behaviour of *this Prince*, and on the Behaviour of *Parties*, in his Reign, and at the *Revolution*, will be ſufficient to wind up the Hiſtory of *Whig* and *Tory*, and to prove what I have ſo often aſſerted, that *both Sides* purged Themſelves on this great Occaſion, of the Imputations laid to their Charge by their *Adverſaries*; that the proper and real Diſtinction of the *two Parties* expired at this Æra, and that although their Ghoſts have continued to haunt and divide us ſo many Years afterwards, yet there neither is, nor can be any Diviſion of *Parties* at this Time, reconcileable with common Senſe, and common Honeſty, among Thoſe, who are come on the Stage of the World, under the *preſent Conſtitution*; except Thoſe of *Churchmen*, and *Diſſenters*; Thoſe of *Court* and *Country*.

The Behaviour and Conduct of King *James* the 2d would be ſufficient, if there was no other In-

* *An Expreſſion uſed by King* Charles *on many Occaſions.*

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ſtance, and there are Thouſands, to ſhew that as ſtrong Prejudices, however got, are the Parents, ſo a weak Underſtanding is the Nurſe of *Bigotry*, and Injuſtice, and Violence and Cruelty its Off-ſpring. *This Prince* was above *Fifty*, when he came to the Throne. He had great Experience of all Kinds; particularly of the Temper of *this Nation*, and of the Impoſſibility to attempt introducing *Popery*, without hazarding his Crown. But his *Experience* profited him not. His *Bigotry* drew falſe Concluſions from it. He flattered himſelf that he ſhould be able to play *Parties* againſt one another, better than his *Brother* had done; (which, by the Way, was the leaſt of his little Talents;) and to compleat his Deſigns by an *Authority*, which was but too well eſtabliſhed. He paſſed, I think, for a ſincere Man. Perhaps, he was ſo, and he ſpoke always with great Emphaſis of the *Word of a King*; and yet never was the meaneſt Word ſo ſcandalouſly broken as his. In the Debate in 1678, about the *Teſt*, when He got a Proviſo put in for excepting Himſelf, it has been advanced in Print, and not denied that I know of, that ſpeaking with * *great Earneſtneſs, and with Tears in his Eyes, He ſolemnly proteſted that whatever his Religion might be, it ſhould only be a private Thing between God and his own Soul; and that no Effect of it ſhould ever appear in the Government.* At his Acceſſion to the Throne, in *Council* firſt, and after That in *full Parliament*, in the Face of the Nation, he made the ſtrongeſt Declaration in Favour of the Conſtitution in Church and State, and took the moſt ſolemn Engagements to defend and ſupport it. But *Bigotry* burſt thro' all theſe Cobwebs; for ſuch they are to Men, tranſported by a *religious Delirium*, who acquire a Strength

* *Burnet's Hiſt.*

that Thoſe, who are well, have not, and conſciencioufly break all the Obligations of Morality. Theſe admirable Diſpoſitions in the *King* were encouraged by the State, in which his *Brother* left and He found the Nation, and by the Complaiſance of the *Parliament*, which He called ſoon after his Acceſſion. They were confirmed, and He was determined to pull off the Mask entirely, by the ill Succeſs of the Duke of *Monmouth* and the Earl of *Argyle*. Biſhop *Burnet* ſpeaks of *this Parliament* very indecently, and I think very untruly. *They were neither Men of Parts, nor Eſtates*, according to Him. The Truth is, that the Circumſtances, under which we were brought, by the factious Proceedings of *both Parties*, in the late Reign, for and againſt the *Court*, were ſuch as might perplex the beſt Parts, and puzzle the Heads even of the wiſeſt Men. A *profeſſed, zealous Papiſt*, in full and quiet Poſſeſſion of the Throne, and, inſtead of any Proviſion made, or any Meaſures taken againſt him, the Notion and the Exerciſe of the *Prerogative* eſtabliſhed at an extravagant Height, were ſuch Circumſtances, as laid the Nation almoſt at the Mercy of the *King*. They therefore, who were the moſt determined not to part with either their *Religion*, or their *Liberty*, and yet had more to loſe in the Fray than Dr. *Burnet*, might be willing to look round them; to wait Opportunities; and not undertake raſhly what can ſeldom be undertaken twice. It is impoſſible to believe that their Confidence in the *King's Word* was ſuch as They affected. But like drowning Men, who ſaw nothing elſe to catch at, They caught at a Straw. The Duke of *Monmouth's* Expedition into *England*, and the Earl of *Argyle's* into *Scotland*, were ſo far from affording the Nation any Opportunity of mending their Condition, that the Declaration of the *former* might

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draw ſome of the *Diſſenters* to his Standard, as it did; but was calculated to drive the *Tory Party*, moſt of the *Whigs*, and in ſhort the *Bulk of the People* from Him. The Declaration of the *latter* was founded in the *ſolemn League and Covenant*; and gave ſo much Reaſon to apprehend that a Revival of the *ſame Principles*, and a Renewal of the *ſame Tyranny* was intended, that we cannot wonder it had no better an Effect; though we lament the Fate of a *worthy* and *gallant Man*, whoſe Crime was refuſing a *Teſt*, that ſhould never have been impoſed on *Proteſtants* and *Freemen*, and who had been driven into theſe extreme Reſolutions by a Series of *unjuſt* and *tyrannical Uſage*.

Thus were *theſe Invaſions*, in the very Beninning of his Reign, favourable in ſome Reſpects to the Deſigns of King *James*. They fortified, in the Minds of Men, the Jealouſies and Fears, which had a few Years before formed the *Tory Party*; and diſpoſed Them by Conſequence, at leaſt, to keep Meaſures and not break with the *King*. They gave him the Pretence, which He ſeized very readily, of raiſing and keeping up a *ſtanding Army*. But, in the Event, they forwarded our Deliverance from all the Dangers, to which we were expoſed, under his Government, by precipitating his Attempts againſt our *Religion* and *Liberty*. The ſame Day, that the News of the Invaſion in *Scotland* was communicated to the *Parliament* here, the *Commons* voted that great Revenue, which they gave him, and gave him for Life. After *theſe Invaſions* were over, They voted a Supply, which was intended for the Charge of maintaining the *additional Forces*. They offered to paſs a Law for indemnifying his *Popiſh Officers* from the Penalty They had incurred; and to capacitate *ſuch others* as he ſhould name in a Liſt to be given to the *Houſe*. In ſhort, They

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ſuffered Themſelves to be drawn to the Brink of the Precipice; but there They ſtopped. They would neither give him the whole Supply of 1,200,000 *l.* which he asked, nor ſanctify, by the Authority of *Parliament*, the Practice of keeping up a *ſtanding Army in Time of Peace*; but rejected the Words moved for that Purpoſe. They would neither repeal the *Teſt* and *penal Laws*; nor ſubmit to his *diſpenſing*, or *ſuſpending*, which was in Effect a *repealing Power*; That is, They would not caſt Themſelves headlong down the Precipice; and becauſe They would not, He quarrelled with Them; loſt the 700,000 *l.* They had voted, rather than ſuffer Them to ſit any longer; and never met Them more.

Things haſtened now to a Deciſion. The *King's* Deſigns were openly avowed, and deſperately puſhed. The Church of *England* oppoſed them, with the utmoſt Vigour. The *Diſſenters* were cajoled by the *Court*; and They, who had been ready to take Arms againſt King *Charles*, becauſe He was unwilling to exclude his *Brother*, and who had taken Arms againſt *this Prince*, ſince he was on the Throne, became Abettors of his Uſurpations. It were eaſy to prove This, even by Biſhop *Burnet's* Account, as much as That is ſoftened; and if the Excuſes, which have been made for their Silence againſt *Popery* in this critical Moment, or for their approving and encouraging the Exerciſe of a *diſpenſing Power*, are to be received, one may undertake to excuſe, on the ſame Principles of Reaſoning, all thoſe Inſtances of Miſconduct in the *Church Party*, which I have preſumed to cenſure ſo freely. But the Truth is, theſe Excuſes are frivolous. I could quote ſome, that are even burleſque. Let us reverence Truth therefore, and condemn the *Diſſenters* as frankly, on this Occaſion, as we have con-

condemn'd the Members of the *Church of England* on others.

The *Revolution* ſoon followed. Many of the moſt diſtinguiſhed *Tories*, ſome of Thoſe, who carried higheſt the Doctrines of *Paſſive Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, were engaged in it; and the whole Nation was ripe for it. The *Whigs* were zealous in the ſame Cauſe; but their Zeal was not ſuch as, I think, it had been ſome Years before, *a Zeal without Knowledge*; I mean, that it was better temper'd, and more prudently conducted. Though the *King* was not the better for his Experience, *Parties* were. Both ſaw their Errors. The *Tories* ſtopped ſhort in the Purſuit of a *bad Principle*. The *Whigs* reformed the Abuſe of a *good one*. Both had ſacrificed their *Country* to their *Party*. Both ſacrificed, on this Occaſion, their *Party* to their *Country*. When the *Tories* and the *Whigs* were thus coalited, the *latter* ſtood no longer in Need of any adventitious Help. If They did not refuſe the Aſſiſtance of Thoſe, who had weaken'd their Cauſe more, by the Jealouſies and Fears, to which They gave both Occaſion and Pretence, than They had ſtrengthened it by their Number; yet They ſuffered Them to have no Influence in their Councils, no Direction of their Conduct. The Cauſe of *Liberty* was no longer made the Cauſe of a *Party*, by being ſet on ſuch a Bottom, and puſh'd in ſuch a Manner, as *one Party* alone approved. The *Revolution* was plainly deſign'd to reſtore and ſecure our Government, Eccleſiaſtical and Civil, on true Foundations; and whatever might happen to the *King*, there was no Room to ſuſpect any Change of the *Conſtitution*. There were Some, indeed, concern'd in this great and glorious Undertaking, who had obſtinately preſerved, or lightly taken up the *Republican* and *other Whimſies*, that reign'd in the Days

the Days of Uſurpation and Confuſion. If They could have prevailed, and it was no Fault of theirs They did not, the *Coalition of Parties* had been broken; and, inſtead of a *Revolution*, we might have had a *civil War*; perhaps, not even that ſad Chance for our *Religion* and *Liberty*. But *this Leven* was ſo near worn out, that it could neither corrupt, nor ſeem any longer to corrupt the Maſs of the *Whig Party*. The *Party* never had been *Presbyterians*, nor *Republicans*, any more than They had been *Quakers*; any more than the *Tory Party* had been *Papiſts*, when, notwithſtanding their Averſion to *Popery*, They were undeniably under the accidental Influence of *Popiſh Councils*. But even the Appearances were now rectified. The *Revolution* was a Fire, which purged off the Droſs of *both Parties*; and the Droſs being purged off, They appeared to be the ſame Metal, and anſwered the ſame Standard.

I ſhall deliver my Thoughts, on ſome other Occaſion, concerning the Diſputes, that aroſe about the *Settlement of the Crown*, after the *Revolution*; and ſhew, if I do not very much deceive myſelf, that no Argument can be drawn from thence againſt any Thing I have advanced.

I am, SIR, &c.

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LETTER VIII.

SIR,

THE ſlaviſh Principles of *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, which had ſculk'd perhaps in ſome old Homily before King *James* the 1ſt, but were talked, written and preached into Vogue in that inglorious Reign, and in Thoſe of his three Succeſſors, were renounced at the *Revolution* by the *laſt of the ſeveral Parties*, who declared for them. Not only the *Laity*, but the *Clergy* embraced and co-operated in the Deliverance, which the Prince of *Orange* brought Them. Some of our *Prelates* join'd to invite Him over. Their Brethren refuſed to ſign an Abhorrence of this Invitation. The Univerſity of *Oxford* offered Him their Plate, and aſſociated for Him againſt their King. In one Word, the Conduct of the *Tories*, at this Criſis, was ſuch as might have inclined a Man to think They had never held *Reſiſtance* unlawful, but had only differed with the *Whigs* about the Degree of Oppreſſion, or of Danger, which it was neceſſary to wait, in order to ſanctify *Reſiſtance*. Now, it may appear at firſt a little ſtrange that *theſe Principles*, which had always gone Hand in Hand with Thoſe of the *divine*, *hereditary*, *indefiezable Right of Kings*, that were juſt as well founded in Reaſon, in ſupport of which the Example of the primitive *Chriſtians* might be pompouſly cited, and to countenance which ſome Texts

of the Bible might be piouſly ſtrain'd, ſhould not keep their Hold, and maintain their Influence, as well as the *others*.

This Attachment to *hereditary Right* will appear the more ſtrange, if We conſider what Regard was ſhewn, at this Time, to the Difficulties They, who had pawn'd Themſelves, as it were, for the *Principles*, would be under, when They came to concur in eſtabliſhing a *Settlement* repugnant to it. That great and ſolemn Reſolution, about the *Abdication of King James*, and the *Vacancy of the Throne*, might have been expreſs'd in Terms much ſtronger and plainer than it was. I have heard there were Perſons who had a Mind it ſhould be ſo; and who, more attach'd to the Honour, That is the Humour of *Party*, than to the *national Intereſt*, in this great Event, would have turned this Reſolution, as well as the Declaration of the Prince of *Orange*, to a more expreſs Approbation of the *Whig*, and a more expreſs Condemnation of the *Tory* Tenets and Conduct. But a wiſer and honeſter Conſideration prevail'd. Inſtead of erecting the *new Government* on the narrow Foundations of *Party Syſtems*, the Foundations of it were laid as wide, and made as comprehenſible, as They could be. No Man, I believe, at this Time thinks that the Vote aſſerted too little; and ſurely there was no Colour of Reaſon on the Side of Thoſe, who cavilled againſt it, at that Time, for aſſerting too much.

The Diſputes about the Words *abdicate*, or *deſert*, and about the *Vacancy of the Throne*, were in Truth fitter for a *School* than a *Houſe of Parliament*, and might have been expected in ſome Aſſembly of *Pedants*, where young Students exerciſed Themſelves in Diſputation, but not in ſuch an auguſt Aſſembly as That of the *Lords* and *Commons*, met

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in ſolemn Conference upon the moſt important Occaſion. The Truth is that They, who formed the Oppoſition, were reduced to maintain ſtrange Paradoxes; ſtranger, in my Opinion, than moſt of Thoſe, which caſt ſo much Ridicule on the *Stoicks* of old. Thus, for inſtance, They were forced to admit that an *oppreſs'd People* might ſeek their Remedy in *Reſiſtance*, for They had ſought it there Themſelves, and yet They oppoſed making Uſe of the *only Remedy*, which could effectually ſecure Them againſt Returns of the *ſame Oppreſſion*, when *Reſiſtance* had put it in their Power, as *Oppreſſion* had given Them a Right to uſe this *Remedy*. Surely This muſt appear a Paradox, and a very abſurd one too, if We conſider that *Reſiſtance*, in all ſuch Caſes, is the *Mean*, and *future Security* the *End*; and that the *former* is impertinent, nay wicked in the higheſt Degree, if it be not imployed to obtain the *latter*. Thus again, the *ſame Men* declared Themſelves willing to ſecure the Nation againſt the Return of King *James* to that Throne, which He had *abdicated*; or, according to Them, *deſerted*; nay, ſome of Them were ready, if We may credit the Anecdotes of that Time, to proceed to ſuch extream Reſolutions, as would have been more effectual, than juſtifiable in the Eyes of Mankind; and yet they could not prevail on their ſcrupulous Conſciences to declare *the Throne vacant*. They had concurred in the Vote, that it was *inconſiſtent with the Laws, Liberties and Religion of* England *to have a* Papiſt *rule over the Kingdom*. King *James* had followed the pious Example of *Sigiſmond*, who, not content to loſe the Crown of *Sweden Himſelf* for his Religion, had carried his *Son* away, that he might be bred a *Papiſt*, and loſe it too; and yet They maintain'd, though They did not expreſly name Him, that if the Throne was then,

or ſhould be at any Time vacant of the *Father*, it muſt be reputed inſtantaneouſly full of the *Son*, upon the Foundation of this ſilly Axiom, that the *King never dies*. According to this Law, and theſe Politicks, King *James* and his Succeſſors, to the twentieth Generation, might have continued abroad, a Race of Royal Exiles, preſerving their *indefiezable Right* to govern, but debarred from the *Exerciſe* of it; whilſt the Nation continued, during all this Time, from Century to Century, under the Dominion of *Regents*, with *regal Authority*, but without any *regal Right*; an excellent Expedient ſure to keep the Monarchy in an *hereditary Succeſſion!* But there remain'd none better, on the Principles of *theſe Men*, ſince the Prince of *Orange* had committed the fatal Overſight of neglecting to *conquer* the Nation. His Sword would have cut the Gordian Knot of *hereditary Right*, and They could have ſubmitted with ſafe Conſciences to a *Conqueror*. But to *give* the Crown to a *Prince*, though They had put the *whole Adminiſtration* into his Hands; which, by the Way, was *High Treaſon*, unleſs the Throne was, what They deny'd it to be, actually *vacant*; to *give* the Crown, I ſay, to a *Prince*, who would not *take* it, when it was in his Power to *take* it, without their *Conſent*; to ſettle a new Government by *Agreement* and *Compact*, when the glorious Opportunity of eſtabliſhing it by *Force* and *Conqueſt* had been unhappily loſt; Theſe were Propoſitions, to which They could not conſent. King *James* had violated the fundamental Laws, which He had promiſed over and over and ſworn to maintain. He had ſhewn by his *firſt Eſcape*, when nothing was more impoſed on Him than to wait the Reſolution of a *free Parliament*, that he would renounce his Crown rather than ſubmit to ſecure effectually the Obſervation

ſervation of theſe Laws. He had made a *ſecond Eſcape*, which was voluntary as well as the *firſt*, and made on the ſame Principle, againſt the Intreaties of his Friends, and the Inſtigations of the *ſame Council* as had directed his former Conduct, and on a Letter from the *Queen*, claiming his Promiſe to do ſo. Notwithſtanding all theſe Reaſons, They, who maintain'd the *hereditary Right of our Kings*, reduced themſelves, and would have reduced their Country, to the abſurd Neceſſity of altering the *Conſtitution*, under Pretence of preſerving it. No *King*, except a *Stuart*, was to reign over Us. But We might eſtabliſh a *Doge*, a *Lord Archon*, a *Regent*; and thus theſe warm Aſſertors of *Monarchy*, refuſing to be *Slaves*, contended to be *Republicans*. Many more Paradoxes of equal Extravagance might be cited, which were advanced directly, or which reſulted plainly, from the Arguments employed on one Side of the Queſtion in thoſe Diſputes. But the Inſtances I have cited, may ſuffice for our preſent Purpoſe, and may ſerve to ſhew that although Difficulties hard to ſolve in Speculation, or to remove in Practice, will ariſe in the Purſuit of the moſt rational Principles; yet ſuch Abſurdities as theſe can never ariſe, except from the moſt irrational, and always muſt ariſe from ſuch.

If the Perſons, who maintain'd this *divine*, *hereditary*, *indefiezable Right of our Kings*, had thought fit to drop theſe Principles, when they laid aſide Thoſe of *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, and no tolerable Reaſon can be given why They did not, their Conduct would have been conſiſtent and uniform on this great Occaſion; and this Conſiſtency and Uniformity would have been productive of great Good, by taking away at once even the Appearances of all political Diviſion in the Bulk of the Nation

Nation. But whilſt they labour'd to reconcile their *preſent Conduct* to their *antient Syſtem*, They were true to *neither*. They had gone much farther than *This* would allow, and then *They* refuſed to go as far as the *other* required, in order to be ſafe, and therefore in order to be juſtify'd. They loſt every Kind of Merit; the chimerical Merit of adhering to a Set of *ſilly Principles*; the real Merit of ſacrificing their Prejudices to the compleat Deliverance of their Country from the recent Danger of *Popery* and *arbitrary Power*. Nay, They did worſe; for the miſchievous Conſequences of their Conduct were not hurtful to Them alone, and at that Time alone, but to the Publick, and even down to theſe Times. They furniſhed Pretence to *Factions*, who kept up a Diviſion under the *old Names*, when the Differences were really extinguiſhed by the Conduct of *both Parties*; becauſe the Conduct of *both Parties* was no longer conformable to the *Principles* imputed to them. The *Tories* had no longer any Pretence of fearing the Deſigns of the *Whigs*; ſince the *Whigs* had ſufficiently purged Themſelves from all Suſpicion of *Republican Views*, by their Zeal to continue *monarchical Government*, and of Latitudinarian Schemes in Point of *Religion*, by their ready Concurrence in preſerving our *Eccleſiaſtical Eſtabliſhment*, and by their inſiſting on nothing farther, in Favour of the *Diſſenters*, than that Indulgence, which the *Church* was moſt willing to grant. The *Whigs* had as little Pretence of fearing the *Tories*; ſince the *Tories* had purged Themſelves, in the moſt ſignal Manner, from all Suſpi- [redacted] favouring *Popery*, or *arbitrary Power*, by [redacted] gorous Reſiſtance They made to *both*. They [redacted] engaged, They had taken the Lead in the *Revolution*, and They were fully determin'd againſt the Return of King *James*. The real Eſſences of *Whig*

Whig and *Tory* were thus deſtroyed; but the nominal were preſerved, and have done ſince that Time a good Part of the Miſchief, which the real did before. The Oppoſition made to the *Settlement of the Crown* brought This about. An over-curious Enquiry into the Motives of this Oppoſition would be a Taſk too invidious for me to undertake. Something however may be ſaid upon it. We may ſay in general, without Offence, that *private Ambition* mingled itſelf early in the great and national Concerns of the *Revolution*; and that it did ſo more, as the Proſpect of a *new Settlement*, and of the Elevation of the Prince of *Orange* approached. Expectations were raiſed; Diſappointments were given, or foreſeen; and a Variety of Motives of the ſame Kind began to influence very ſtrongly the Conduct of the principal Actors. *Some* endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of their future Fortune by Demonſtrations of a perſonal Attachment to the *Prince*; which were carried on, I doubt, a little too independently of the Regard due to their Country, in ſome Caſes; particularly, if I miſtake not, in That of *the Declaration of Rights*, of which We may pronounce, and Experience will juſtify us, that it was too looſe, too imperfect, and nothing leſs than proportionable to the Importance of the Occaſion, and the favourable Circumſtances of the Conjuncture. *Others* there were, who imagined that the ſhorteſt and ſureſt Way for Them to take, in Purſuit of the ſame View, was to make Themſelves conſiderable by *Oppoſition*, to form a *Party*, and maintain a Struggle for *perſonal Power*, under the Pretence and Umbrage of *Principle*. This was, without Doubt, the Motive of ſome particular, leading Men, and could not be, at leaſt at firſt, the Motive of Numbers. But there was *another Motive*, which eaſily became That of Numbers, becauſe it

it aroſe out of a Fund common to all Men, the *Perverſity of human Nature*, according to an Obſervation made in one of theſe Letters. Whilſt the Event of the Prince of *Orange*'s Expedition was undecided, Men remained under the full Influence of their *Fears*, which had determin'd Them to act againſt their *Prejudices*. But when the *Revolution* was ſecure, and theſe *Fears* were calm'd, *theſe Prejudices* reſumed, in ſome Degree, their former Power, and the more for being reviv'd and encourag'd by Men of Reputation and Authority, who argued for ſome, and might as reaſonably have argued for all the Errors, in Contradiction to which moſt of Them had acted, nay and were ready to act. With ſuch Views, and by ſuch Means, were many brought, at this Time, to entangle Themſelves in a Maze of inextricable Abſurdities. Had They own'd candidly and fairly that their *Principles*, as well as Thoſe of the *Whigs*, were carried too high in the former Diſputes of *Parties*, and that *theſe Principles* could not be true, ſince They found Themſelves actually in a Situation, wherein it was not poſſible to act agreeably to them without manifeſt Abſurdity, the Diſtinction, as well as the Difference, of *Whig* and *Tory* had been at an End. But contrary Meaſures produced a contrary Effect. They kept up the Appearances, and They could keep up no more, of a *Whig* and a *Tory Party*, and with theſe Appearances a great Part of the old Animoſity. The *two Names* were ſounded about the Nation; and Men, who ſaw the ſame Enſigns flying, were not wiſe enough to perceive, or not honeſt enough to own, that the ſame Cauſe was no longer concerned, but liſted Themſelves on either Side, as their Prejudices at firſt, and their Inclinations, or other Motives, which aroſe in the Progreſs of their Conteſts, directed Them afterwards; *Whigs* very often under the

the *Tory* Standard, *Tories* very often under the *Whig* Standard.

This general Repreſentation, which I have made of the State of *Parties* at the *Revolution*, is, I am verily perſuaded, exactly juſt; and it might be ſupported by many particular Proofs, that I chuſe rather to ſuggeſt, than to mention. But if any Doubt remains, let us analyſe the ſeveral *Parties* of that Time a little more, reduce them to their *firſt* and *real Principles*, and then pronounce whether We find the *Whig*, or the *Tory Party* ſubſiſting among Them.

In the firſt Place, there was a *Party*, that concurred in making the *new Settlement*; a *Party*, that prevail'd in *Parliament*, and was by much the Majority of the Nation out of it. Were the *Whigs* this Majority? Was this Party a *Whig Party?* No Man will preſume to affirm ſo notorious an Untruth. The *Whigs* were far from being this Majority, and King *James* muſt have dyed on the Throne, if the *Tories* had not concurred to place the Prince of *Orange* there, in his ſtead. Was this Party a *Tory Party* then? Certainly no. The *Whigs* had been zealous in the ſame Cauſe, and had contributed to make it ſucceſsful by their Temper, as well as their Zeal; by waiting the Time of the *Tories*, or rather the Maturity of the Conjuncture, and by moderating their Principles and their Conduct, in Favour of that *Coalition*, without which the *Revolution* could have ſucceeded no more than the *Excluſion* did. We find then here neither a *Whig*, nor a *Tory Party*; for in *Coalitions* of this Kind, where *two Parties* are melted, as it were, into one, *neither* of them can be ſaid, with Truth and Propriety, to exiſt.

There was *another Party* directly oppoſite to *This*; a certain Number of Men, on whom the ori-

ginal Taint, tranſmitted down from King *James* the 1ſt, remain'd ſtill in the full Strength of its Malignity. Theſe Men adhered to *thoſe Principles*, in the natural Senſe and full Extent of them, which the *Tories* had profeſs'd. But yet, the *Tories* having renounced *theſe Principles*, or diſtinguiſhed Themſelves out of any Obligation to obſerve them, this inconſiderable Faction could not be deem'd the *Tory Party*, but received the Name of *Jacobite* with more Propriety.

Two other Parties there were at this Time, form'd on one common Principle, but widely different however, by the different Conſequences They drew from it. The Principle I mean is That contain'd in the Diſtinction of a King *de Jure*, and a King *de Facto*. The famous Statute of *Henry* the 6th authorized this Diſtinction. The Statute was deſign'd principally, no Doubt, for the Advantage of the *Subjects*, that They might be ſafe, which-ever Side prevail'd in an Age, when the epidemical Folly of fighting for *different Pretenders* had ſpilt Oceans of Blood on the Scaffold, as well as in the Field; and yet the Statute was deſign'd for the Service of *Kings de Facto* too, and particularly of *Henry* the 7th. The Author of *hereditary Right aſſerted* would have us believe otherwiſe; and yet ſurely nothing can be more evident than This, that if King *Henry* the *Seventh*'s Right had been as unqueſtionable as He ſuppoſes, and I preſume to deny that it was, yet He would have been declared a King *de Facto* only, if the Intrigues of the Dutcheſs of *Burgundy*, and the Faction of *York* had ſucceeded; and conſequently this Proviſion for the Safety of his Adherents, in that poſſible Contingency, gave Strength to Him, as it would have given Strength to any other Prince, whilſt it attach'd his Adherents to Him by the apparent Security it provided; for *this Author*

ther contends that it did not eſtabliſh a real Security, and adviſes us to ſuſpend our Judgment on the Validity of *this Statute*, till We ſee what the *Opinion of Parliament, or the Judges, may be, whenever a King* de Jure *ſhall diſpoſſeſs a King* de Facto. He refers us *ad Calendas Græcas.*

But there are two Obſervations to be made to our preſent Purpoſe on *this Statute*, which ſeem to me natural and plain. *Firſt*, it confounds in Effect the very Diſtinction it ſeems to make; ſince it ſecures alike, and, by ſecuring alike, authorizes alike Thoſe, who adhere to the *King de Jure*, and Thoſe, who adhere to the *King de Facto*, provided They adhere to the *King in Poſſeſſion. Secondly*, it was contrived *to hinder People*, according to my Lord *Bacon*'s Senſe of it, *from buſying Themſelves in prying into the King's Title, and that Subjects might not trouble Themſelves with Enquiries into the Juſtneſs of the King's Title, or Quarrel.* Now, upon the Foundation of this Diſtinction, and this Statute, thus underſtood, They, who demurred on the *Settlement of the Crown*, at the *Revolution*, might plauſibly, though I think very unreaſonably, reſolve neither to vote, nor act Themſelves againſt thoſe Maxims and Principles, which They had entertain'd and profeſs'd, as Maxims of Law, and Principles of the Conſtitution, and yet reſolve to ſubmit ſincerely, and adhere faithfully to a *new Eſtabliſhment*, when it was once made. But the *other of the two Parties* I mentioned drew from the ſame Principle, of diſtinguiſhing between a King *de Facto* and a King *de Jure*, a very different Concluſion. They acknowledg'd *one King*, and held their Allegiance ſtill due to *another*. They bound Themſelves by Oath to preſerve a *Settlement*, which They pretended Themſelves in Conſcience obliged to ſubvert. This was to juſtify *Perfidy*, to ſanctify *Perjury*,

jury, to remove the ſacred Boundaries of *Right* and *Wrong*, and, as far as in Them lay, to teach Mankind *to call Good evil, and Evil good.*

Such were the *three Diviſions*, into which Men broke at the *Revolution*, in oppoſing the *Settlement* then made; whilſt the great Body of the Nation concurred in it, and *Whig* and *Tory* form'd in Reality but *one Party*. The *firſt of theſe Diviſions* continued, and became a *Faction in the State*; but made no Proſelytes, and is worn out by Time. The Principle of the *ſecond* was wrong; but it could not be reputed dangerous, whilſt it laſted, and it ſeems to have been built on ſo narrow and ſlippery a Foundation, that it did not continue long in Force. I may be more bold in aſſerting This, ſince if We look back to the Æra of the *Revolution*, and to the Times, which followed, We ſhall find among Thoſe, who voted for a *Regent*, not a *King*, on the Abdication of King *James*, ſome illuſtrious Perſons, who ſerv'd King *William* faithfully, who adher'd inviolably to our *new Eſtabliſhment*, and who have been diſtinguiſhed Friends of the *Succeſſion*, that hath now taken Place. That there have been Perſons, who deſerv'd to be rank'd under the *third Head*, is too notorious to be deny'd; but I perſuade my ſelf that *this Diviſion* hath conſiſted always of a flux Body. On one Hand, it is ſcarce poſſible to believe that any Number of Men ſhould be ſo harden'd, as to avow to Themſelves, and to one another, the acting and perſiſting to act on a *Principle* ſo repugnant to every Notion and Sentiment, that harbour in the Breaſts of ſocial Creatures. On the other, We know how the Sallies and Tranſports of *Party*, on ſome Occaſions, can hurry even reaſonable Men to act on the moſt abſurd, and honeſt Men to act on the moſt unjuſtifiable Principles, or both one and the other

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on no Principle at all, according as the Object, which the prevailing Paſſion preſents to Them, directs. This hath been the Caſe of many, ſince the *Revolution*, and there are ſome of all Sides, I believe, ſtill alive, ſure I am that there were ſome a few Years ago, who know that no Side is abſolutely unexceptionable in this Reſpect.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER IX.

SIR,

BUT whatever the State of *Parties* was at the *Revolution*, and for ſome Time afterwards, the *Settlement* made at that Time having continued, that State of *Parties* hath changed gradually, tho' ſlowly, and hath received at Length, according to the neceſſary Courſe of Things, a total Alteration. This Alteration would have been ſooner wrought, if the Attempt I have mentioned, to defend *Principles* no longer defenſible, had not furniſhed the Occaſion and Pretence to keep up the Appearances of a *Tory*, and a *Whig Party*. Some of Thoſe, who had been called *Tories*, furniſhed this Pretence. They, who had been called *Whigs*, ſeiz'd and improved it. The Advantages to *one Side*, the Diſadvantages to the *other*, the Miſchiefs to the whole, which have enſued, I need not deduce. It ſhall ſuffice to obſerve, that theſe Appearances were the more eaſy to be kept up, becauſe ſeveral Men, who had ſtood conſpicuous in Oppoſition to one another before the *Revolution*, continued an Oppoſition, though

though not the ſame, afterwards. Freſh Provocations were daily given, and freſh Pretences for Diviſion daily taken. Theſe Conteſts were preſent; They recalled Thoſe, that had paſt in the Time of King *Charles* the 2d; and *both Sides* forgot that Union, which their common Danger and their common Intereſt had form'd at the *Revolution*. Old Reproaches were renew'd, new ones invented, againſt the Party call'd *Whigs*, when They were as complaiſant to a *Court* as ever the *Tories* had been; againſt the Party call'd *Tories*, when They were as jealous of *publick Liberty*, and as frugal of *publick Money*, as ever the *Whigs* had been. Danger to the *Church*, on *one Side*, and Danger to the *State*, on the *other*, were apprehended from Men, who meant no Harm to *either*; for though *Diſſenters* mingled Themſelves on *one Side*, and *Jacobites* on the *other*, and notwithſtanding the Leanings of *Parties* in Favour of Thoſe, by whom They were abetted; yet is it a certain Truth, that the Struggle was in the main for *Power*, not *Principle*; and that there was no formal Deſign laid, on *one Side*, to deſtroy the *Church*, nor, on the *other*, the *State*. The Cavils, which may be made, and the Facts, which may be cited, ſome of older, and ſome of freſher date, againſt what hath been here ſaid, do not eſcape me. Men of Knowledge, and of cool and candid Thought, will anſwer one, and account for the other, without my Help; and I cannot reſolve, for the Sake of the Paſſionate, nor even of the Ignorant, to deſcend upon this Subject into a greater Detail.

I paſs to That, which is cloſer to my preſent Purpoſe, and of more immediate Uſe; and I ſay that as the natural Diſpoſitions of Men are alter'd and form'd into different moral Characters by Education, ſo the Spirit of a Conſtitution of Government

ment, which is confirm'd, improv'd and ſtrengthen'd by the Courſe of Events, and eſpecially by Thoſe of fruitleſs Oppoſition, in a long Tract of Time, will have a proportionable Influence on the Reaſoning, the Sentiments, and the Conduct of Thoſe, who are ſubject to it. A different Spirit and contrary Prejudices may prevail for a Time. But the Spirit and Principles of the Conſtitution will prevail at laſt. If one be unnatural, and the other abſurd, and That is the Caſe in many Governments, a vigorous Exerciſe of Power, ſignal Rewards, ſignal Puniſhments, and a Variety of other ſecondary Means, which in ſuch Conſtitutions are never wanting, will however maintain, as long as they are employed, both the Spirit and the Principles. But if the Spirit and Principles of a Conſtitution be agreeable to Nature, and the true Ends of Government, which is the Caſe of the preſent Conſtitution of the *Britiſh Government*, They want no ſuch Means to make them prevail. They not only flouriſh without them, but they would fade and dye away with them. As *Liberty* is nouriſhed and ſupported by ſuch a Spirit and ſuch Principles, ſo They are propagated by Liberty. Truth and Reaſon are often able to get the better of Authority in particular Minds; but Truth and Reaſon with Authority on their Side will carry Numbers, bear down Prejudices, and become the very Genius of a People. The Progreſs They make is always ſure, but ſometimes not obſervable by every Eye. Contrary Prejudices may ſeem to maintain Themſelves in Vigour, and theſe Prejudices may be kept up long by Paſſion and by Artifice. But when Truth and Reaſon continue to act without Reſtraint, a little ſooner, or a little later, and often when this Turn is leaſt expected, the Prejudices vaniſh at once.

once, and Truth and Reaſon triumph without any Rival.

The Conſtitution of *England* had been ſeen in two very different Lights, for almoſt a Century before the *Revolution*; ſo that there is no Room to be ſurpriſed at the great Oppoſition, that appeared (when the *Whig* and *Tory Parties* aroſe a very few years before that Æra,) between *Principles*, which, as oppoſite as they were, each Side pretended to eſtabliſh on the Nature of *one and the ſame Conſtitution*. How This happened, hath been often hinted, and I have not here Room to explain any farther. Let us be ſatisfy'd that it is no longer the Caſe. Our *Conſtitution* is no longer a Myſtery; the Power of the *Crown* is now exactly limited; the Chimæra of *Prerogative* removed; and the *Rights of the Subject* are no longer problematical, though ſome Things neceſſary to the more effectual Security of them may be ſtill wanting. Under *this Conſtitution*, the greateſt Part of the Men now alive were born. They lie under no Pretence of Obligation to any *other*, and to the Support of This They are bound by all the Ties of Society, and all the Motives of Intereſt.

Let us prove what We advance; and that We may do ſo *ad Homines*, let us borrow our Argument from the great Champion of *hereditary Right*. Having mentioned in his Introduction what He endeavours pompouſly, but vainly, to eſtabliſh in his Book, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, *a Preſcription of nine Centuries*, *a continual Claim of five hundred and fifty Years*, He attempts to convince us by a *novel Law*, *and a modern Conſtitution*. This modern Conſtitution is the *Act of Recognition*, in the 1ſt of King *James* the 1ſt. The Declarations there made, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, are no Doubt as ſtrong as Words can frame, and the

the Words are ſuch as would tempt one to think, by the Fuſtian They compoſe, that his Majeſty Himſelf had penn'd them. From hence it is concluded that ſince *the Vows and Acts of Fathers —— bind their Poſterity——This Act, till the Society hath revok'd it lawfully, lays the ſame Obligation on every Member of the Society, as if he had perſonally conſented to it.* ——— If *this Act* then was *lawfully revok'd*, or repeal'd, another *novel Law*, contrary to it, might be made equally binding; but neither *this Act*, nor the Act of the 12th of *Charles* the 2d, affirming the Crown to appertain *by juſt and undoubted Right* to the King, his Heirs and lawful Succeſſors, having been expreſly repeal'd, We ſtill lye under the ſame Obligations, and every Settlement, contrary to them, and by Conſequence the Settlement made at the *Revolution*, is unlawful. Now I aſk, was not the Will of *Henry* the 8th, which excluded the whole *Scotiſh* Line, made in Purſuance, and by the Authority of an Act paſſed in the 25th Year of his Reign? Hath not *this Author* juſtify'd the Validity of this *Will*, much to his own Satisfaction, and, I believe, to That of his Readers? Was this Will *lawfully revok'd?* Was this Statute *expreſly repeal'd?* I aſk farther, whether *hereditary Right*, and the *Obligations of Subjects to it*, could be made *immutable and eternal*, as *this Author* aſſerts that they were by the *Act of Recognition*, without a manifeſt Contradiction to the Act of Queen *Elizabeth*, which declares the Power of Parliament to *limit* and *bind* the Succeſſion to the Crown? Was this Act *expreſly repeal'd?* That King *James* the 1ſt ſucceeded *lawfully againſt Law*, our Author is fond to maintain, and the Propoſition is not unlike That of ſome *Popiſh Caſuiſts*, who aſſert that his Holineſs *Jure poteſt contra Jus decernere, can decree rightfully againſt Right*; but if theſe Queſtions are fairly anſwer'd, it will reſult from ſuch anſwers,

and from the Arguments I have quoted, that this *novel Law*, this *modern Conſtitution*, is a meer Illuſion; that it never bound any *Member of the Society*; and that the Parliament had as much Right to make the *Settlement* in 1688, notwithſtanding the *Act of Recognition*, as the Parliament had to make *this Act* in 1603, notwithſtanding the *two Acts* I have mentioned, and the *Will* of *Henry* the 8th, made by Virtue of the *firſt* of them. This wayward and forlorn *hereditary Right* muſt therefore fall to the Ground, or be ſupported by the ſuppoſed *Preſcription of nine Centuries*, and *Claim of five and a half*, which no intelligent Man, who reads this Book, will be perſuaded that the *Author* hath proved a Jot better, than the uninterrupted Succeſſion of *Popes*, from St. *Peter* down to his preſent Holineſs, is proved by the learned Antiquaries of *Italy*. If *this Act of Recognition* be urged, as it ſometimes is, to ſhew the declared Senſe of the *three Eſtates of the Kingdom*, which Declaration was obtained, it ſeems, in an Hurry, ſince the *Act* was read three Times in one Houſe the ſame Day; the declared Senſe of the *three Eſtates*, not pronounced in an Hurry, but after the moſt ſolemn Debates and Conferences, may be urged with much greater Weight, in Favour of our *preſent Settlement*. If this *Act of Recognition*, notwithſtanding what hath been objected, be urged as a *Law*, which had the Aſſent of a *King*, in Oppoſition to the Proceedings of the *Convention*, by which King *William* and Queen *Mary* were rais'd to the Throne; the Anſwer is obvious and concluſive. The Circumſtances of the *two Caſes* are very different; but when they come to be weigh'd in a fair Ballance, Thoſe, which attended the Settlement of the Crown on the *Revolution*, will be found at leaſt as conformable to Reaſon, to Law, and to Practice, as Thoſe, which attended the Eſtabliſh-

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ment of the *Stuart Family*. Queen *Elizabeth* deſigned King *James* the 1ſt to be her Succeſſor; the Nation concurred to make him ſo; neither She nor They paid any Regard to the *Law*, which ſtood in his Way. Their Reaſons for acting in this Manner are eaſy to be diſcovered in the Hiſtory of that Time; and on the ſame Authority We may certainly conclude, that They would not have acted in this Manner, if King *James* had been, like his Mother, a *profeſſed Papiſt*. Thus He got into the Throne; and when he was there, He got, like other Kings, *ſuch a Title*, as He choſe to ſtand upon, *agniz'd*, or *recogniz'd*, by his Parliament. The Settlement at the *Revolution* was made by a *Convention of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal*, and *a full and free Repreſentative of the whole Body of the People*. When King *William* and Queen *Mary* were once ſettled in the Throne, *this Settlement* was continued and confirmed by an Aſſemblage of *all the legiſlative Powers*. He, who will diſpute the Validity of theſe Proceedings, muſt ſhew therefore *firſt* of all, what hath never yet been ſhewn, (no, not by the *Author* I have ſo often quoted) the Invalidity of the Proceedings of *thoſe Parliaments*, which raiſed *Edward* the 3d and *Henry* the 4th to the Throne; which were called as irregularly, though by Writs in the Names of *Edward* the 2d and *Richard* the 2d, as it can be pretended that the *Convention* was. He muſt ſhew the Invalidity of the Proceedings even of *that Aſſembly*, by which *Charles* the 2d was called home, till their Proceedings became valid by a ſubſequent Confirmation. He muſt ſhew farther, how any of the Laws of the Princes of the Houſe of *Lancaſter* came to be *conſtantly received and executed*, a little better than the Author of *hereditary Right aſſerted* hath done, by aſſuring us on his Word that it was by the *Sufferance of Edward*

the 4th and his Succeſſors, and the Approbation of the People. He muſt account for the Continuance in Force of the Laws of *Richard* the 3d, and of *Henry* the 7th, a little better than the *ſame Author* does, by the Deficiency of *Henry* the 7th's Title, (which, upon another Occaſion, He magnifies; though upon This He affirms it to have been *no better* than That of *Richard* the 3d) and by the great Reſpect of *Henry* the 8th for his Father. When This hath been once ſhewn, it will be Time to think of a Reply. In the mean while, We will obſerve that beſides the Paſſion and Party-Spirit, which poſſeſs almoſt all Thoſe, who write on this Subject, there is a Diſtinction, which ſhould be conſtantly made in Caſes of this Nature, and which They never make, or never make exactly enough. They compare the Proceedings, without comparing the Situation. *Neceſſity* and *Self-Preſervation* are great Laws of Nature, and may well diſpenſe with the ſtrict Obſervation of the common Forms of any particular Conſtitution. Either the *Convention* muſt have fallen into the Abſurdities I have already mentioned; or have called back King *James*, which would have been ſtill a greater Abſurdity; or have left their Country in abſolute Anarchy; or have done what They did. What They did, was done as near as poſſible to the Spirit of our *Conſtitution*, the Forms of our *Laws*, and the Examples of *former Times*. They had the *Merit*; their Poſterity hath the *Benefit*; nay He, who would ſay that They had the *Guilt*, not the *Merit*, muſt ſtill allow that their Poſterity hath the *Benefit*, without ſharing the *Guilt*; and, upon the whole Matter, I will venture to aſſert that He, who ſcruples, or pretends to ſcruple, at this Time, the Validity of our *preſent Conſtitution*, is no wiſer, or elſe no honeſter, than He would be, who ſhould ſcruple, or

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pretend to ſcruple, the Validity of *magna Charta*. I have often wiſh'd that ſome profound Antiquary, of much Leiſure, would write an elaborate Treatiſe to aſſert *Royal Prerogative* againſt the *great Charter*, as well as *hereditary Right* againſt the *Revolution*. I am perſuaded that He would ſucceed alike in *both*. Why, indeed, ſhould a *Charter*, extorted by Force, and therefore vicious in its Principle, ſtand on a better Foot, or have more Regard paid to it, than a *Settlement* made in Oppoſition to a *divine*, and therefore *indefiezeable Right?* I ſay, *and therefore indefiezable*; becauſe if it be not proved to be ſomething more than *human*, it will hardly be proved *indefiezable*. But I quit this Subject; upon which, perhaps, you may think I have ſpent my Time as ill, as I ſhould have done, if I had preached againſt the *Koran* at *Paul's*. It is Time to ſpeak of the Motives of Intereſt, by which we are bound, as well as by the Ties of Duty, to ſupport the *preſent Conſtitution*.

Upon this Head, a few Words will be ſufficient; ſince I preſume that no Prejudices can be ſtrong enough to create much Diverſity of Opinion, in a Caſe ſo very clear, and capable of being ſtated ſo ſhortly. Whether the *Revolution* altered our *old Conſtitution for the better*, or *renewed* it, and brought it back to the *firſt Principles*, and nearer to the *primitive Inſtitution*, ſhall not be diſputed here. I think the *latter*, and every Man muſt think that *one* or the *other* was neceſſary, who conſiders, in the firſt Place, how the Majeſty and Authority of the *Prince* began to ſwell above any Pitch, proportionable to the Rank of *chief Magiſtrate*, or *ſupreme Head*, in a *free State*; by how many Arts the *Prerogative of the Crown* had been ſtretch'd, and how many *Precedents*, little favourable to *Liberty*, had been ſet, even before the Acceſſion of the *Scotiſh Line*;

Line; and who conſiders, in the next Place, the direct Tendency, confirm'd by Experience, of *thoſe Principles of Government*, ſo frequently mentioned, which compoſed an avowed Syſtem of *Tyranny* and eſtabliſhed *Slavery* as a political, a moral, and a religious Obligation; which King *James* the 1ſt was too ſucceſsful in eſtabliſhing; but neither *He*, nor his *Deſcendents* were able to purſue. What theſe Conſiderations made neceſſary, was done at the *Revolution*; at leaſt, ſo far as to put it into our Power to do the Reſt. A Spirit of *Liberty*, tranſmitted down from our *Saxon Anceſtors*, and the unknown Ages of our Government, preſerved itſelf through one almoſt continual Struggle, againſt the Uſurpations of our *Princes*, and the Vices of our *People*; and They, whom neither the *Plantagenets*, nor the *Tudors* could enſlave, were incapable of ſuffering their Rights and Privileges to be raviſhed from Them by the *Stuarts*. They bore with the *laſt King of this unhappy Race*, till it was ſhameful, as it muſt have been fatal, to bear any longer; and whilſt They aſſerted their *Liberties*, They refuted and anticipated, by their Temper and their Patience, all the Objections, which foreign and domeſtick Abettors of *Tyranny* are apt to make againſt the Conduct of our Nation towards their *Kings*. Let us juſtify this Conduct, by perſiſting in it, and continue to ourſelves the peculiar Honour of maintaining the Freedom of our *Gothick Inſtitution of Government*, when ſo many other Nations, who enjoyed the ſame, have loſt theirs.

If a *divine*, *indefiezable*, *hereditary Right* to govern a Community be once acknowledged, a *Right independent of the Community*, and which veſts in every ſucceſſive Prince immediately on the Death of his Predeceſſor, and previouſly to any Engagement

ment taken on his Part towards the *People*; if the *People* once acknowledge Themſelves bound to ſuch Princes by the Ties of *Paſſive-Obedience* and *Non-Reſiſtance*, by an *Allegiance unconditional*, and not reciprocal to *Protection*; if a Kind of *oral Law*, or *myſterious Cabbala*, which Phariſees of the *black Gown* and the *long Robe* are always at Hand to report and interpret, as a *Prince* deſires, be once added, like a ſupplemental Code, to the *known Laws of the Land*; then, I ſay, ſuch Princes have the *Power*, if not the *Right*, given Them, of commencing *Tyrants*; and Princes, who have the *Power*, are prone to think that They have the *Right*. Such was the State of *King* and *People* before the *Revolution*. By the *Revolution*, and the *Settlement* ſince made, this State hath received conſiderable Alterations. A *King of Britain* is now, ſtrictly and properly, what *Kings* ſhould always be, a Member, but the Supreme Member, or the Head of a political Body. Part of one individual, ſpecifick Whole, in every Reſpect; diſtinct from it, or independent of it in none; He can move no longer in another Orbit from his *People*, and, like ſome ſuperior Planet, attract, repel, influence, and direct their Motions by his own. He and They are Parts of the ſame Syſtem, intimately join'd and co-operating together, acting and acted upon, limiting and limited, controuling and controuled by one another; and when He ceaſes to ſtand in this Relation to Them, He ceaſes to ſtand any. The *Settlements*, by Virtue of which He governs, are plainly *original Contracts*. His *Inſtitution* is plainly *conditional*; and He may forfeit his Right to *Allegiance*, as undeniably and effectually, as the Subject may forfeit his Right to *Protection*. There are no longer any hidden Reſerves of Authority, to be let out on Occaſion, and to overflow the Rights

and

and Privileges of the People. The *Laws of the Land* are known, and they are the ſole Springs, from whence the *Prince* can derive his Pretenſions, and the *People* theirs. It would be to no Purpoſe to illuſtrate any farther a Matter, which begins to be ſo well underſtood; or to deſcend into a more particular Enumeration of the Advantages, that reſult, or may reſult, from our *preſent Settlement*. No Man, who does not prefer *Slavery* to *Liberty*, or a more precarious Security to a better, will declare for ſuch a Government, as our national Diviſions, and a long Courſe, ſeldom interrupted, of improvident Complaiſance to the *Crown*, had enabled King *James* the 2d to eſtabliſh againſt ſuch a Government as was intended by the *ſubſequent Settlement*; and if there be any ſuch Man, I declare that I neither write to Him, nor for Him.

I may aſſume therefore, without fearing to be accuſed of begging the Queſtion, that the *Conſtitution*, under which We now live, is preferable to That, which prevailed at any Time before the *Revolution*. We are arrived, after many Struggles, after a Deliverance almoſt miraculous, and ſuch an one as no Nation hath Reaſon to expect twice, and after having made ſome honeſt Improvements on the Advantages of our *new Conſtitution*, very near to that full Security, under which Men, who are free and ſollicitous to continue ſo, may ſit down, not without watchfulneſs, (for That is never to be ſuffer'd to relax under ſuch a Government as ours) but without Anxiety. The Sum therefore of all theſe Diſcourſes, and of all our Exhortations to one another, is, and ought to be, that We ſhould not ſtop ſhort in ſo important a Work. It was begun at the *Revolution*; but He, who thinks it was perfected then, or hath been perfected ſince, will find Himſelf very much miſtaken. The Foundations were laid then. We proceeded

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for ſome Time after That, like the *Jews* in rebuilding their Temple; We carried on the holy Work with one Hand, and held our Swords in the other to defend it. That Diſtraction, that Danger is over, and we betray the Cauſe of *Liberty* without any Colour of Excuſe, if We do not compleat the glorious Building, which will laſt to Ages yet remote, if it be once finiſhed, and will mouldet away and fall into Ruins, if it remain longer in this imperfect State.

Now, that We may ſee the better how to proceed in the Cauſe of *Liberty*, to compleat the Freedom, and to ſecure the Duration of our *preſent Conſtitution*; it will be of Uſe, I think, to conſider what Obſtacles lye, or may hereafter lye, in our Way, and of what Nature that Oppoſition is, or may hereafter be, which We may expect to meet. In order to This, let us once more analyſe our political Diviſions; Thoſe, which may poſſibly exiſt now, or hereafter, as We did Thoſe, which were form'd at the *Revolution*.

One poſſible Diviſion then is That of Men angry with the *Government*, and yet reſolved to maintain the *Conſtitution*. This may be the Caſe at any Time; under the preſent, wiſe, virtuous, and triumphant Adminiſtration, and therefore to be ſure at any other.

A *ſecond poſſible Diviſion* is That of Men averſe to the *Government*, becauſe They are ſo to the *Conſtitution*, which I think can never be the Caſe of many; or averſe to the *Conſtitution*, becauſe They are ſo to the *Government*, which I think may be the Caſe of more. *Both* of Theſe tend to the ſame Point. *One* would ſubvert the *Government*, that they might change the *Conſtitution*. The *other* would ſacrifice the *Conſtitution*, that They might ſubvert the *Government*.

A *third poſſible Diviſion*, and I ſeek no more, is That of Men attach'd to the *Government*; or, to ſpeak more properly, to the Perſons of *Thoſe*, who govern; or, to ſpeak more properly ſtill, to the Power, Profit, or Protection They acquire by the Favour of *theſe Perſons*; but Enemies to the *Conſtitution*.

Now, as to the *firſt* and *ſecond of theſe poſſible Diviſions*, if there be any ſuch among us, I do not apprehend that We are at preſent, or can be hereafter, in much Danger; or that the Cauſe of *Liberty* can meet with much Oppoſition from them; though the *ſecond* have certainly Views, more likely to bring *Slavery* upon us, than to promote *Liberty*; and though Prudence requires that We ſhould be on our Guard againſt *both*. The *firſt*, indeed, might hope to unite even the Bulk of the Nation to Them, in a weak and oppreſſive Reign. If Grievances ſhould grow intolerable under ſome Prince as yet unborn; if Redreſs ſhould become abſolutely deſperate; if *Liberty* it ſelf ſhould be in imminent Peril; the Nature of our *Conſtitution* would juſtify the Reſiſtance, that We ought to believe well enough of Poſterity to perſuade ourſelves would be made in ſuch an Exigency. But without ſuch an Exigency, particular Men would flatter Themſelves extremely, if They hoped to make the Nation angry, becauſe They were ſo. Private Motives can never influence Numbers. When a Nation revolts, the Injury is national. This Caſe therefore is remote, improbable, nay impoſſible, under the Lenity, Juſtice and heroical Spirit of the *preſent Government*; and if I mentioned ſuch an *imaginary Party*, it was only done that I might omit none, which can be ſuppoſed. The Projects of the *ſecond Diviſion*, ſtated in the ſame hypothetical Manner, are ſurely too extravagant, and their Deſigns too wicked, to be dangerous.

dangerous. Diſputes may ariſe hereafter, in ſome diſtant Time, about *Miniſters*, perhaps about *Kings*; but I perſuade my ſelf that *this Conſtitution* will be, as it ought to be always, diſtinguiſhed from, and prefer'd to *both*, by the *Britiſh* Nation. Reaſons muſt ariſe in Proceſs of Time, from the very Nature of Man, to oppoſe *Miniſters* and *Kings* too; but none can ariſe, in the Nature of Things, to oppoſe *ſuch a Conſtitution* as ours. *Better Miniſters, better Kings*, may be hereafter often wanted, and ſometimes found; but a *better conſtituted Government* never can. Should there be therefore ſtill any ſuch Men, as We here ſuppoſe, among us, They cannot expect, if they are in their Senſes, a national Concurrence; and ſurely a little Reflection will ſerve to ſhew Them, that the ſame Reaſons, which make Them weaker now than They were ſome Years ago, muſt make Them weaker ſome Years hence than they are now.

As to the *third Diviſion*, if any ſuch there be, it is in That our greateſt and almoſt our whole Danger centers. The *others* cannot overthrow, but *Theſe* may undermine our *Liberty*. Capable of being admitted into Power, in all Courts, and more likely than other Men to be ſo in every Court, except the preſent, (whoſe approved Penetration and ſpotleſs Innocence give a certain Excluſion to Them,) They may prevent any farther Securities from being procured to *Liberty*, till Thoſe already eſtabliſhed are diſſolved, or perverted. Since then our principal Danger muſt in all Times ariſe from Thoſe, who belong to *this Diviſion*, it is neceſſary to ſhew, before We conclude theſe Diſcourſes, by what Means *ſuch Men* may carry on their pernicious Deſigns with Effect, and by what Means They may be defeated. Theſe Conſiderations will lead us to fix that Point, wherein

Men of all Denominations ought to unite, and do unite, and to ſtate the ſole Diſtinction of *Parties*, which can be made with Truth, at this Time, amongſt us.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER X.

SIR,

IT may be aſk'd, perhaps, how Men, who are Friends to a *Government*, can be Enemies at the ſame Time to the *Conſtitution*, upon which *that Government* is founded. But the Anſwer will be eaſy, if We conſider theſe two Things; *firſt*, the true Diſtinction, ſo often confounded in Writing, and almoſt always in Converſation, between *Conſtitution* and *Government*. By *Conſtitution* We mean, whenever We ſpeak with Propriety and Exactneſs, that Aſſemblage of Laws, Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reaſon, directed to certain fix'd Objects of publick Good, that compoſe the general Syſtem, according to which the Community hath agreed to be governed. By *Government* We mean, whenever We ſpeak in the ſame Manner, that particular Tenor of Conduct, which a chief Magiſtrate, and inferior Magiſtrates, under his Direction and Influence, hold in the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs. We call This a *good Government*, when the Execution of the Laws, the Obſervation of the Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, in ſhort, the whole Adminiſtration of publick Affairs is wiſely purſued, and with a ſtrict

Conformity

Conformity to the Principles and Objects of the *Conſtitution*. We call it a *bad Government*, when it is adminiſter'd on other Principles, and directed to other Objects, either wickedly or weakly, either by obtaining *new Laws*, which want this Conformity, or by preverting *old ones*, which had it; and when This is done *without Law*, or in *open Violation of the Laws*, We term it a *tyrannical Government*. In a Word, and to bring this home to our own Caſe, *Conſtitution* is the Rule, by which our Princes ought to govern, at all Times; *Government* is That, by which They actually do govern, at any particular Time. *One* may remain immutable; the *other* may, and as human Nature is conſtituted, muſt vary. *One* is the Criterion, by which We are to try the *other*; for ſurely We have a Right to do ſo, ſince if We are to live in Subjection to the Government of our *Kings*, our *Kings* are to govern in Subjection to the *Conſtitution*; and the Conformity, or Non-Conformity of their Government to it, preſcribes the Meaſure of our Submiſſion to Them, according to the Principles of the *Revolution*, and of our *preſent Settlement*; in both of which, though ſome remote Regard was had to *Blood*, yet the Preſervation of the *Conſtitution* manifeſtly determined the Community to the Choice then made of the *Perſons*, who ſhould govern. Another Thing to be conſidered is This. When Perſons are ſpoken of as *Friends to the Government*, and *Enemies to the Conſtitution*, the Term *Friendſhip* is a little proſtituted, in Compliance with common Uſage. Such Men are really incapable of Friendſhip; for real Friendſhip can never exiſt among Thoſe, who have baniſhed Virtue and Truth. They have no Affection to any but Themſelves; no Regard to any Intereſt, except their own. Their ſole Attachments are ſuch as I mentioned in the laſt

laſt Letter, Attachments to *Power* and *Profit*, and when they have contracted a Load of Infamy and Guilt, in the Purſuit of *Theſe*, an Attachment to *that Protection*, which is ſufficient to procure Them Appearances of Conſideration, and real Impunity. They may bear the Semblance of Affection to their Prince, and of Zeal for his Government; but They, who are falſe to the Cauſe of their Country, will not be true to any other; and the very *ſame Miniſter*, who exalts his Maſter's Throne on the Ruins of the *Conſtitution*, that He may govern without Controul, or retire without Danger, would do the Reverſe of This, if any Turn of Affairs enabled Him to compound, in that Manner, the better for Himſelf.

Under a Prince therefore tolerably honeſt, or tolerably wiſe, *ſuch Men as Theſe* will have no great Sway; at leaſt, They will not hold it long. Such a Prince will know, that to unite Himſelf to *Them*, is to diſunite Himſelf from his *People*, and that He makes a ſtupid Bargain, if He prefers Trick to Policy, Expedient to Syſtem, and a Cabal to the Nation. Reaſon and Experience will teach Him that a Prince, who does ſo, muſt govern weakly, ignominiouſly and precariouſly; whilſt He, who engages all the Hearts, and employs all the Heads and Hands of his People, governs with Strength, with Splendour, and with Safety, and is ſure of riſing to a Degree of abſolute Power, by maintaining *Liberty*, which the moſt ſucceſsful Tyrant could never reach, by impoſing Slavery. But how few Men (and Princes, by their Leaves, are Men) have been found in Times paſt, or can be hoped for in Times to come, capable of governing by ſuch Arts as theſe? Some cannot propoſe the Ends, nor ſome employ the Means; for ſome are wicked, and ſome are weak. This general Diviſion runs through the

whole

whole Race of Mankind; of the Multitudes deſign'd to obey, and of the Few deſign'd to govern. It was this Depravity of Multitudes, as well as their mutual Wants, which obliged Men firſt to enter into Societies; to depart from their natural Liberty; and to ſubject themſelves to Government. It was this Depravity of the Few, (which is often the greater, becauſe born no better than other Men, They are educated worſe) which obliged Men firſt to ſubject *Government* to *Conſtitution*, that They might preſerve ſocial, when They gave up natural Liberty, and not be oppreſſed by arbitrary Will. *Kings* may have preceded *Lawgivers*, for aught I know, or have poſſibly been the *firſt Lawgivers*, and *Government by Will* have been eſtabliſhed before *Government by Conſtitution*. *Theſeus* might reign at *Athens*, and *Eurytion* at *Sparta*, long before *Solon* gave Laws to *one*, and *Lycurgus* to the *other* of theſe Cities. *Kings* had governed *Rome*, We know, and *Conſuls* had ſucceeded *Kings*, long before the *Decemviri* compiled a Body of Law; and the *Saxons* had their Monarchs before *Edgar*, though the *Saxon Laws* went under his Name. Theſe and a thouſand other Inſtances of the ſame Kind will never ſerve to prove, what my Lord *Bacon* would prove by them, † *that Monarchies do not ſubſiſt, like other Governments, by a precedent Law, or Compact*; that the *original Submiſſion to them was natural*, like the Obedience of a *Child* to his *Parents*; and that *Allegiance to hereditary Monarchs is the Work of the Law of Nature*. But That, which theſe Examples prove very plainly is, that however Men might ſubmit voluntarily in the primitive Simplicity of early Ages, or be ſubjected by Conqueſt, to a *Government* without a *Conſti-*

† *Argum. in the Caſe of* Poſtnati.

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tution, yet They were never long in diſcovering that * *to live by one Man's Will became the Cauſe of all Mens Miſery*, and therefore They ſoon rejected the Yoke, or made it ſit eaſy on their Necks. They inſtituted *Commonwealths*, or they limited *Monarchies*; and here began that Struggle between the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit of Dominion*, which always hath ſubſiſted, and, that We may not flatter our ſelves nor others, muſt always ſubſiſt, except in thoſe Inſtances, of which the moſt antient Hiſtories furniſh ſo few, the Reigns of a *Titus*, or a *Trajan*; for it might look like Flattery to quote the preſent moſt auſpicious Reign.

To govern a Society of Freemen by a *Conſtitution*, founded on the eternal Rules of right Reaſon, and directed to promote the Happineſs of the whole, and of every Individual, is the nobleſt Prerogative, which can belong to Humanity; and if Man may be ſaid, without Prophaneneſs, to imitate God in any Caſe, This is the Caſe. But ſure I am, He imitates the Devil, who is ſo far from promoting the Happineſs of others, that he makes his own Happineſs to conſiſt in the Miſery of others; who governs by no Rule but That of his Paſſions, whatever Appearances He is forced ſometimes to put on; who endeavours to corrupt the Innocent, and to inſlave the Free; whoſe Buſineſs is to ſeduce, or betray; whoſe Pleaſure is to damn; and whoſe Triumph is to torment. Odious and execrable as this Character is, it is the Character of every Prince, who makes uſe of his Power to ſubvert, or even to weaken *that Conſtitution*, which ought to be the Rule of his *Government*. When ſuch a Prince fills a Throne with ſuperior Parts, *Liberty* is in the utmoſt Peril; nor does the Danger diminiſh in Pro-

* Hooker's *Eccleſ. Pol. L.* 1. *Sect.* 10.

portion

portion, if he happens to want them. Such Men as We are now to ſpeak of (*Friends to the Government* and *Enemies to the Conſtitution*) will be always at Hand to ſupply his Defects; for as They are the willing Inſtruments of a wicked Prince, They are the ready Prompters of a weak one. They may ſink into the Maſs of the People, and diſappear in a good and a wiſe Reign, or work Themſelves into Power under falſe Colours. *Sed Genus immortale manet.* Their Race will continue as long as Ambition and Avarice prevail in the World, and there will be bad Citizens as long as there are bad Men. The good ought therefore to be always on their Guard againſt Them, and whatever Diſguiſe They aſſume, whatever Veils They caſt over their Conduct, They will never be able to deceive Thoſe long, who obſerve conſtantly the Difference between *Conſtitution* and *Government*, and who have Virtue enough to prefer the Cauſe of the *former*, how unprofitable ſoever it may be at all Times, and how unpopular ſoever at ſome.——But I ramble too long in Generals. It is high Time I ſhould come to thoſe particular Meaſures, by which the Men I have deſcribed are moſt likely to carry on their Deſigns againſt our *Conſtitution*; after which I ſhall ſay ſomething of the Methods, by which alone their Deſigns may be prevented, or will be defeated, if a *national Union* oppoſe it ſelf by ſuch Methods as Theſe, in Time, to them.

Now, that I may do This the better, and make what I have to ſay the more ſenſibly felt, give me Leave to ſuppoſe (though I ſpeak of a remote Time, and ſuch an one as We ought to hope will never come) that our national Circumſtances will be juſt the ſame as They are now, and our *Conſtitution* as far diſtant as it now is from that Point of Perfection, to which the *Revolution* ought to have

brought it, might have brought it, and hath given the Nation a Right to expect that it ſhould be brought. The Completion of that glorious Deliverance is ſtill imperfect, after five and forty Years, notwithſtanding the Hopes then given, the Engagements then taken, and the Opportunities, that have ſince ariſen. How This hath happen'd, by what Arts this Juſtice to the *Conſtitution* hath been hitherto evaded, ſometimes in Favour of one Government, and ſometimes in Favour of another, might eaſily be ſhewn, and proved too, beyond Contradiction. But I had rather exhort, than reproach; and eſpecially at a Time, when a ſtrong Tendency appears among Men of all Denominations to ſuch a *national Union*, as will effectually obtain the complete Settlement of our *Conſtitution*, which hath been ſo long delay'd, if it be honeſtly, prudently and vigorouſly improved.

It is certain then that if ever ſuch Men as call Themſelves *Friends to the Government*, but are *real Enemies of the Conſtitution*, prevail, They will make it a capital Point of their wicked Policy to keep up a *ſtanding Army*. Falſe Appearances of Reaſon for it will never be wanting, as long as there are *Pretenders* to the Crown; though nothing can be more abſurd than to employ, in Defence of *Liberty*, an Inſtrument ſo often employ'd to deſtroy it; tho' nothing can be more abſurd than to maintain that *any Government* ought to make uſe of the ſame Expedient to ſupport it ſelf, as *another Government*, on the Ruins of which *this Government* ſtands, was ſubverted for uſing; tho' nothing can be proved more manifeſtly by Experience than theſe two Propoſitions; that *Britain* is enabled, by her Situation, to ſupport her *Government*, when the Bulk of her People are for it, without employing any Means inconſiſtent with her *Conſtitution*; and that the Bulk of

of the People are not only always for the *Government*, when the *Government* ſupports the *Conſtitution*, but are even hard and ſlow to be detach'd from it, when the *Government* attacks, or undermines the *Conſtitution*, and when they are by Conſequence both juſtified in reſiſting, and even obliged in Conſcience to reſiſt the *Government*.

I have heard it argued lately that *Pretenders* abroad are a Security at home, and that a *Government*, expoſed to their Attacks, will never venture to attack the *Conſtitution*. I have been told too that theſe Notions were entertain'd by Some, who drew many political Conſequences from them at the *Revolution*. But if any of thoſe Perſons are ſtill alive, I perſuade my ſelf that They have altered this Opinion, ſince ſuch a Situation will furniſh, at all Times, Pretences of Danger; ſince Pretences of Danger to a *Government*, whether real or imaginary, will be always urged with Plauſibility, and generally with Succeſs, for obtaining *new Powers*, or for ſtraining *old ones*; and ſince whilſt Thoſe, who mean well to the *Government*, are impoſed upon by Thoſe, who mean ill to the *Conſtitution*, all true Concern for the *latter* is loſt in a miſtaken Zeal for the *former*, and the moſt important is ventured to ſave the leaſt important, when neither one nor the other would have been expoſed, if falſe Alarms had not been raſhly and too implicity taken, or if true Alarms had not given unneceſſary Strength to the *Government*, at the Expence of weakening the *Conſtitution*.

Notwithſtanding what hath been ſaid, I do not imagine that an *Army* would be employed by *theſe Men*, directly and at firſt, againſt the Nation, and national Liberty. I am far from thinking that any Men can ariſe, in future Times, capable of attempting, in this Manner, what ſome Men in our

Age, who call Themſelves *Friends to the Government*, have been ſo weak and ſo impudent as to avow in Print, and publiſh to the Nation. To deſtroy *Britiſh Liberty* with an *Army of Britons* is not a Meaſure ſo ſure of Succeſs, as ſome People may believe. To *corrupt the Parliament* is a ſlower, but might prove a more effectual Method, and two or three hundred Mercenaries in the two Houſes, if They could be liſted there, would be more fatal to the *Conſtitution* than ten Times as many Thouſands in Red and in Blue out of them. *Parliaments* are the true Guardians of *Liberty*. For This principally They were inſtituted; and This is the principal Article of that great and noble Truſt, which the collective Body of the People of *Britain* repoſes in the Repreſentative. But then no Slavery can be ſo effectually brought and fix'd upon us, as *Parliamentary Slavery*. By the *Corruption of Parliament*, and the abſolute Influence of a *King*, or his *Miniſter*, on the *two Houſes*, we return into that State, to deliver or ſecure us from which *Parliaments* were inſtituted, and are really governed by the arbitrary Will of *one Man*. Our whole *Conſtitution* is at once diſſolved. Many Securities to *Liberty* are provided; but the Integrity, which depends on the *Freedom* and the *Independency of Parliament*, is the Key-ſtone, that keeps the whole together. If This be ſhaken, our *Conſtitution* totters. If it be quite removed, our *Conſtitution* falls into Ruin. That noble Fabrick, the Pride of *Britain*, the Envy of her Neighbours, raiſed by the Labour of ſo many Centuries, repaired at the Expence of ſo many Millions, and cemented by ſuch a Profuſion of Blood; that noble Fabrick, I ſay, which was able to reſiſt the united Efforts of ſo many Races of Gyants, may be demoliſhed by a Race of Pygmies. The Integrity of *Parliament* is a Kind of *Palladium*, a tutelary Goddeſs,

Goddeſs, who protects our State. When ſhe is once removed, We may become the Prey of any Enemies. No *Agamemnon*, no *Achilles* will be wanted to take our City. *Therſites* Himſelf will be ſufficient for ſuch a Conqueſt. But I need not dwell any longer on this Subject. There is no Man, who thinks at all, and can fail to ſee the ſeveral fatal Conſequences, which will neceſſarily flow from this one Source, whenever it ſhall be opened. If the Reaſon of the Thing does not ſtrike him enough, Experience muſt. The ſingle Reign of *Henry* the 8th will ſerve to ſhew that no Tyranny can be more ſevere than That, which is exerciſed by a Concert with *Parliament*; that *arbitrary Will* may be made the ſole Rule of Government, even whilſt the Names and Forms of a *free Conſtitution* are preſerved; that for a *Prince*, or his *Miniſter*, to become our *Tyrant*, there is no Need to aboliſh *Parliaments*; there is no Need that He, who is Maſter of *one Part of the Legiſlature*, ſhould endeavour to aboliſh the *other two*, when He can uſe, upon every Occaſion, the united Strength of the *whole*; there is no Need He ſhould be a Tyrant in the Groſs, when He can be ſo in Detail, nor in Name, when He can be ſo in Effect; that for *Parliaments* to eſtabliſh *Tyranny*, there is no Need therefore to repeal *magna Charta*, or any other of the great Supports of our *Liberty*. It is enough, if They put Themſelves corruptly and ſervilely under the Influence of ſuch a *Prince*, or ſuch a *Miniſter*.———On the whole, I conclude that, in the poſſible Caſe here ſuppoſed, the firſt and principal Object will be to deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, under Pretence of preſerving the *Government*, by *corrupting our Parliaments*. I am the better founded in concluding that This may happen in ſome future Age, by what We may obſerve in our own. There is ſurely but too much Reaſon to

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expect that the *Enemies of our Conſtitution* may attempt hereafter to govern by *Corruption*, when We hear and ſee the Friends and Advocates of our *preſent moſt incorrupt Miniſter* harangue and ſcribble, in Favour of *Corruption*; when it is pleaded for and recommended, as a neceſſary Expedient of Government, by ſome Men, of all Ranks and Orders; not only by *profeſs'd Hirelings*, who write that They may eat; but by Men, who have talk'd and written Themſelves already out of their native Obſcurity and Penury, by effecting Zeal in the Cauſe of *Liberty*; not only by ſuch as Theſe, but by Men, whoſe Birth, Education and Fortune aggravate their Crime and their Folly; by Men, whom Honour at leaſt ſhould reſtrain from favouring ſo diſhonourable a Cauſe; and by Men, whoſe peculiar Obligations to preach up *Morality* ſhould reſtrain Them, at leaſt, from being the Preachers of an *Immorality*, above all others, abominable in its Nature, and pernicious in its Effects.

Theſe Men are ready, I know, to tell us that the *Influence* They plead for is neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Hands of Thoſe, who govern; that *Corruption* ſerves to oil the Wheels of Government, and to render the Adminiſtration more ſmooth and eaſy; and that it can never be of dangerous Conſequence, under the preſent Father of our Country.——Abſurd and wicked Triflers! *According to Them, our excellent Conſtitution* (as one of your Correſpondents hath obſerved extremely well) *is no better than a Jumble of incompatible Powers, which would ſeparate and fall to Pieces of Themſelves, unleſs reſtrain'd and upheld by ſuch honourable Methods as thoſe of* BRIBERY and CORRUPTION. They would prove *that the Form of our Government is defective to a Degree of Ridiculouſneſs*. But the Ridicule, as well as the Iniquity,

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is their own. A *good Government* can want no Power, under the *preſent Conſtitution*. A *bad one* may, and it is fit it ſhould. *Popularity* is the Expedient of *one*, and will effectually ſupport it. Nothing but *Corruption* can ſupport the *other*. If there was a real Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, it ought to be ſupply'd, no Doubt. The old Whimſies of *Prerogative* ſhould not be revived; but *Limitations* ought to be taken off, or *new Powers* to be given. The *Friends of Liberty* acknowledge that a Ballance of the Powers, divided among the *three Parts of the Legiſlature*, is eſſential to our *Conſtitution*, and neceſſary to ſupport it. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore would concur, at leaſt to a certain Point, with the *Friends of the Miniſtry*; for the *former* are Friends to Order, and Enemies to Licence. For Decency's Sake therefore let the Debate be put on this Iſſue. Let it be ſuch a Debate as *Freemen* may avow, without bluſhing. To argue from this ſuppoſed Deficiency of *Power in the Crown*, in Favour of a Scheme of Government, repugnant to all Laws divine and human, is ſuch an Inſtance of abandon'd, villainous Proſtitution, as the moſt corrupt Ages never ſaw, and as will place the preſent Age, with infamous Pre-eminence, at the Head of them; unleſs the Nation do it ſelf Juſtice, and fix the Brand on *Thoſe*, who ought alone to bear it.———Thus much for the Iniquity of the Practice pleaded for. As to the Danger of it, let us agree that a Prince, of ſuch Magnanimity and Juſtice as our preſent Monarch, can never be tempted by any ſordid Motives to forget the recent Obligation, which He and his Family have to the *Britiſh* Nation, by whom They were made Kings; nor to aim at greater Power and Wealth than are conſiſtent with the Safety of the *Conſtitution* They are intruſted to preſerve, and obliged to

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ſecure. Allowing This to be our preſent Caſe, (and concerning our preſent Caſe, there are not two Opinions, I dare ſay, in the whole Nation) yet ſtill the Symptoms I have mentioned ſhew that the Poiſon, with which theſe pretended *Friends of the Government*, and real *Enemies of the Conſtitution*, corrupt the Morals of Mankind, hath made ſome Progreſs; and if this Progreſs be not immediately check'd by proper Antidotes, and the Power of poiſoning taken from *theſe Empiricks*, the Diſeaſe will grow incurable. The laſt diſmal Effect of it may not, or if you pleaſe, cannot happen in this Reign; but it may, nay it muſt happen in ſome other, unleſs We prevent it effectually and ſoon; and what Seaſon more proper to prevent it in, and to compleat the Security of our *Liberties*, than the Reign of a Prince, for whom the Nation hath done ſo much, and from whom by Conſequence the Nation hath a Right to expect ſo much? King *William* delivered us from Popery and Slavery. There was Wiſdom in his Councils, and Fortitude in his Conduct. He ſteer'd through many real Difficulties at home, and He fought our Battles abroad; and yet thoſe Points of Security, which had been neglected, or not ſufficiently provided for, in the Honey-moon of his Acceſſion, were continually preſs'd upon Him, during the whole Courſe of his Reign. The Men, who preſs'd them, were called *Jacobites*, *Tories*, *Republicans*, and *Incendiaries* too, not from the Throne indeed, but by the Clamour of Thoſe, who ſhew'd great Indifference at leaſt for the *Conſtitution*, whilſt They affected great Zeal for the *Government*. They ſucceeded however in Part, and We enjoy the Benefit of their Succeſs. If They did not ſucceed in the whole; if the Settlement neceſſary to ſecure our *Liberty*, and therefore intended at the *Revolution*,

tion, be not yet compleat; let us be perſuaded, and let us act on that Perſuaſion, that the Honour of compleating it was reſerved to crown the Glories of the preſent Reign. To finiſh the great Work, which King *William* began, of eſtabliſhing the Liberties of *Britain* on firm and durable Foundations, muſt be reputed an Honour ſurely; and to whom can this Honour belong more juſtly than to a Prince, who emulates in ſo remarkable a Manner all the other heroick Virtues of his renowned Predeceſſor?

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XI.

SIR,

IF it was poſſible for any Man, who hath the leaſt Knowledge of our Conſtitution, to doubt in good Earneſt whether the Preſervation of *publick Freedom* depends on the Preſervation of *Parliamentary Freedom*, his Doubts might be removed and his Opinion decided, one would imagine, by this ſingle, obvious Remark; that all the Deſigns of our Princes againſt *Liberty*, ſince *Parliaments* began to be eſtabliſh'd on the Model ſtill ſubſiſting, have been directed conſtantly to one of theſe *two Points*; either to obtain *ſuch Parliaments as They could govern*; or elſe to ſtand all the Difficulties, and to run all the Hazards of *governing without Parliaments*. The Means principally employ'd, to the *firſt of theſe Purpoſes*, have been undue Influences on the *Elections* of Members of the Houſe of Commons, and on *theſe Members*, when choſen. When ſuch Influences could be employed ſucceſsfully, They

have anſwered all the Ends of *arbitrary Will*; and when they could not be ſo employ'd, *arbitrary Will* hath been forc'd to ſubmit to the *Conſtitution*. This hath been the Caſe, not only ſince, but before that great Change in the Ballance of *Property*, which began in the Reigns of *Henry* 7th, and *Henry* 8th, and carried a great Part of that Weight into the Scale of the *Commons*, which had lain before in the Scale of the *Peers* and *Clergy*.

If we look back as far as the Cloſe of the 14th Century, (an Æra pretty near to That, when *Parliaments* received their preſent Form) We ſhall find *both theſe Means* employed by one of the worſt of our Kings, *Richard* the 2d. *That he might obtain his Will, which was raſh*, He directed Mandates to *his Sheriffs* (Officers of the *Crown* and appointed by the *Crown*; for ſuch They were then, and ſuch They ſtill are) *to return certain Perſons nominated by himſelf*; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Elections*. In the next Place, He obliged the Perſons thus return'd *ſometimes by Threats and Terrour, and ſometimes by Gifts, to conſent to thoſe Things, which were prejudicial to the Realm*; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Houſe of Commons*; ſo that, upon the whole, the arbitrary Will of a *raſh, headſtrong Prince*, and the Suggeſtions of his *wicked Miniſters*, guided the Proceedings of *Parliament*, and became the *Law of the Land*. I might purſue Obſervations of the ſame Kind through ſeveral ſucceeding Reigns; but to avoid lengthening theſe Letters, which are grown perhaps too long already, let us deſcend at once to the Reign of King *Charles* the 2d; for in That We ſhall find Examples of all the Means, which a *Court*, that hath common Senſe, and a *Prince*, who will not ſet his Crown on the Caſt of a Dye, can take to undermine the Foundations of *Liberty*,

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either by *governing Parliaments*, or by *governing without them.*

Now the firſt Attempt, of this Kind, which King *Charles* made againſt the *Conſtitution*, was This. He improved and managed the Spirit of the *firſt Parliament* He call'd, ſo as to render the *two Houſes* obſequious to his Will, almoſt in every Caſe; and having got the TRIENNIAL BILL repeal'd, He kept the *ſame Parliament* in Being for many Years by *Prorogations*; which crept into Cuſtom long before his Time, but were ſtill a modern Invention, with reſpect to the primitive Inſtitution of *Parliaments*, and wholly repugnant to the antient Practice. Thus He eſtabliſh'd a *ſtanding Parliament*; which is, in the Nature of it, as dangerous as a *ſtanding Army*, and may become, in ſome Conjunctures, much more fatal to *Liberty*. When the Meaſures of his Adminiſtration grew too bad, and the Tendency of them too apparent to be defended and ſupported, even in *that Parliament*, and even by a *Party-Spirit*, He had Recourſe to a ſecond Attempt; That is, to *Corruption*, and *Clifford* firſt liſted a mercenary Band of *Friends to the Government* againſt the *Conſtitution*.———Let us obſerve, on this Occaſion, and as We paſs along, that a *national Party* (ſuch a Party as the Court *adopts*, in Contradiſtinction to ſuch a Party as it *creates*,) will always retain ſome *national Principles*, ſome Regard to the *Conſtitution*. They may be tranſported, or ſurprized, during the Heat of Conteſt eſpecially, into Meaſures of long and fatal Conſequence. They may be carried on, for a certain Time and to a certain Point, by the Luſts of Vengeance and of Power, in order to wreak one upon their Adverſaries, and to ſecure the other to Themſelves. But a *national Party* will never be the Inſtruments of compleating *national Ruin*. They will become the Adverſaries of their

Friends, and the Friends of their Adverſaries, to prevent it; and the *Miniſter*, who perſiſts in ſo villainous a Project, by what name ſoever He may affect to diſtinguiſh Himſelf and his Followers, will be found really at the Head of a *Faction*, not of a *Party*. But the Difference between *one* and the *other* is ſo viſible, and the Boundaries, where *Party* ceaſes and *Faction* commences, are ſo ſtrongly mark'd, that it is ſufficient to point at them.

I return therefore, and obſerve that when the *Spirit of Party* fail'd King *Charles*, and the *Corruption* He employed proved ineffectual, He reſolved to govern for a Time *without Parliaments*, and to employ that Time, as ſoon as He had check'd the Spirit of *one Party*, by inflaming That of *another*, in *garbling Corporations*. He had found by Experience that it was impoſſible to corrupt the Stream in any great Degree, as long as the Fountain continued pure. He apply'd Himſelf therefore to ſpread the Taint of the *Court* in them, and to poiſon thoſe Springs, from whence the Health and Vigour of the *Conſtitution* flow. This was the third, the laſt, and by much the moſt dangerous Expedient, employ'd by the *Friends of the Government*, in the Reign of King *Charles* the 2d, to undermine our *Liberties*. The Effect of it He did not live to ſee; but we may eaſily conjecture what it would have been.

The Uſe I make of what hath been here ſaid is This. The Deſign of the *Revolution* being not only to ſave us from the immediate Attempts on our Religion and Liberty, made by King *James*, but to ſave us from all other Attempts, which had been made, or might be made, of the ſame Tendency; to renew and ſtrengthen our Conſtitution; * *to*

* *See th. Prince of* Orange's *Declaration.*

eſtabliſh

eſtabliſh the Peace, Honour and Happineſs of theſe Nations upon laſting Foundations, ——— and to procure a Settlement of the Religion, and of the Liberties and Properties of the Subjects, upon ſo ſure a Foundation, that there might be no Danger of the Nation's relapſing into the like Miſeries at any Time hereafter; This being, I ſay, the avow'd Deſign of the *Revolution*, and the Nation having engaged in it on a Confidence that all This would be effectually perform'd, the Deſign of the *Revolution* was not accompliſhed, the Benefit of it was not ſecured to us, the juſt Expectations of the Nation could not be anſwer'd, unleſs the *Freedom of Elections* and the *Frequency, Integrity and Independency of Parliaments* were ſufficiently provided for. Theſe are the Eſſentials of *Britiſh Liberty*. Defects in other Parts of the *Conſtitution* can never be fatal, if Theſe are preſerved intire. But Defects in Theſe will ſoon deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, though every other Part of it ſhould be ſo preſerved. However it happened, the Truth and Notoriety of the Fact oblige us to ſay that theſe important Conditions, without which *Liberty* can never be ſecure, were almoſt wholly neglected at the *Revolution*. The *Claim of Right* declares, indeed, that *Elections ought to be free*; *that Freedom of Speech and Debates ought not to be impeach'd, or queſtion'd out of Parliament*; *and that Parliaments ought to be held frequently*. But ſuch Declarations, however ſolemnly made, are nothing better than pompous Trifles, if They ſtand alone; productive of no Good, and thus far productive of Ill, that they ſerve to amuſe Mankind, in Points of the greateſt Importance, and wherein it concerns Them the moſt nearly neither to be deceived, nor ſo much as amuſed. Theſe were *Rights*, no Doubt, to which the Nation had an indiſputable Claim. But then they ought to have been more

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than claim'd, ſince they had been ſo often and ſo lately invaded. That they were not more than claimed, that they were not effectually aſſerted and ſecured, at this Time, gave very great and immediate Diſſatisfaction; and They, who were called *Whigs* in thoſe Days, diſtinguiſhed Themſelves by the Loudneſs of their Complaints. Thus, for Inſtance, They inſiſted that there could be no * *real Settlement*, nay that it was a *Jeſt to talk of a Settlement*, till the *Manner* and *Time of calling* Parliaments, and their *ſitting*, when *call'd*, were *fully determined*; and This, in order to prevent the Practice of *keeping* ONE *and the* SAME PARLIAMENT *ſo long on Foot, till the* Majority *was corrupted by Offices, Gifts and Penſions.* They inſiſted that the Aſſurances given at the *Revolution* had led Them to think that † *the antient, legal Courſe of* ANNUALLY CHOSEN PARLIAMENTS *would have been immediately reſtored*; and the particular Circumſtances of King *William*, who had received the *Crown* by Gift of the People, and who had renewed the *original Contract* with the People, (which are preciſely the Circumſtances of the preſent, Royal Family) were urged as particular Reaſons for the Nation to expect his Complyance.

The *frequent ſitting of Parliament* was indeed provided for, indirectly and in Conſequence, by the Exigencies of the *War*, which ſoon followed the *Revolution*. This War made *annual Supplies* neceſſary; and, before it was over, the ſame Neceſſity of *annual Seſſions of Parliament* came to be eſtabliſhed, as it continues to this Hour, by the

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* See *Conſiderations concerning the State of the Nation, by Mr.* Hambden, *publiſhed in* 1692.

† *An Enquiry, or a Diſcourſe, &c. publiſhed in* 1693.

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great Alteration made relatively to the *publick Revenue*. The *whole publick Revenue* had been the *King's* formerly. *Parliamentary Aids* were, in thoſe Days, extraordinary and occaſional; and Things came to that Paſs at laſt, that *Parliaments* were more frequently, or more rarely conven'd, juſt as *Courts* had more frequent, or more rare Occaſions for ſuch Supplies. But King *William* began to be, and all our Princes ſince Him have continued to be, only Proprietors for Life of that Part of the *publick Revenue*, which is appropriated to their *Civil Liſt*; although They are intruſted ſtill with the Management of the *Whole*, and are even the Stewards of the *publick Creditors* for that Part, which is the private Property of *theſe Creditors*. This is the preſent State, ſufficiently known, but neceſſary to be mention'd particularly on this Occaſion; and This muſt continue to be the State; unleſs ſome Prince ſhould ariſe hereafter, who, being adviſed by a *deſperate Miniſter*, abetted by a *mercenary Faction*, ſupported by a *ſtanding Army*, and inſtigated, like *Richard* the 2d, by the * *Raſhneſs of his own Temper*, may lay rapacious Hands on all the *Funds*, that have been created, and by applying illegally what He may raiſe legally, convert the whole to his own Uſe, and ſo eſtabliſh *arbitrary Power*, by depriving at one Stroke many of his Subjects of their *Property*, and all of them of their *Liberty*. Till This happens, (and Heaven forbid that it ſhould be ever attempted!) *Seſſions of Parliament* muſt be *annually* held, or the Government it ſelf be diſtreſs'd. But neither is This ſuch a direct and full Security as the Importance of the Thing requires; nor does

* *Per immoderatam voluntatem.*

the

the Security of our *Liberty* conſiſt only in *frequent Seſſions of Parliaments*; but it conſiſts likewiſe in *frequent new Parliaments*. Nay, it conſiſts ſo much more in *This* than in the *other*, that the *former* may tend, without the *latter*, even more than the *Diſcontinuance of Parliaments*, to the Loſs of *Liberty*. This was foreſeen by the Wiſdom of our *Conſtitution*. According to That, although it became in Time (by the Courſe of Events and inſenſible Alterations) no longer neceſſary to call Parliaments *once*, or even *twice in a Year*, which had been the more antient Practice; yet ſtill our *Kings* continued under an Incapacity of proceeding long in Government, with any tolerable Eaſe and Safety to Themſelves, without the Concurrence and Aſſiſtance of *theſe Aſſemblies*. According to the *ſame Conſtitution*, as *Parliaments* were to be *held*, ſo they were to be *choſen frequently*; and the Opinion, that the *Holding and Continuance of Parliaments depended abſolutely on the Will of the Prince*, may be juſtly rank'd amongſt thoſe Attempts, that were made by ſome Men to ſet the *Law*, whilſt others endeavour'd to ſet the *Goſpel*, on the Side of *arbitrary Power*. This is the plain Intent and Scheme of our *Conſtitution*, which provides that the *Repreſentatives of the People* ſhould have frequent Opportunities to communicate together about *national Grievances*; to complain of them, and to obtain the Redreſs of them, in an orderly, ſolemn, legal Manner; and that the *People* ſhould have frequent Opportunities of calling their *Repreſentatives* to Account, as it were, for the Diſcharge of the Truſt committed to Them, and of approving, or diſapproving their Conduct, by electing, or not electing them anew. Thus our *Conſtitution* ſuppoſes that *Princes* may abuſe their Power, and *Parliaments* betray their Truſt; and

provides,

provides, as far as human Wiſdom can provide, that neither *one*, nor the *other*, may be able to do ſo long, without a ſufficient Controul. If the *Crown*, indeed, perſiſts in uſurping on the *Liberty of the People*, or in any other Kind of *Male-Adminiſtration*; and if the *Prince*, who wears it, proves deaf, as our *Princes* have ſometimes been, to the Voice of his *Parliament* and his *People*, there remains no Remedy in the Syſtem of the *Conſtitution*. The *Conſtitution* is broken by the Obſtinacy of the *Prince*, and the * *People muſt appeal to Heaven in This, as in all other Caſes, where They have no Judge on Earth.* Thus, if a *Parliament* ſhould perſiſt in abetting *Male-Adminiſtration*, or any Way give up *thoſe Liberties*, which They were intruſted to maintain, no Doubt can be made but that the *People* would be in the ſame Caſe; ſince their *Repreſentatives* have no more Right to betray Them, than their *Kings* have to uſurp upon them; and by Conſequence They would acquire the ſame Right of *appealing to Heaven*, if our *Conſtitution* had not provided a Remedy againſt *this Evil*, which could not be provided againſt the *other*; but our *Conſtitution* hath provided ſuch a Remedy in the *frequent Succeſſion of new Parliaments*, by which there is not Time ſufficient given to form a *Majority of the Repreſentatives of the People* into a MINISTERIAL CABAL; or by which, if This ſhould happen, *ſuch a Cabal* muſt be ſoon broken. Theſe Reflections and ſuch others, as they naturally ſuggeſt, are ſufficient to convince any thinking Man, 1*ſt*, That nothing could make it ſafe, nor therefore reaſonable, to repoſe in any Set of Men whatſoever ſo great a

* Locke's *Eſſay upon Government, Chap.* 14.

Truſt as the *collective Body* delegates on the *Repreſentative* in this Kingdom, except the *Shortneſs of the Term*, for which this Truſt is delegated. 2*dly*, That every *Prolongation of this Term* is therefore, in its Degree, unſafe for the *People*; that it weakens their *Security*, and endangers *Liberty* by the very Powers given for its Preſervation. 3*dly*, That *ſuch Prolongations* expoſe the Nation, in the poſſible Caſe of having a *corrupt Parliament*, to loſe the great Advantage, which our *Conſtitution* hath provided, of curing the Evil, before it grows confirm'd and deſperate, by the gentle Method of *chuſing a new Repreſentative*, and reduce the Nation by Conſequence to have no other Alternative than That of *ſubmitting*, or *reſiſting*; though *Submiſſion* will be as grievous, and *Reſiſtance* much more difficult, when the *Legiſlature* betrays its Truſt, than when the *King* alone abuſes his Power.——Theſe Reflections, I ſay, are ſufficient to prove theſe Propoſitions; and theſe Propoſitions ſet before us, in a very ſtrong Light, the Neceſſity of uſing our utmoſt Efforts that the true Deſign of our Conſtitution may be purſued as cloſely as poſſible by the Re-eſtabliſhment of *annual*, or at leaſt of *triennial Parliaments*. But the Importance of the Matter, and the particular Seaſonableneſs of the Conjuncture, invite me to offer one Conſideration more upon this Head, which I think will not ſtrike the leſs for being obvious and plain. It is This. Should a *King* obtain, *for many Years at once*, the Supplies and Powers, which uſed to be granted *annually* to Him; This would be deemed, I preſume, even in the preſent Age, an unjuſtifiable Meaſure and an intolerable Grievance, for this plain Reaſon; becauſe it would alter our *Conſtitution* in the fundamental Article, that requires *frequent Aſſemblies of the whole Legiſlature*, in order to aſſiſt, and controul

too,

too, the *executive Power*, which is intruſted with *one Part of it*. Now I aſk, is not the Article, which requires *frequent Elections of the Repreſentative*, by the *collective Body of the People*, in order to ſecure the *latter* againſt the ill Conſequences of the poſſible Weakneſs, or Corruption of the *former*, as fundamental an Article, and as eſſential to the Preſervation of our *Liberties*, as the *other?* No Man dares ſay that it is not; at leaſt no Man, who deſerves our Attention. The People of *Britain* have as good a Right, and a Right as neceſſary to be aſſerted, to keep their *Repreſentatives* true to the Truſt repoſed in Them, and to the Preſervation of the *Conſtitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Elections*, as they have to keep their *Kings* true to the Truſt repoſed in Them, and to the Preſervation of the *Conſtitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Sittings of Parliament*. How comes it then to paſs, that We may obſerve ſo great a Difference in the Sentiments of Mankind, about theſe *two Caſes?* Propoſe the *firſt*, there is no *ſervile Friend of Government*, who will not affect all that Horrour at the Propoſition, which every *Friend of the Conſtitution* will really feel. Propoſe the keeping up *ſeptennial*, nay the making *decennial Parliaments*, the ſame *Friends of Government* will contend ſtrenuouſly for *one* and by Conſequence for *both*; ſince there can be no Reaſon alledged for the *firſt*, which is not ſtronger for the *laſt*, and would not be ſtill ſtronger for a *longer Term*. Theſe Reaſons, drawn from two or three commonplace Topicks of *pretended Conveniency* and *Expediency*, or of *ſuppoſed Tranquillity at home*, and *Strength abroad*, I need not mention. They have been mentioned by others, and ſufficiently refuted. But That, which may very juſtly appear marvellous, is This; that ſome Men, I think not

many, who are *true Friends of the Conſtitution*, have been ſtaggered in their Opinions, and almoſt ſeduced by the falſe Reaſonings of theſe *Friends of Government*; though nothing can be more eaſy than to ſhew from Reaſon and Experience, that *Convenience*, *Expediency*, and *domeſtick Tranquility* may be, and in Fact have been as well, nay better ſecured, under *triennial*, nay *annual Parliaments*, than under *Parliaments of a longer Continuance*; and as for *Strength abroad*, (That is, national Credit and Influence) it will depend on the Opinion foreign Nations have of our national Diſpoſitions, and the Unanimity of our Sentiments. It muſt be chiefly determin'd therefore by their Knowledge of the real Senſe of the Nation. Now That can appear no Way ſo much as in the natural State of our *Conſtitution*, by *frequent Elections*; and when it does appear ſo, it muſt have another Kind of Effect than the bare Reſolutions of a *ſtale*, *miniſterial Parliament*; eſpecially if it happens, as it may happen in ſome future Time, that the Senſe of the *Nation* ſhould appear to be different from the Senſe of *ſuch a Parliament*; and that the Reſolutions of *ſuch a Parliament* ſhould be avowedly dictated by *Men*, odious and hated, contemptible and contemn'd, both at Home and Abroad.

But in the Suppoſition that ſome Inconveniencies may ariſe by *frequent Elections*; (which is only allow'd for Argument's Sake;) are ſuch Inconveniencies, and the trifling Conſequences of them, to be ſet in the Ballance againſt the Danger of weakening any one Barrier of our *Liberty*? Every Form of Government hath Advantages and Diſadvantages peculiar to it. Thus *abſolute Monarchies* ſeem moſt form'd for ſudden and vigorous Efforts of Power, either in attacking, or in defending; whilſt, in *free Conſtitutions*, the Forms of Government muſt be neceſſarily

neceſſarily more complicated and ſlow; ſo that in *Theſe*, the ſame Secrecy cannot be always kept, nor the ſame Diſpatch always made, nor the ſame Steadineſs of Meaſures always purſued. Muſt all theſe Forms, inſtituted to preſerve the Checks and Controuls of the ſeveral Parts of the *Conſtitution* on one another, and neceſſary by Conſequence to preſerve the *Liberty* of the whole, be abandoned therefore, and a *free Conſtitution* be deſtroy'd, for the Sake of ſome *little Conveniency*, or *Expediency* the more, in the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs? No certainly. We muſt keep our *free Conſtitution*, with the ſmall Defects belonging to it, or We muſt change it for an *arbitrary Government*, free perhaps from theſe Defects, but liable to more and to worſe. In ſhort, We muſt make our Option; and ſurely this Option is not hard to be made, between the real and permanent Bleſſings of *Liberty*, diffus'd through a *whole Nation*, and the fantaſtick and accidental Advantages, which *They*, who govern, not the *Body of the People*, enjoy under *abſolute Monarchies*. I will not multiply Inſtances, though they croud in upon me. ——— *Two Conſuls* were choſen *annually* at *Rome*, and the *Proconſular Power* in the Government of Provinces was limited to a *Year*. Several Inconveniencies aroſe, no Doubt, from the ſtrict Obſervation of this Inſtitution. Some appear very plian in Hiſtory; and We may aſſure ourſelves that many Arguments of *Conveniency*, of *Expediency*, of preſerving the *Tranquillity* of the City, and of giving *Strength* and *Weight* to the Arms and Counſels of the Commonwealth, were urged to prevail on the People to diſpenſe with theſe Inſtitutions, in Favour of *Pompey* and of *Cæſar*. What was the Conſequence; the *Pyrates* were extirpated, the Price of *Corn* was reduced, *Spain* was held in Subjection, *Gaul* was conquered, the *Germans* were repulſed,

Rome

Rome triumphed, her *Government* flouriſhed; but her *Conſtitution* was deſtroyed, her *Liberty* was loſt.——The Law of *Habeas Corpus*, that noble Badge of *Liberty*, which every Subject of *Britain* wears, and by which He is diſtinguiſhed ſo eminently, not from the *Slaves* alone, but even from the *Freemen* of other Countries; the Law of *Habeas Corpus*, I ſay, may be attended perhaps with ſome little Inconveniencies, in Time of Sedition and Rebellion.——The ſlow Methods of *giving Money*, and the *ſtrict Appropriations of it*, when given, may be attended with ſome Inconveniency likewiſe, in Times of Danger, and in great Exigencies of the State——But who will plead for the Repeal of the *Habeas Corpus Act*; or who would not preſs for the Revival of it, if it ſtood ſuſpended for an *indefinite*, or even a *long Term?*--Who will ſay that the Practice of *giving Money without Account*, or paſſing *Votes of Credit*; (by which the *Purſe of the People* is taken out of the Hands of *Thoſe*, whom the *People* truſted, and put into the Hands of *Thoſe*, whom They neither did, nor would have truſted) who will ſay that ſuch a Deviation from thoſe *Rules of Parliament*, which ought to be deem'd ſacred and preſerved inviolate, may be eſtabliſhed, or ſhould not be oppoſed by all poſſible Means, if it was eſtabliſhed?

If all This be as clear as I imagine it is; if the Objections to *frequent Elections of Parliaments* do not lye; or, ſuppoſing them to lye, if the Danger on *one Side* outweighs vaſtly the ſuppoſed Inconveniency on the *other*; nay, if *Laws* and *Inſtitutions*, not more eſſential to the Preſervation of *Liberty* than this *antient and fundamental Rule of our Conſtitution*, be maintained; and if all Men are forced to agree, (even They, who wiſh them perhaps aboliſhed) that they ought to be

maintain'd,

maintain'd, for the Sake of preſerving *Liberty*; let me aſk again, how comes it to paſs that We obſerve ſo great a Difference between the Sentiments and Reaſonings of Mankind about *frequent Seſſions of Parliament*, and *frequent Parliaments*; about the *Caſe* now before us, and all the *others*, that have been mentioned? The only Manner, in which I can account for ſuch an Inconſiſtency, is This. The Sight of the *Mind* differs very much from the Sight of the *Body*, and its Operations are frequently the Reverſe of the *other*. Objects at a Diſtance appear to the *former* in their true Magnitude, and diminiſh as they are brought nearer. The Event, that created much Aſtoniſhment, Indignation, or Terror in Proſpect, creates leſs and leſs, as it approaches, and by the Time it happens, Men have familiarized Themſelves with it.——If the *Romans* had been told, in the Days of *Auguſtus*, that an Emperor would ſucceed, in whoſe Reign an *Horſe* ſhould be made Conſul, They would have been extremely ſurpriſed. I believe, They were not ſo much ſurpriz'd, when the Thing happened; when the *Horſe* was Conſul and *Caligula* Emperor.——If it had been foretold to thoſe Patriots at the *Revolution*, who remember'd *long Parliaments*, who ſtill felt the Smart of them, who ſtruggled hard for *annual*, and obtain'd with much Difficulty, at the End of five or ſix Years, *triennial Parliaments*, that a Time would come, when even the Term of *triennial Parliaments* would be deem'd too ſhort, and a Parliament, choſen for *three Years*, would chuſe itſelf for *four* more, and entail *ſeptennial Parliaments* on the Nation; that This would happen, and the Fruits of their honeſt Labours be loſt, in little more than twenty Years; and that it would be brought about, whilſt our Government continued on the Foundations

Foundations They had then ſo newly laid; if all This had been foretold at the Time I mention, it would have appeared improbable and monſtrous to the Friends of the *Revolution*. Yet it hath happened; and, in leſs than twenty Years, it is grown or is growing, familiar to us. The uniform Zeal and Complaiſance of our *Parliaments* for the *Crown* leave little Room to apprehend any Attempt to *govern without them*; or to make Them do in *one Seſſion* the Work of *ſeven*; though This would be extremely *convenient*, no Doubt, a great Eaſe to *future Miniſters*, and a great ſaving of Expence and Time to *Country Gentlemen*. But ſuppoſe, (for I deſire it may be remember'd that We reaſon hypothetically) ſuppoſe a *Parliament* ſhould think fit to give, in the *firſt Seſſion*, all the *Money*, all the *Credit*, and all the *Powers*, neceſſary for carrying on the Government, during *ſeven Years*; and then let thoſe Perſons, who will be ſhock'd at this Suppoſition, and yet declare Themſelves for *ſeptennial Parliaments*, lay their Hands on their Hearts, and conſider whether ſuch an Alteration of the Conſtitution might not grow familiar to Them, and even gain their Approbation. I think, it would do ſo. I am ſure, it might as reaſonably as the other. They would find the Eaſe, in one Caſe, of *little Attendance*, as much as That of *diſtant Elections*, in the other. The Arguments of *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, *publick Tranquility*, and *Strength to the Government*, would be juſt as well apply'd; and if the *Miniſters* ſhould, by Miracle, make no very exorbitant ill Uſe of ſuch a Situation, I doubt whether He, who ſhould plead for *annual Parliaments* then, would be much better heard by the ſame Perſons, than He, who pleads for *frequent Elections of Parliaments*, is now. But let not the *Lovers of Liberty*, the *Friends of our Conſtitution*, reaſon

reaſon in this Manner. Let Them remember that Danger commences, when the Breach is made, not when the Attack is begun; that He, who neglects to ſtop the Leak, as ſoon as it is diſcovered, in Hopes to ſave his Ship by Pumping, when the Water guſhes in with Violence, deſerves to be drown'd; and, to lay aſide Figures of Speech, that our *Conſtitution* is not, like the Schemes of *ſome Politicians*, a Jumble of disjointed, incoherent Whimſies, but a noble and wiſe Syſtem, the eſſential Parts of which are ſo proportioned, and ſo intimately connected, that a Change in one begets a Change in the whole; that the *frequent Elections of Parliament* are as much an eſſential Part of this Syſtem as the *frequent Sittings of Parliament*; that the Work of the *Revolution* is imperfect therefore, and our future Security precarious, unleſs our *ancient Conſtitution* be reſtored, in this eſſential Part; and that the Reſtoration of it, in this Part, is one of thoſe Methods, by which alone the pernicious Deſigns of *ſuch Men*, as We have mentioned in a former Letter, if any ſuch ſhould be ever admitted into Power, (*Enemies to the Conſtitution*, under the Maſk of *Zeal for the Government*) may be defeated.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XII.

SIR,

WE have obſerved already that the *Conſtitution of the Britiſh Government* ſuppoſes our *Kings* may abuſe their Power, and our *Repreſentatives* betray their Truſt; and provides againſt both theſe Contingencies, as well as human Wiſdom can provide. Here let us obſerve that the ſame *Conſtitution* is very far from ſuppoſing the *People* will ever betray Themſelves; and yet this Caſe is poſſible, no Doubt. We do not read, I think, of more than * *one Nation*, who refuſed *Liberty*, when it was offered to Them; but We read of many, and have almoſt ſeen ſome, who loſt it through their own Fault, by the plain and neceſſary Conſequences of their own Conduct, when They were in full Poſſeſſion of it, and had the Means of ſecuring it effectually in their Power. A wiſe and brave People will neither be cozen'd, nor bully'd out of their *Liberty*; but a wiſe and brave People may ceaſe to be ſuch; They may degenerate; They may ſink into Sloth and Luxury; They may reſign Themſelves to a treacherous Conduct; or abet the *Enemies of the Conſtitution*, under a Notion of

* *The* Cappadocians. *vid.* Strabo *Lib.* 12. —— *Libertatem repudiaverunt, ut quam ſibi dicerent intolerabilem.*

ſupporting

ſupporting the *Friends of the Government*; They may want the Senſe to diſcern their Danger in Time; or the Courage to reſiſt, when it ſtares Them in the Face. The *Tarquins* were expell'd, and *Rome* reſum'd her Liberty. *Cæſar* was murdered, and all his Race extinct; but *Rome* remain'd in Bondage. From whence this Difference? † *Machiavel* ſhall account for it. In the Days of *Tarquin*, the People of *Rome* were not yet corrupted. In the Days of *Cæſar*, They were moſt corrupt. A free People may be ſometimes betray'd; but no People will betray themſelves, and ſacrifice their *Liberty*, unleſs they fall into a State of univerſal Corruption; and when They are once fallen into ſuch a State, They will be ſure to loſe what They deſerve no longer to enjoy. To what Purpoſe therefore ſhould our *Conſtitution* have ſuppoſed a Caſe, in which no Remedy can avail; a Caſe, which can never happen, 'till the Spirit, which form'd *this Conſtitution* firſt, and hath preſerv'd it ever ſince, ſhall be totally extinguiſhed; and 'till it becomes an ideal Entity, like the *Utopia*, exiſting in the Imagination, or Memory, no where elſe? As all Government began, ſo all Government muſt end by the *People*; tyrannical Governments by their Virtue and Courage, and even free Governments by their Vice and Baſeneſs. Our *Conſtitution*, indeed, makes it impoſſible to deſtroy *Liberty* by any ſudden Blaſt of popular Fury, or by the Treachery of a Few; for though the Many cannot eaſily hurt, They may eaſily ſave Themſelves. But if the Many will concur with the Few; if They will adviſedly and deliberately ſuffer their *Liberty* to be taken away by Thoſe, on

† *Diſcourſes Lib.* 1. *c.* 17.

whom They delegate Power to preſerve it; This no *Conſtitution* can prevent. God would not ſupport even his own Theocracy againſt the concurrent Deſire of the Children of *Iſrael*, but gave Them a *King* in his Anger. How then ſhould our human Conſtitution of Government ſupport itſelf againſt ſo univerſal a Change, as We here ſuppoſe, in the Temper and Character of our People? It cannot be. We may give our ſelves a Tyrant in our Folly, if We pleaſe: But This can never happen till the whole Nation falls into a State of political Reprobation. Then, and not till then, political Damnation will be our Lot.

Let us deſcend into a greater Detail, in order to develope theſe Reflections fully, and to puſh the Conſequences of them home to our ſelves, and to our preſent State. They deſerve our utmoſt Attention, and are ſo far from being foreign to the Subject of theſe Eſſays upon *Parties*, that they will terminate in the very Point, at which We began, and wind up the whole in one important Leſſon.

To proceed then; I ſay, that if the People of this Iſland ſhould ſuffer their Liberties to be at any Time raviſh'd, or ſtol'n from Them, They would incur greater Blame, and deſerve by Conſequence leſs Pity, than any enſlaved and oppreſſed People ever did. By how much *true Liberty* (That is, Liberty ſtated and aſcertain'd by *Law*, in equal Oppoſition to *popular Licence* and *arbitrary Will*) hath been more boldly aſſerted, more wiſely or more ſucceſsfully improved, and more firmly eſtabliſh'd in This, than in other Countries; by ſo much the more heavy would our juſt Condemnation prove in the Caſe, that is here ſuppoſed. The Virtue of our Anceſtors, to whom all theſe Advantages are owing, would aggravate the Guilt and the Infamy of their degenerate Poſterity. There

have

have been Ages of *Gold*, and of *Silver*, of *Braſs* and of *Iron*, in our little World, as in the great World, though not in the ſame Order. In which of theſe Ages We are at preſent, let others determine. This, at leaſt, is certain, that in all theſe Ages *Britain* hath been the Temple, as it were, of *Liberty*. Whilſt her ſacred Fires have been extinguiſhed in ſo many Countries, here they have been religiouſly kept alive. Here ſhe hath her Saints, her Confeſſors, and a whole Army of Martyrs, and the Gates of Hell have not hitherto prevail'd againſt Her; ſo that if a fatal Reverſe is to happen; if Servility and Servitude are to over-run the whole World, like Injuſtice, and *Liberty* is to retire from it, like *Aſtræa*; our Portion of the abandon'd Globe will have, at leaſt, the mournful Honour, whenever it happens, of ſhewing her laſt, her parting Steps.

The antient *Britons* are to us the *Aborigines* of our Iſland. We diſcover little of Them through the Gloom of Antiquity, and We ſee nothing beyond Them. This however We know; They were *Freemen*. *Cæſar*, who viſited Them in an hoſtile Manner, but did not conquer Them, perhaps was * beaten by Them; *Cæſar*, I ſay, beſtows very liberally the Title of *Kings* upon their Chieftains, and the Compilers of fabulous Traditions deduce a Series of their Monarchs from *Samothes*, a Cotemporary of *Nimrod*. But *Cæſar* affected to ſwell the Account of his Expedition with pompous Names; and theſe Writers, like Thoſe whom † *Strabo* mentions, endeavour'd to recommend Themſelves by publiſhing Romances to an

* *Tertia quæſitis oſtendit Terga Britannis.*
† *Geog. Lib.* 11.

ignorant

ignorant Generation, inſtead of Hiſtories. Theſe ſuppoſed Monarchs were the * Heads of little Clans; *Reguli, vel melioris Notæ Nobiles*; and if our Iſland knew any Authority of the kingly Sort in thoſe Days, it was That of *occaſional* and *temporary Monarchs*, elected in great Exigencies, † *communi Conſilio, Suffragiis Multitudinis*, like *Caſſivellaunus* in *Britain*, or *Vercingetorix* in *Gaul*; for, in ſome Caſes, Examples taken from either of theſe People will conclude for both. The *Kings*, who ruled in *Britain*, after the *Romans* abandon'd the Iſland, in the Beginning of the 5th Century, held their Authority from the *People*, and govern'd under the Controul of *national Aſſemblies*, as We have great Reaſon to believe, and none to doubt. In ſhort, as far as We can look back, a lawleſs Power, a Government by Will, never prevail'd in *Britain*.

The *Saxons* had *Kings*, as well as the *Britons*. The Manner, in which They eſtabliſhed Themſelves, and the long Wars They waged for and againſt the *Britons*, led to and maintain'd *monarchical Rule* amongſt Them. But *theſe Kings* were in their firſt Inſtitution, no Doubt, ſuch as *Tacitus* deſcribes the *German Kings* and *Princes* to have been; ** Chiefs, who perſuaded, rather than commanded; and who were heard in the publick Aſſemblies of the Nation, according as their *Age*, their *Nobility*, their *military Fame*, or their *Eloquence* gave Them Authority. How many doubty Monarchs, in later and more polite Ages, would have ſlept in Cottages, and have

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* *Sel. Anal. Anglo Brit. Lib.* 2. *cap.* 3. *Cam.*
† *Cæſ. de Bell. Lib.* 5. *&* 7.
** *De Situ mor. & Pop. Germ. lib.* 11.

work'd

work'd in Stalls, inſtead of inhabiting Palaces, and being cuſhion'd up in Thrones, if this Rule of Government had continued in Force?——But the *Saxon Kings* grew into Power in Time; and among Them, as among other Nations, Birth, inſtead of Merit, became, for the Sake of Order and Tranquility, a Title to the Throne. However, tho' theſe Princes might command, and were no longer under the Neceſſity of governing by Perſuaſion, They were ſtill under That of governing to the Satisfaction of the People. By what other Expedient could They govern Men, who were wiſe enough to preſerve and exerciſe the Right of electing their *civil Magiſtrates*, and *military Officers*, and the Syſtem of whoſe Government was upheld and carried on by a Gradation of *popular Aſſemblies*, from the inferior Courts to the high Court of Parliament; for ſuch, or very near ſuch, was the *Wittena Gemote* in Nature and Effect, whenever the Word *Parliament* came into Uſe?

The firſt Prince of the *Norman* Race was an abſolute *Conqueror*, in the Opinion of ſome Men; and I can readily agree that He aſſumed, in ſome Caſes, the Power of a *Tyrant*. But ſuppoſing all This to be true in the utmoſt Extent, that the *Friends of abſolute Monarchy* can deſire it ſhould be thought ſo; This, and This alone, will reſult from it; *unlimited*, or *abſolute Monarchy*, could never be eſtabliſhed in *Britain*; no, not even by *Conqueſt*. The Rights of the People were ſoon re-aſſerted; the Laws of the *Confeſſor* were reſtored; and the third Prince of this Race, *Henry* the 1ſt, covenanted in a ſolemn Speech to his People for their Aſſiſtance againſt his Brother *Robert* and the *Normans*, by promiſing that *ſacred Charter*, which was in other Reigns ſo often and ſo ſolemnly confirmed, by engaging

gaging to maintain his Subjects in * *their ancient Liberties*, to *follow their Advice*, and to rule Them in Peace with *Prudence* and *Mildneſs*.

I need not deſcend into more Particulars to ſhew the Perpetuity of free Government in *Britain*. Few Men, even in this Age, are ſo ſhamefully unacquainted with the Hiſtory of their Country, as to be ignorant of the principal Events and ſignal Revolutions, which have happened ſince the *Norman* Æra. One continued Deſign againſt *Liberty* hath been carried on by various Methods, almoſt in every Reign. In many, the Struggles have been violent and bloody. But *Liberty* ſtill hath triumph'd over Force, over Treachery, over Corruption, and even under Oppreſſion. The Altars of *Tyranny* have been demoliſhed as ſoon as raiſed; nay, even whilſt they were raiſing; and the Prieſts of that Idol have been hew'd to Pieces; ſo that I will affirm, without the leaſt Apprehenſion of being diſproved, that our *Conſtitution* is brought nearer than any *other Conſtitution* ever was to the moſt perfect Idea of a *free Syſtem of Government*.——One Obſervation only I will make, before I leave this Head, and it is This. The Titles of thoſe Kings, which were precarious, from Circumſtances of Times, and Notions that prevailed, notwithſtanding the general Acquieſence of the Nation to them, afforded ſo many Opportunities to our Anceſtors of better ſecuring, or improving *Liberty*. They were not ſuch Bubbles as to alter, without mending the Government; much leſs to make Revolutions, and ſuffer by them. They were not ſuch Bubbles

* *In Antiquis veſtris Libertatibus. Veſtris inclinando Conſiliis. Conſultius & mitius, more manſueti Principis.*——Vid. *Mat. Par.*

as

as to raiſe Princes to the Throne, who had no Pretenee to ſit in it but their Choice, purely to have the Honour of bettering the Condition of thoſe Princes, without bettering their own in proportion.——If what I have been ſaying appears a little too digreſſive from the main Scope of this Eſſay, I ſhall hope for Indulgence from this Conſideration, that the natural Effect of ſuch Reflections, as I have made and ſuggeſted, muſt be to raiſe in our Minds the honeſt Ambition of emulating the Virtue and Courage of our Forefathers, in the Cauſe of *Liberty*; and to inſpire a reaſonable Fear, heightened by Shame, of loſing what They preſerved and delivered down to us, through ſo many Mixtures of different People, of *Britons* with *Saxons*, of both with *Danes*, of all three with *Normans*, through ſo many Difficulties, ſo many Dangers, ſo many Revolutions, in the Courſe of ſo many Centuries.

There is another Reaſon to be given why the People of this Iſland would be more inexcuſable than any other, if They loſt their *Liberty*; and the opening and enforcing of this Reaſon will bring us fully into our Subject.

I ſuppoſed juſt now that our *Liberty* might be raviſh'd, or ſtol'n from us; but I think that Expreſſion muſt be retracted; ſince it will appear, upon due Conſideration, that our *Liberty* cannot be taken away by the Force, or Fraud alone of Thoſe, who govern; it cannot be taken away, unleſs the People are Themſelves Accomplices; and They, who are Accomplices, cannot be ſaid to ſuffer by one, or the other. Some Nations have received the Yoke of Servitude with little or no Struggle; but if ever it is impoſed upon us, We muſt not only hold out our Necks to receive it; We muſt help to put it on. Now, to be paſſive in ſuch a Caſe

is ſhameful; but to be active is ſupreme and unexampled Infamy. In order to become Slaves, We of this Nation muſt be beforehand, what other People have been render'd by a long Courſe of Servitude; We muſt become the moſt corrupt, the moſt profligate, the moſt ſenſeleſs, the moſt ſervile Nation of Wretches, that ever diſgraced Humanity; for a Force ſufficient to raviſh *Liberty* from us, ſuch as a great *ſtanding Army* is in Time of Peace, cannot be continued, unleſs We continue it; nor can the Means, neceſſary to ſteal *Liberty* from us, be long enough employ'd with Effect, unleſs We give a Sanction to their Iniquity, and call Good Evil, and Evil Good.

It may be ſaid that even the *Friends of Liberty* have ſometimes different Notions about it, and about the Means of maintaining, or promoting it; and therefore that even the *Britiſh* Nation may poſſibly, ſome Time or other, approve and concur in Meaſures deſtructive of their *Liberty*, without any Intention to give it up, and much more without changing from the Character, which They have hitherto borne among the Societies of Mankind, to that infamous Character I have juſt now ſuppoſed. If This were true, it would only furniſh more Reaſons to be always on our Guard, to be jealous of every extraordinary Demand, and to reject conſtantly every Propoſition, though never ſo ſpecious, that had a Tendency to weaken the Barriers of *Liberty*, or to raiſe a Strength ſuperior to theirs. But I confeſs I do not think We can be led blindfold ſo far as the Brink of the Precipice. I know that all Words, which are Signs of complex Ideas, furniſh Matter of Miſtake and Cavil. We diſpute about *Juſtice*, for Inſtance, and fancy that We have different Opinions about the ſame Thing; whilſt, by ſome little Difference in the Compoſition of

of our Ideas, it happens that We have only different Opinions about different Things, and ſhould be of the ſame Opinion about the ſame Thing. But This, I preſume, cannot happen in the Caſe before us. All Diſputes about *Liberty* in this Country, and at this Time, muſt be Diſputes for and againſt the ſelf-ſame, fix'd and invariable Set of Ideas, whatever the Diſputants on *one Side of the Queſtion* may pretend, in order to conceal what it is not yet very ſafe to avow. No Diſputes can poſſibly ariſe from different Conceptions of any Thing ſo clearly ſtated, and ſo preciſely determined, as the fundamental Principles are, on which our whole *Liberty* reſts.

If *Liberty* be that delicious and wholſome Fruit, on which the *Britiſh* Nation hath fed for ſo many Ages, and to which We owe our Riches, our Strength, and all the Advantages we boaſt of; the *Britiſh Conſtitution* is the Tree, that bears this Fruit, and will continue to bear it, as long as We are carefull to fence it in, and trench it round, againſt the Beaſts of the Field, and the Inſects of the Earth. To ſpeak without a Figure, our *Conſtitution* is a Syſtem of Government ſuited to the Genius of our Nation, and even to our Situation. The Experience of many hundred Years hath ſhewn that by preſerving *this Conſtitution* inviolate, or by drawing it back to the Principles, on which it was originally founded, whenever it ſhall be made to ſwerve from them, We may ſecure to ourſelves, and to our lateſt Poſterity, the Poſſeſſion of that *Liberty*, which We have long enjoy'd. What would We more? What *other Liberty* than This do We ſeek? And if We ſeek no other, is not This mark'd out in ſuch Characters as He, that runs, may read? As our *Conſtitution* therefore ought to be, what it ſeldom is, the *Rule of Government*; ſo

let us make the Conformity, or Repugnancy of Things to *this Conſtitution* the Rule, by which We accept them as favourable, or reject them as dangerous to *Liberty*. They, who talk of *Liberty* in *Britain* on any other Principles than Thoſe of the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, talk impertinently at beſt, and much Charity is requiſite to believe no worſe of Them. But They, who diſtinguiſh between *practicable* and *impracticable Liberty*, in order to inſinuate what They mean, (or they mean nothing) that the *Liberty* eſtabliſhed by the true Scheme of our *Conſtitution* is of the *impracticable Kind*; and They, who endeavour, both in Speculation and Practice, to elude and pervert the Forms, and to ridicule and explode the Spirit of *this Conſtitution*; theſe Men are Enemies, open and avowed Enemies, to it, and by Conſequence to *Britiſh Liberty*, which cannot be ſupported on any other Bottom.——— Some Men there are, the Peſts of Society I think Them, who pretend a great Regard to *Religion* in general, but who take every Opportunity of declaiming publickly againſt that *Syſtem of Religion*, or at leaſt againſt that *Church Eſtabliſhment*, which is received in *Britain*. Juſt ſo the Men, of whom I have been ſpeaking, affect a great Regard to *Liberty* in general, but They diſlike ſo much the Syſtem of *Liberty* eſtabliſhed in *Britain*, that they are inceſſant in their Endeavours to puzzle the plaineſt Thing in the World, and to refine and diſtinguiſh away the Life and Strength of our *Conſtitution*, in Favour of the little, preſent, momentary Turns, which They are retain'd to ſerve. What now would be the Conſequence, if all theſe Endeavours ſhould ſucceed? I am perſuaded that the *great Philoſophers*, *Divines*, *Lawyers*, and *Politicians*, who exert them, have not yet prepared and agreed upon the Plans of

a *new*

a *new Religion*, and of *new Conſtitutions in Church and State*. We ſhould find ourſelves therefore without any Form of *Religion*, or *civil Government*. The *firſt Set of theſe Miſſionaries* would take off all the Reſtraints of *Religion* from the *Governed*, and the *latter Set* would remove, or render ineffectual, all the Limitations and Controuls, which *Liberty* hath preſcribed to *Thoſe that govern*, and disjoint the whole Frame of our *Conſtitution*. Entire Diſſolution of Manners, Confuſion, Anarchy, or perhaps abſolute Monarchy, would follow; for it is poſſible, nay probable, that in ſuch a State as This, and amidſt ſuch a Rout of lawleſs Savages, Men would chuſe this Government, abſurd as it is, rather than have no Government at all.

But here again it may be ſaid, that as *Liberty* is a Word of uncertain Signification, ſo is *Conſtitution*; that Men have taught the moſt oppoſite Doctrines, and pretended at leaſt to build them on the Principles of the *Conſtitution*; that the Rule therefore of determining our Notions of *Liberty*, by the Principles of our *Conſtitution*, is no Rule, and We are by Conſequence juſt where We were before. But the Anſwer is ready. It is true that there were formerly Men, who perſiſted long in the Attempt to talk and write that Chimera, called *Prerogative*, into Vogue; to contend that it was ſomething *real*; a Right inherent in the *Crown*; founded in the *Conſtitution of our Government*; and equally neceſſary to ſupport the juſt Authority of the *Prince*, and to protect the *Subject*. How We had like to have loſt our *Liberty* by the Prevalence of *ſuch Doctrines*, by the Conſequences drawn from them, and the Practices built upon them, hath been touch'd in the Deduction of the State of *Parties*. But happily this Kind of Progreſſion from a free to a ſlaviſh Conſtitution of Government was

ſtopped

ſtopped at the *Revolution*, and the Notions themſelves are ſo exploded in the Courſe of ſix and forty Years, that they are entertained at this Hour by no Set of Men, whoſe Numbers, or Importance, give Them any Pretence to be reckoned among our *national Parties*. ——— It is as true, that there are now Men, who purſue the very ſame Deſign by different Methods. The *former* attack'd, *Theſe* undermine our *Liberty*. The *former* were the *Beaſts of the Field*, hinted at above; *Theſe* are the *Inſects of the Earth*; and like other Inſects, though ſprung from Dirt, and the vileſt of the animal Kind, They can nibble and gnaw, and poiſon; and, if They are ſuffered to multiply and work on, They can lay the moſt fruitful Country waſte. *Corruption* and *Dependency* are their favourite Topicks. They plead for the *firſt* as a laudable Expedient of Government; and for the *laſt*, I mean *corrupt, private Dependency*, as an eſſential Part of our *Conſtitution*. When they have perplex'd, as much as they are able, our Ideas of *Dependency* and *Independency*, They reaſon, if I may give their Sophiſms ſo good a Name, as if the *Independency of each Part of the Legiſlature*, of the *King* particularly, aroſe from the *Dependency of the other Parts on that Part*. Now, This is both falſe and abſurd. ——— It is falſe, becauſe the *conſtitutional Independency of Each Part of the Legiſlature* ariſes from hence; that diſtinct Rights, Powers and Privileges are aſſigned to it by the *Conſtitution*. But then this *Independency of one Part* can be ſo little ſaid to ariſe from the *Dependency of another*, that it conſiſts properly and truely in the free, unbiaſs'd, uninfluenc'd, and independent Exerciſe of theſe Rights, Powers and Privileges, by *each Part*, in as ample an Extent as the *Conſtitution* allows; or, in other Words,

as

as far as that Point, where the *Conſtitution* ſtops this free Exerciſe, and ſubmits the Proceedings of *one Part*, not to the private Influence, but to the publick Controul of the *other Parts*. Before this Point, the *Independency of each Part* is meant by the *Conſtitution* to be *abſolute*. From this Point, the *conſtitutional Dependency of each Part on the others* commences. To talk of *natural Independency* belonging to the *kingly Office*, to an *Houſe of Peers*, or an *Houſe of Commons*, (the Inſtitutions of *Art*, not of *Nature*) is impertinent. —— It is abſurd, becauſe it abſolutely deſtroys the very Thing it is advanc'd to eſtabliſh; for if *A*'s *Independency* ariſes from the *Dependency of B*, and *B*'s *Independency* from the *Dependency of A*, then are *A*. and *B*. both dependent, and there is no ſuch thing as *conſtitutional Independency* at all. The *Crown* is the Source of *Honours*, and hath the Diſpoſal of *publick Employments*. This no Man diſputes; nor would any Man, I believe, go about to alter. But will it follow that the * *conſtitutional Independency of the King* would be loſt, becauſe the *Houſe of Commons* give the Supplies, if He had not the Power of giving Part of this Money, in *Places* and *Penſions*, back again to the Members of *that Houſe?* It would be eaſy for me to turn this whole profound Reaſoning into many, even ridiculous Lights; but the Subject creates other Sentiments than Thoſe of Mirth, though the Logick employ'd about it deſerves a ludicrous, not a ſerious Treatment.——I aſk Pardon for having ſaid ſo much upon ſo ſlight an Occaſion, and I proceed.

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* *Vide London Jour. Sept.* 28, 1734.

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Notwithſtanding all theſe Endeavours to puzzle our *Conſtitution*, formerly in Favour of that *Prerogative*, by the Weight of which it muſt have been cruſh'd, and actually at this Time in Favour of *that Corruption* and *corrupt Dependency*, by which it would be ſoon demoliſhed; the main Principles of the *Britiſh Conſtitution* are ſimple, and obvious, and fix'd, as well as any Truths can be fix'd, in the Minds of Men, by the moſt determinate Ideas. The State of our *Conſtitution* then affords an eaſy and unerring Rule, by which to judge of the State of our *Liberty*. The Improvement, or Decay of *one* denotes the Improvement, or Decay of the *other*; and the Strength, or Weakneſs of *one*, the Safety, or Danger of the *other*. We cannot loſe our *Liberty*, unleſs We loſe our *Conſtitution*, nor loſe our *Conſtitution*, unleſs We are Accomplices to the Violations of it; for *this Conſtitution* is better fitted than any, antient or modern, ever was, not only to preſerve *Liberty*, but to provide for its own Duration, and to become immortal, if any Thing human could be ſo.

I am, S I R, &c.

LETTER XIII.

SIR,

MUCH hath been ſaid occaſionally, in the Courſe of theſe Letters, concerning the Beauty and Excellency of the *Britiſh Conſtitution*. I ſhall make however no Excuſe for returning to the ſame Subject upon an Occaſion, which introduces it ſo naturally, and indeed ſo neceſſarily. Nothing can be more appoſite to the profeſſed Deſign of theſe Writings; nothing of more real, and more preſent Uſe. Let me ſpeak plainly. We have been all of us, Thoſe of every Side, and of every Denomination, accuſtom'd too long to value ourſelves fooliſhly, or knaviſhly, on our Zeal for *this*, or *that Party*, or for *this*, or *that Government*; and to make a Merit of ſtraining the *Conſtitution* different Ways, in order to ſerve the different Purpoſes of each. It is high Time We ſhould all learn, if That be ſtill poſſible, to value ourſelves in the firſt Place on our Zeal for the *Conſtitution*; to make *all Governments*, and much more *all Parties*, bow to *That*, and to ſuffer *That* to bow to none. But how ſhall this *Conſtitution* be known, unleſs We make it the Subject of careful Enquiry, and of frequent and ſober Reflection? Or unknown, how ſhall it become, what it ought to be, the Object of our Admiration, our Love and our Zeal? Many of Thoſe, who reap the greateſt Advantages

from it, paſs it by unregarded, with equal Folly and Ingratitude. Many take a tranſient, inattentive View of it. Many again conſider it in Part only, or behold it in a narrow, pedantick Light. Inſtead of This, We ſhould view it often. We ſhould pierce through the Form to the Soul of it. We ſhould contemplate the noble Object in all its Parts, and in the Whole, and reader it as familiar to our intellectual Sight, as the moſt common ſenſible Objects are to our corporeal Sight. **Quam illæ ardentes Amores exitaret ſui, ſi videretur?* Well may it be allowed me to apply to ſo glorious an Effort of human Wiſdom what *Tully* ſays after *Plato*, in the *Phædrus*, if I miſtake not, of Wiſdom herſelf.

All publick Regiment, ſays Mr. *Hooker*, *hath ariſen from deliberate Advice, Conſultation and Compoſition between Men.* The Propoſition is undoubtedly and univerſally true. It is as true in the Kingdom of *Morocco*, as it is in the Kingdom of *Britain*; and the undeniable Conſequences, which flow from it, are obvious. We are not to wonder however, if Men do not look up to *this Original of Government*, nor trace theſe Conſequences from it, in moſt Countries. In the Inſtitution of Governments, too great Powers have been uſually given, and too great Confidence repoſed, either at firſt, or in Proceſs of Time. Theſe Powers have ſubſiſted, have been confirm'd by more Time, and increaſed by the very Nature of Power, which is the propereſt Inſtrument of its own Propagation. But the *original Compoſition*, for want of being expreſs'd, or ſufficiently imply'd, or frequently recurred to by the Forms of the Government, hath been forgot, or hath grown ſo obſolete, that They, whoſe Intereſt

* *Cic. de Finib. L. 2.*

required

required that no ſuch Thing ſhould be believed, have thought Themſelves at Liberty boldly to deny it; and not only ſo, but to ſuppoſe *ſome other Original of Government*. Strange Syſtems of *Policy*, and ſtranger of *Religion*, have been deviſed to ſupport and ſanctify theſe Uſurpations. *Education* hath been ſet on the ſame Side; and *ſaucy Authority* hath prevail'd againſt the cleareſt Light of *Nature*, and the plaineſt Dictates of *common Senſe*. No Man, who hath read and look'd abroad into the World, and made a reaſonable Uſe of either, will think This too ſtrange to be true; ſince there is no demonſtrated Truth (ſuch Truths I mean as are here ſpoken of) which may not be render'd, at leaſt, very problematical by long, uniform, poſitive Contradiction; nor any demonſtrated Lye, which may not be rendered probable to many, and certain to ſome, by long, uniform, poſitive Affirmation; according to a juſt Obſervation made by Father *Paul* ſomewhere or other, on Occaſion of *Conſtantine*'s ſuppoſed Grant, and other Cheats of the Court of *Rome*. But We of this Country have been more happy. Our *original Contract* hath been recurred to often, and as many Cavils as have been made, as many Jeſts as have been broke about this Expreſſion, We might ſafely defy the *Aſſertors of abſolute Monarchy and arbitrary Will*, if there were any worth our Regard, to produce any one Point of Time, ſince which We know any Thing of our *Conſtitution*, wherein the whole Scheme of it would not have been one monſtrous Abſurdity, unleſs an *original Contract* had been ſuppoſed. They muſt have been blinded therefore by Ignorance, or Paſſion, or Prejudice, who did not always ſee that there is ſuch a Thing neceſſarily, and in the very Nature of our *Conſtitution*; and that They might as well doubt whether the Foundations of an antient,

ſolid Building were ſuited and proportioned to the Elevation and Form of it, as whether our *Conſtitution* was eſtabliſhed by *Compoſition* and *Contract*. Sure I am that They muſt be worſe than blind, if any ſuch there are, who do not confeſs at this Time, and under the *preſent Settlement*, that our *Conſtitution* is in the ſtricteſt Senſe a *Bargain*, a *conditional Contract between the Prince and the People*, as it always hath been, and ſtill is, between the *repreſentative and collective Bodies of the Nation*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *Prince*, with the *People*, (though the *executive Power* be truſted to the *Prince*, to be exercis'd according to ſuch Rules, and by the Miniſtry of ſuch Officers, as are preſcrib'd by the Laws and Cuſtoms of this Kingdom) the *legiſlative*, or *ſupreme Power*, is veſted by our *Conſtitution* in *three Eſtates*, whereof the *King* is one. Whilſt the Members of the *other Two* preſerve their *private Independency*, and *thoſe Eſtates* are conſequently under no *Dependency* except That, which is in the Scheme of our *Conſtitution*, this Controul on the *firſt* will always be ſufficient; and a *bad King*, let Him be as bold as He may pleaſe to be thought, muſt ſtand in Awe of an *honeſt Parliament*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *repreſentative Body*, with the *collective Body of the Nation*, it is not only a principal, declared Right of the People of *Britain*, *that the Elections of Members to ſit in Parliament ſhall be free*; but it hath been a principal Part of the Care and Attention of Parliaments, for more than three hundred Years, to watch over *this Freedom*, and to ſecure it, by removing *all Influence of the Crown*, and *all other corrupt Influence*, from theſe Elections. This Care and this Attention have gone ſtill farther.

They

They have provided, as far as they have been ſuffered to provided hitherto, by the *conſtitutional Dependency of one Houſe on the other, and of both on the Crown*, that *all ſuch Influence* ſhould be removed from the Members, after They are choſen. Even here the Providence of our *Conſtitution* hath not ſtopped. Leſt all other Proviſions ſhould be ineffectual to keep the Members of the Houſe of Commons out of this *unconſtitutional Dependency*, which ſome Men preſume with a ſilly dogmatical Air of Triumph to ſuppoſe neceſſary to ſupport the *conſtitutional Independency of the Crown*, the Wiſdom of our *Conſtitution* hath thought fit that the *Repreſentatives of the People* ſhould not have Time to forget that They are *ſuch*; that They are empowered to act *for the People*, not *againſt Them*. In a Word, our *Conſtitution* means that the Members of this Body ſhould be kept, as it were, to their good Behaviour, by the frequent Returns of *new Elections*. It does all that a *Conſtitution* can do, all that can be done by legal Proviſions, to ſecure the Intereſts of the People, by maintaining the Integrity of their *Truſtees*; and leſt all This ſhould fail, it gives frequent Opportunities to the *People* to ſecure their Intereſts *Themſelves*, by mending their Choice of their *Truſtees*; ſo that as a *bad King* muſt ſtand in Awe of an *honeſt Parliament*, a *corrupt Houſe of Commons* muſt ſtand in Awe of an *honeſt People*.

Between theſe *two Eſtates*, or Branches of the *legiſlative Power*, there ſtands a *third*, the *Houſe of Peers*; which may ſeem in Theory, perhaps, too much under the Influence of the Crown, to be a proper Controul upon it; becauſe the ſole Right of creating *Peers* reſides in the *Crown*; whereas the *Crown* hath no Right to intermeddle in the electing *Commoners*. This would be the Caſe, and an intolerable one indeed, if the *Crown* ſhould exerciſe this

this Right often, as it had been exerciſed ſometimes with univerſal and moſt juſt Diſapprobation. It is poſſible too that This may come to be the Caſe, in ſome future Age, by the Method of electing Peers to ſit in Parliament, for *one Part of the ſame Kingdom*, by the frequent Tranſlations of *Biſhops*, and by other Means, if the Wiſdom and Virtue of the preſent Age, and the favourable Opportunity of the preſent auſpicious and indulgent Reign do not prevent it. But in all other Reſpects the Perſons, who are once created *Peers*, and their Poſterity, according to the Scheme of the *Conſtitution*, having a Right to ſit and debate, and vote in the *Houſe of Peers*, which cannot be taken from Them, except by Forfeiture; all Influence of the Kind I have mentioned ſeems to be again removed, and their Share in the *Government* depending neither on the *King*, nor the *People*, They conſtitute a *middle Order*, and are properly Mediators between the *other Two*, in the Eye of our *Conſtitution*.

It is by this Mixture of *Monarchical*, *Ariſtocratical* and *Democratical Power*, blended together in one Syſtem, and by theſe *three Eſtates* ballancing one another, that our *free Conſtitution of Government* hath been preſerved ſo long inviolate, or hath been brought back, after having ſuffered Violations, to its original Principles, and been renewed, and improved too, by frequent and ſalutary Revolutions. It is by This, that *weak* and *wicked Princes* have been oppoſed, reſtrained, reformed, puniſhed by *Parliaments*; that the real, and perhaps the doubtful, Exorbitancies of *Parliaments* have been reduced by the *Crown*; and that the Heat of *one Houſe* hath been moderated, or the Spirit raiſed, by the Proceedings of the *other*. Parliaments have had a good Effect on the *People*, by keeping Them

Them quiet; and the *People* on *Parliaments*, by keeping Them within Bounds, which They were tempted to tranſgreſs. A juſt Confidence in the ſafe, regular, Parliamentary Methods of redreſſing Grievances hath often made the freeſt, and not the moſt patient People on Earth, bear the greateſt Grievances much longer than People, held under ſtronger Reſtraints, and more uſed to Oppreſſion, who had not the ſame Confidence, nor the ſame Expectation, have borne even leſs. The Cries of the *People*, and the Terror of *approaching Elections* have defeated the moſt dangerous Projects for beggaring and enſlaving the Nation; and the *Majority without doors* hath obliged the *Majority within Doors* to truckle to the *Minority*. In a Word, two Things may be ſaid with Truth of our *Conſtitution*, which I think neither can, nor ever could be ſaid of any other. It ſecures Society againſt the Miſeries, which are inſeparable from *ſimple Forms of Government*, and is liable as little as poſſible to the Inconveniencies, that ariſe in *mix'd Forms*. It cannot become uneaſy to the *Prince*, or *People*; unleſs the *former* be egregiouſly weak, or wicked; nor be deſtroyed, unleſs the *latter* be exceſſively and univerſally corrupt.———But theſe general Aſſertions require to be a little better explained.

By *ſimple Forms of Government* I mean ſuch as lodge the whole ſupreme Power, abſolutely and without Controul, either in a *ſingle Perſon*, or in the *principal Perſons of the Community*, or in the *whole Body of the People*. Such Governments are Governments of *arbitrary Will*, and therefore of all imaginable Abſurdities the moſt abſurd. They ſtand in direct Oppoſition to the ſole Motive of Submiſſion to any Government whatſoever; for if Men quit the State, and renounce the Rights of *Nature*, (one of which is, to be ſure, That of being governed

governed by their *own Will)* They do This, that They may not remain expoſed to the *arbitrary Will of other Men*, the Weakeſt to That of the Strongeſt, the Few to That of the Many. Now, in ſubmitting to any *ſimple Form of Government* whatever, They eſtabliſh what They mean to avoid, and for Fear of being expoſed to *arbitrary Will* ſometimes, They chuſe to be governed by it always. *Theſe Governments* do not only degenerate into *Tyranny*; They are *Tyranny* in their very Inſtitution; and They, who ſubmit to Them, are *Slaves*, not *Subjects*, however the ſupreme Power may be exerciſed; for *Tyranny* and *Slavery* do not ſo properly conſiſt in the Stripes that are given and received, as in the Power of giving them at Pleaſure, and the Neceſſity of receiving them, whenever and for whatever they are inflicted. *Abſolute Democracy* may appear to ſome, in abſtracted Speculation, a leſs Deviation from Nature than *Monarchy*, and more agreeable to Reaſon; becauſe here it is the *Will of the whole Community*, that governs the *whole Community*, and becauſe Reaſon does certainly inſtruct every Man, even from a Conſciouſneſs of his own Frailty, the *Impotentia Animi* of the *Latin* Writers, to truſt as little Power as poſſible to any other Man. But ſtill it muſt be confeſs'd, that if it be unſafe for a People to truſt too much Power to a *Prince*, it is unſafe for Them likewiſe to keep too much Power to *Themſelves*. *Abſolute Monarchy* is *Tyranny*; but *abſolute Democracy* is *Tyranny* and *Anarchy* both. If *Ariſtocracy* be placed between theſe two Extremes, it is placed on a ſlippery Ridge, and muſt fall into one or the other, according to the natural Courſe of human Affairs; if the Few, who govern, are united, into *Tyranny*, perhaps, more ſevere than any other; if They are diſunited, into *Factions* and *Diſorders*, as great as Thoſe of the moſt *tumultuous Democracy*.

From

From ſuch Obſervations, and many of the ſame Kind and Tendency, it hath been concluded very reaſonably that the beſt Form of Government muſt be one compounded of *theſe Three*, and in which they are *all* ſo tempered, that *each* may produce the good Effects, and be reſtrained by the Counter-workings of the *other Two*, from producing the bad Effects, that are natural to it. Thus much is evident. But then how to fix that juſt Proportion of each, how to hit that happy Temperament of them all in one Syſtem, is a Difficulty that hath perplexed the wiſeſt Politicians, and the moſt famous Legiſlators. Let me quote one of the greateſt Writers of Antiquity. † *Tacitus* acknowledges, in the fourth Book of his Annals, what is here advanced; but He thinks *ſuch a Conſtitution of Government* rather a Subject of fine Speculation, than of Practice. He thinks it much more likely that *ſuch a Syſtem* ſhould continue to be admired and praiſed in Idea, than eſtabliſh'd in Fact; and if it happens ever to be eſtabliſhed, He does not imagine it can be ſupported long. Not only the real Difficulties, which his Sagacity preſented to his Mind, but his Reflections on the Conſtitution and Fate of the *Roman* Commonwealth might lead *Tacitus* into this Deſpondency. But what the Refinements of *Roman* Policy could not do, hath been done in this Iſland, upon Foundations laid by the rough Simplicity of our *northern Anceſtors*.

It would be a curious and entertaining Amuſement, to reduce the Conſtitutions of the *Roman Government* and of *Thoſe*, which were formed on the Ruins

† *Cunctas Nationes & Urbes* Populus, *aut* Primores, *aut* ſinguli *regunt. Delecta ex his & conſtituta Reipublicæ Forma, laudari facilius quàm evenire; vel, ſi evénit, haud diuturna eſſe poteſt.*

of *that Empire*, particularly of *our own*, to their firſt Principles; to obſerve in which They agree, and in which They differ, and the uniform or various Tendencies of each; to mark the latent, as well as apparent Cauſes of their Riſe and Fall; how well or how ill they were contrived for Triumphs abroad, or Peace at home; for vain Grandeur, or real Proſperity; for reſiſting Corruption, or being ruin'd by it. Such an Analyſis and Enquiry would be, I imagine, not only amuſing, but uſeful. At leaſt, it would be more ſo than any Rhapſody of general Reflections, huddled together with little Order, or Deſign; for Theſe leave no ſyſtematical Impreſſions on the Mind; nothing but a Confuſion of Ideas, often bright and glittering, ſeldom inſtructive. But a Work of this Kind would be too voluminous and too aſpiring for theſe little Eſſays, and the humble Author of them. He will therefore keep to his Point, and content Himſelf to make ſome of thoſe Obſervations alone, which ſeem proper to illuſtrate and prove what He hath advanced; that the *Britiſh Conſtitution* is a plain and ſufficient Rule of Judgment and Conduct to us in every Thing, that regards our *Liberty*; for preſerving of which, as well as for ſecuring its own Duration, it is better fitted than any other.

There was ſo great a Mixture of monarchical Power in the *Roman Commonwealth*, that † *Livy* dates the Original of *Liberty* from the Expulſion of the *Tarquins*, rather becauſe the *conſular Dignity* was made annual, than becauſe the *regal Power* had ſuffered any Diminution in that Change. The

† *Libertatis Originem inde magis, quia annum Imperium Conſulare factum eſt, quam quod diminutum quicquam ſit ex Regiâ Poteſtate, numeres. Omnia Jura, omnia inſignia primi Conſules tenuere. Lib. Cap.* 1.

dictatorial

dictatorial Power, the moſt abſolute that can be imagined, was introduced in eight, or at fartheſt in eleven Years afterwards, and may therefore be reckoned coæval with the Commonwealth; and whatever Diminution either This, or the *conſular Power* might ſuffer, the Axes and the Rods were terrible to the laſt; eſpecially when they were carried before a *Dictator*, for whom the *Tribunes of the People* were not a Match, as They were for the *Conſuls*. But though there were *three Sorts of Power* exerciſed, there were but *two Orders*, or *Eſtates*, eſtabliſhed in this Commonwealth, the *Patricians* and the *Plebeians*; and the ſupreme Power was divided accordingly between the *Senate* and the *collective*, not a *repreſentative*, *Body of the People*. Theſe *two Orders*, or *Eſtates*, had frequent Conteſts, and well They might, ſince They had very oppoſite Intereſts. † *Agrarian Laws*, for Inſtance, began to be promulgated within three and twenty Years, and continued to the End of the Commonwealth to produce the ſame Diſorders. How inconſiſtent, indeed, was *that Plan of Government*, which required ſo much hard Service of the *People*; and which, leaving Them ſo much *Power* in the Diſtribution of *Power*, left Them ſo little *Property* in the Diſtribution of *Property?* Such an *Inequality of Property*, and of the Means of acquiring it, cannot ſubſiſt in an *equal Commonwealth*; and I much apprehend that any near Approaches to a *Monopoly of Property* would not be long endured even in a *Monarchy*.—— But I return to my firſt Obſervation.

Though the *Romans* made frequent Experience of the cruel Miſchiefs, and even extreme Danger

† *Tum primum Lex agraria promulgata eſt; nunquam deinde uſque ad hanc Memoriam ſine maximis motibus Rerum agitata. Liv. L. 2. C. 41.*

to *Liberty*, which attended almoſt every Variance of the *two Eſtates*, yet did They never fall upon any ſafe, or effectual Method of preventing theſe Diſputes, or of reconciling them, without Violence. The old Expedients alone ſubſiſted; and ſurely they were not only violent, but extra-conſtitutional. When the *Senate* was inflexible, the *People* had immediate Recourſe to *Sedition*. When the *People* was refractory, the *Senate* had Recourſe to a *Dictator*. The *latter* had an Approbation, which could not be given to the *former*, and was a *legal Inſtitution*; notwithſtanding which I make no Scruple of ſaying that it was, at leaſt, as inconſiſtent with a *free Conſtitution of Government* as the *former*. *Sedition* was *temporary Anarchy*. A *Dictator* was a *Tyrant for ſix Months*, unleſs He thought fit to abdicate ſooner. The *Conſtitution* was ſuſpended, and endanger'd by both. It might have been deſtroyed by the Exceſſes of *one*. It was deſtroyed by the bare Duration of the *other*. If the *Romans* had annually elected out of their Tribes a certain Number of Men to *repreſent the People*, inſtead of depending on their *Tribunes*; (a Sort of bullying Magiſtracy, and often a very corrupt one) and if this *repreſentative Body* had been *one Eſtate*, and had acted as ſuch, the *Conſuls* might very well have ſupply'd the Place of a *third Eſtate*, and have been ſafely truſted, even more independently of the *Senate* than They were, with the *executive Power*. But the Want of a *third Eſtate* in the *Roman* Syſtem of Government, and of a *repreſentative Body*, to act for the *collective Body*, maintained one perpetual Ferment, which often increaſed into a Storm, but never ſubſided into a Calm. The State of *Rome*, and of the greateſt Men in that Commonwealth, would have deſerved Pity rather than Envy, even in the beſt Times, if their

defective

defective Conſtitution had not made ſuch a State of * Trouble and Tumult the Price They paid for the Maintenance of their *Liberty*. But This was not the whole Price. Whilſt *Rome* advanced triumphantly in conquering the *World*, as her Orators, Poets and Hiſtorians have expreſſed Themſelves; That is, a few Nations round the *Mediterranean Sea*, and little more; her Citizens turn'd againſt one another thoſe Weapons, which were put into their Hands againſt the Enemies of *Rome*. Mutual Proſcriptions and bloody Maſſacres follow'd; *each Party* triumph'd in its Turn; They were more animated and better diſciplined by their Conteſts; both grew ſtronger; the *Commonwealth* alone grew weaker; and *Pompey* and *Cæſar* finiſhed the laſt tragical Scene, which *Marius* and *Sylla* began. In fine, the *Roman Commonwealth* would have been diſſolved much ſooner than it was, by the Defects I have mentioned, which many Circumſtances concurred to aggravate, if ſuch a Spirit of Wiſdom, as well as Courage, and ſuch an Enthuſiaſm for the Grandeur, the Majeſty, and the Duration of their Empire had not poſſeſſed this People, as never poſſeſs'd any other. When this Spirit decay'd, when this Enthuſiaſm cool'd, the *Conſtitution* could not help, nay work'd againſt itſelf. That *Dictatorial Power*, on which the *Senate* had always depended for preſerving it, compleated the Ruin of it, in the Hands of *Cæſar*; and that *Tribunitial Power*, to which the *People* had always truſted the Defence of their *Liberty*, confirmed their *Slavery*, in the Hands of *Auguſtus*. *I am, SIR*, &c.

* *Conciones Magiſtratuum pæne per noctantium in Roſtris.——Accuſationes potentium Reorum, & aſſignatæ etiam Domibus Inimicitiæ.——Procerum Factiones, & aſſidua Senatûs adverſum Plebem Certamina.*

Dial. de Orat. Quinctil. Tacito inſcrip.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

SIR,

THE Defects, which I have preſumed to cenſure in the *Roman Conſtitution of Government*, were avoided in ſome of Thoſe, that were eſtabliſhed, on the breaking of that Empire, by the *northern Nations* and the *Goths*; for I ſuſpect that the *Goths* were not properly and ſtrictly a *northern Nation*, any more than the *Huns* and the *Alans*, though They have been often confounded, and I believe by my ſelf. ——— Let us caſt our Eyes on *Spain* and *France*.

We cannot arrive, as far as my ſcanty Knowledge informs me, at any particular and authentick Account of the Scheme of that Government, which the *Weſtern Goths* eſtabliſhed, when, driven out of *Gaul* by the *Franks*, They drove the *Vandals* and the *Alans* out of *Spain*; nor diſtinguiſh very accurately between ſuch Inſtitutions as were Parts of the *original*, *Gothick Plan*, and ſuch as were introduced into the ſeveral Kingdoms, that form'd Themſelves on the Re-Conqueſt of the Country by the *Spaniards* from the *Arabs* and *Moors*. The Original of the *Cortes* particularly is quite in the Dark, as We are aſſured by a very * *induſtrious Enquirer*

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miſcell. Tracts.*

and

and judicious Writer. Thus much however We may aſſert; that the *Gothick Kings* were at firſt *elective*, and always *limited*, even after They became *hereditary*; and that the *Cortes*, whenever it was eſtabliſh'd, was an Aſſembly, that may be more truely compared to a *Britiſh Parliament* than the Aſſembly of the *Eſtates of France* could ever pretend to be. *Churchmen* had wriggled Themſelves into a Share of temporal Power among the *Goths*, as They did in every Country, were They were admitted to preach the Goſpel, though without any Authority from the Goſpel; ſo that the *Cortes* conſiſted of *Prelates*, as well as *Dukes*, *Maſters of Orders*, *Earls* and *Ricoſhomes*, who compoſed the whole Body of the Nobility; and of the *Procurators of the Commons*; That is, of the *Citizens* and *Burgeſſes*, choſen by the *Cities* and *Boroughs* to repreſent and Act for the *whole Body of the Commons*. To preſerve the Independency of this Aſſembly, *theſe Procurators* were to be paid by the *Corporations*, for which They ſerved; the *King* was to give no *Office*, or *Salary* to any of Them; nay, a * *Reſumption of Rewards, granted to Members of the Cortes*, was once at leaſt debated, if not enacted. In ſhort, He was not to name their *Preſident*, nor even to *ſend Letters unopened to any of Them*. No *Money* could be raiſed on the Subjects, without the Conſent of *this Aſſembly*; and it was a ſtanding Maxim, or Order, that *Redreſs of Grievances* ſhould precede the *Grants of Supplies*. Such a Frame of Government as This ſeems built for Duration; and, in Fact, if it had not been undermined, it could not have been demoliſhed. The Manner, in which it was both undermined and demoliſhed totally at laſt, deſerves the Attention of every Man

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miſcell. Tracts.*

in

in *Britain*. It was undermined by the *Influence of the Court*, too much conniv'd at and too long tolerated, *on the Members of the Cortes*. *Proſtitute Wretches* were found in thoſe Days, I doubt not, as well as in ours, to maintain that the *neceſſary Independency of the Prince* could not be ſupported, without allowing a *corrupt Dependency of the Cortes on Him*; and They had, in thoſe Days, ſuch Succeſs in *Caſtile*, as We ought to hope They will never obtain in *Britain*. When *corrupt Majorities* were thus ſecured, Pretences were not wanting, nor will they ever be ſo, for making Conceſſions to the *Crown*, repugnant to the Spirit of the *Conſtitution*, and even inconſiſtent with the Forms of it. Such Pretences, however plauſible, would not have been admitted by Men zealous to preſerve their *Liberty*; becauſe any real Danger, remote as well as immediate, to a *free Conſtitution* would in their Ballance outweigh all Conſiderations of real Expediency, and much more all the frivolous Pretences of that Kind. But the * *Members of the Cortes* were no longer ſuch Men, when *Caſtile* loſt her *Liberties* under *Charles* the 5th. The Cuſtom of bribing the *Repreſentatives of the Commons*, by *Gifts* and *Promiſes*, and ſo ſecuring a Majority to the *Court*, had long prevail'd, as We have juſt now ſaid; and after That, it is not to be wonder'd at if *Exciſes*, given for eight Years only, became perpetual; if *Money* was granted before *Grievances* were redreſs'd; and if the *Precedent*, ſet in the Time of *Henry* the 2d, was followed in all ſucceeding Reigns. The *Cortes* gave *this Prince* a Supply, for making War on the *Moors*; but the † Sum being repreſented by the *Court* to be inſufficient for the Service, it was

* *Dr.* Geddes *in his miſcell. Tract.* † *Ib.*

carried

carried that, in Caſe of a Deficiency, the *King* might raiſe, without calling a *Cortes*, the Money neceſſary to make good that Deficiency. This *Vote of Credit* gave an incurable fatal Wound to *that Conſtitution*. I call it a *Vote of Credit*, though the Powers it gave ſeem to be leſs than Thoſe, which are given by *ſome modern Votes of Credit*; for ſurely there is a Difference, and not a ſmall one, between a Power to raiſe Money, directly on the People, for a *Service known*, and already approved, and provided for in Part, by their *Repreſentatives*, and a Power to borrow Money, on the national Credit, for *Services unknown*, and to lay the Nation under an Obligation of paying for That, which it is poſſible their *Repreſentatives* may diſapprove.

This Precedent having been made, in Favour of *one King*, and in one particular Conjuncture, it became a prevailing Argument, in Favour of *every other King*, and in every other Conjuncture; for though it may be, nay muſt be, in the vaſt Variety of Characters, and of Conjunctures, prudent and juſt to grant, in Favour of *ſome Princes*, and upon ſome Occaſions, what it would be neither prudent, nor juſt to grant, in Favour of *other Princes*, and upon other Occaſions; yet ſuch is the Merit of *every Prince*, who fills a Throne, or rather ſuch is the ſervile Adulation paid to *Power*, in what Hands ſoever it be lodged, that general and almoſt univerſal Experience ſhews *this Rule*, which no Man of Senſe would break in the Management of his *private Intereſts*, abſolutely reverſed in the Management of the moſt *important, national Intereſts*. The Inference to be drawn from hence is plainly This; that the Inconveniency, or Danger of refuſing to *every Prince*, and in every Conjuncture, ſuch Things as are inconſiſtent with the *Conſtitution of a free Government*, muſt be al-

ways leſs than the Inconveniency, or Danger of granting them to *any Prince*, and in any Conjuncture.

Let me add this farther Obſervation, which preſents it ſelf ſo naturally after the former. Though it be proper, in all *limited Monarchies*, to watch and guard againſt all Conceſſions, or Uſurpations, that may deſtroy the *Ballance of Power*, on which the Preſervation of *Liberty* depends; yet is it certain that *Conceſſions to the Crown* from the *other*, *conſtituent Parts of the Legiſlature* are almoſt alone to be feared. There is no Danger that the *Crown* ſhould make them to the *others*; and on this Head the *People* may very ſafely truſt to Thoſe, who *wear* it, and Thoſe, who *ſerve* it. The *Nobility* will not make them to the *Commons*, without great Struggles, which give Time for Interpoſitions; nor the *Commons* to the *Nobility*. But *both* may be eaſily induced to make them to the *Crown*. The Reaſons of this Difference are obvious enough; for, firſt, a *King* is really nothing more than a *ſupreme Magiſtrate*, inſtituted for the Service of the Community, which requires that the *executive Power* ſhould be veſted in a *ſingle Perſon*. He hath, indeed, a *Crown* on his Head, a *Scepter* in his Hand, and *Velvet Robes* on his Back, and He ſits elevated in a *Throne*, whilſt others ſtand on the Ground about Him; and all This to denote that He is a *King*, and to draw the Attention and Reverence of the Vulgar. Juſt ſo, another Man wears a *Mitre* on his Head, a *Croſier* in his Hand, and *Lawn Sleeves*, and ſits in a *purple Elbow-Chair*, to denote that He is a *Biſhop*, and to excite the Devotion of the Multitude, who receive his Benediction very thankfully on their Knees. But ſtill the *King*, as well as the *Biſhop*, holds an *Office*, and owes a *Service*. *Officium eſt imperare, non Regnum*. The *King*, when He *commands*, dicharges

diſcharges a *Truſt*, and performs a *Duty*, as well as the *Subject*, when He *obeys*. Notwithſtanding which, *Kings* are apt to ſee Themſelves in another Light, and Experience ſhews us that even *They*, who made Them what They are, are apt to take Them for what They are not. From hence it happened in *Spain*, and may happen poſſibly in other Countries, that the *Kings*, inſtead of being ſatisfy'd with, and thankful for the Dignity, Honour, Power and Wealth, which They poſſeſs'd in ſo eminent a Degree above all other Magiſtrates and Members of the Commonwealth, repined at their being poſſeſs'd of no more. What They had, was given Them by the *Conſtitution*; and what They had not, was reſerved by the ſame Authority to the *Nobility*, and to the *Commons*. But They proceeded, and their Sycophants reaſoned, as if the ſole Power of the Government, and the whole Wealth of the Nation, belong'd of Right to *Them*, and the Limitations of the Monarchy were ſo many Uſurpations on the Monarch.———In the ſecond Place, beſides this conſtant Deſire of incroaching, there is another Reaſon why *Conceſſions to the Crown* are more to be guarded againſt than others, in *limited Monarchies*. The regal Power reſides in *one Perſon*. The other Shares of the ſupreme Power are aſſign'd to *Bodies of Men*. From hence it follows that the Intereſt of the *King*, and the Intereſt of the *Crown*, cannot well be divided in the Mind of a *Prince*; whereas the Intereſt of *each Individual* may be diſtinguiſhed from the Intereſt of the *Nobility*, or of the *Commons*, and ſtill more from That of the *Nation*, in the Minds of Thoſe, who compoſe an *Houſe of Peers*, or who are *Repreſentatives of the People*. A *King* cannot be tempted to give up the Intereſt of the *Crown*, becauſe He cannot give up this *publick Intereſt*, with-

out giving up his *private Intereſt*; whereas the *Members of ſuch Aſſemblies* may promote their *private Intereſt*, by ſacrificing to it That of the *Publick*. Several other Reaſons might be inſiſted upon, to eſtabliſh the Truth of the Obſervation We have made, and to ſhew how unfairly They argue, who all along ſuppoſe that the *Independency of the Crown* may as eaſily be loſt, and the Ballance of Power be deſtroy'd on that Side, by *Conceſſions from the Prince*, and *Uſurpations on Him*, as the *Independency of the Lords, or Commons*, may be loſt, and the Ballance of Power be deſtroyed on that Side, by *Conceſſions to the Prince*, and by his *Uſurpations*. Such Reaſons, for Inſtance, might be drawn from the Difference of that *Influence*, which the *Crown* hath on the *other Eſtates*, and which the *other Eſtates* have on the *Crown*; as well as from the Difference of the *Pretences*, which may be urged on Behalf of the *Crown*, or of the *Nobility*, or *Commons*, to obtain *ſuch Conceſſions*; for ſuppoſing them all coequal, as Parts of the *Legiſlature*, yet if it be conſidered that the *executive Power* is ſolely in the *Crown*; that the Diſpoſition of *publick Money*, as well as *publick Employments*, is a Part of *this Power*; that *this Power* is in continual Exerciſe, and may immediately affect, more or leſs, at one Time or at another, every particular Man, *Peer*, as well as *Commoner*; whereas the *other Powers* are exerciſed occaſionally, are continued or ſuſpended, in great Meaſure, at the Will of the *Prince*, and are employed chiefly in Matters of general, not particular Concern. In fine, if it be conſidered farther, that the Powers exerciſed by *Aſſemblies of Peers and Commoners*, whether *theſe Aſſemblies* be regarded as Parts of the *Legiſlature*, as the *great Councils of the Nation*, or as the *Judges and Proſecutors of enormous Offenders*, are few and

ſimple,

ſimple, directed to notorious Purpoſes, conducted by Rules always known, always the ſame, and always ſufficient to theſe Purpoſes; whereas the Branches of *executive Power* are numerous and complicated, the Rules various, and the Purpoſes often unknown, often contingent; ſo that it may become difficult to judge either of the Utility of the Purpoſes, or of the Sufficiency of the Powers. If all theſe Things be conſidered, I ſay, We ſhall not be at a Loſs to determine on which Side the Danger to *Liberty*, in a *limited Monarchy*, lies; and whether *Conceſſions to the Crown*, in Prejudice of the *Conſtitution*, are not more likely to be made, than *Conceſſions from it*.

Happy had it been for the People of *Caſtile*, if They had ſeen this Danger in Time, and had remedied, whilſt the Remedies were in their Power, thoſe Defects in their *Conſtitution*, whatever they were, which gave their *Kings* by Degrees ſuch an Influence over the *Cortes*, as overturned at laſt the whole *Conſtitution*, and gain'd to the *German Race*, that began to reign in *Charles* the 5th, (for his Father *Philip* is ſcarce to be reckoned) ſuch an abſolute Power as the *Gothick Kings* had never been able to obtain. Though *Charles* the 5th was a very able Prince, yet the Honour, (for ſuch it will be eſteemed by ſome Men) or more truly the Infamy, of enſlaving *Caſtile* muſt not be aſcribed to his ſuperior Capacity, nor to That of his *Miniſters*. Had He been the meereſt Tool, a Thing of Straw, but ſomething leſs than a Scarecrow, and unable to protect the Property of his Subjects; He might ſtill have taken their Liberties from Them, in that Conjuncture, as He did moſt effectually. *Corruption* was eſtabliſhed; a *Majority of the Cortes* was bribed; the *Nobility* was detach'd from the common Intereſt by *Titles*, *Places*, *Penſions*,

and might have help'd to regulate their Fire, and to keep Them ſober, help'd on the contrary to make Them mad, either by neglecting Them, or by taking Part againſt Them, till it was too late; and then complained of their being mad, with as ill a Grace as the principal Men of *Rome*, who help'd to *corrupt* that People, complained of their *Corruption*, and aſſigned it as a Reaſon for depriving Them of their *Liberty*.

There cannot be a greater Soleciſm in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, under *monarchical Government*, who ſuffered the Liberty of the *Commons* to be taken away. In *Ariſtocracies*, the *Nobility* get whatever the *Commons* loſe; but in *Monarchies*, the *Crown* alone is the Gainer, and the certain Conſequence of their helping to enſlave the *Commons*, muſt be That of being enſlaved Themſelves at laſt. How, indeed, ſhould it be otherwiſe; ſince the Liberty of the *Commons* cannot be taken away, unleſs the *Conſtitution* be firſt broken; and ſince neither the *Peers*, nor any one elſe, can hold their Privileges, or their Properties, by a better Tenure than That of *arbitrary Will*, when the *Conſtitution* is once broken? Was it poſſible to doubt of this Truth, We might find the Proof of it, without going out of the Country where We are; I mean *Spain*. Amongſt all the ſurprizing Phænomena, which have appeared in the World of late Years, there are none, that have ſtruck Mankind with more Aſtoniſhment, than thoſe Inſtances of Perſons raiſed to the higheſt Poſts of Power, Authority and Command, nay to Empire, who had not, either from their obſcure Birth, or their low Talents, or their ſtill lower Habits, the leaſt Occaſion even to dream of ſuch Elevation. Among other Countries *Spain* hath had her Share of them; and the *Grandees*, as They are pompouſly ſtiled, the Succeſſors

Succeſſors of thoſe Men, who thought to riſe on the Ruin of the *Commons of Caſtile*; They, who have the vain Honour of cocking their Hats in the Preſence of their *Prince*, have been ſeen to ſtand at aweful Diſtance, or approach with reſpectful Cringe, in the Preſence of a *Paraſite* and *Buffoon*.

I know full well that, in ſuch Governments as We ſpeak of here, it is both the Duty and Intereſt of the *Nobility* to oppoſe the Exceſſes of the *Commons*; but I know too that They have another Duty, which They are not to leave undone; another Point of Intereſt, which They are not to neglect; and therefore I have ſpoken of this *ſecond Eſtate* in our Government, as of a *middle Order*, that are properly Mediators between the *other two*, in the Eye of our *Conſtitution*. Whilſt the *Peers* maintain this Character, They will be able to diſcharge this Duty; but They would ceaſe to be ſo, if it was poſſible They ſhould ever become the *Tools of Faction*, or the *Vaſſals of a Miniſter*. In Mediations of this Kind, different from Thoſe that are more commonly called ſuch, *Mediators* mingle in the Conteſt, are Parties concerned, and can by That alone expect to mediate with Effect, whether They be conſidered as *Bodies of Men*, or *Individuals*. When the *Commons* are aſſiſted by the *Peers* in their reaſonable Endeavours to promote, or reſtore *Frugality*, to ſecure *Liberty*, and to correct all Sorts of *Male-Adminiſtration*; the *Peers* will have, both collectively and ſeparately, a Credit with the *People*, as well as with the *Repreſentatives of the People*; by which They may contribute to check the *latter*, whenever an *Houſe of Commons* ſhall grow unreaſonable, factious, or ſeditious. But if the *Peers of the Realm* neglect, or oppoſe the *Commons* in their juſt Attempts, and forfeit by Conſequence the Character of Impar-

tiality, and even the Air of Independency, the *Peers* will then add little Strength to the *Crown*, whenever the evil Day comes, and have as little Power to prevent it from coming. There was a Time, our Fathers ſaw it, when an *Houſe of Commons* deſtroy'd, inſtead of ſupporting, the *Conſtitution*, and introduced *Tyranny*, under Pretence of excluding *Slavery*. I think it might be ſhewn, from the Anecdotes of that Age, that This could not have happened, if the *Court* had not been ſo long and ſo partially abetted by the greateſt Part of the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, both in the *Houſe of Lords* and out of it. An univerſal and timely Concurrence with the Spirit of the *Commons*, which was pious in the true Senſe of the Word at firſt, would have had, I preſume, the full Effect that every honeſt Man propoſed in a Parliamentary Reformation of the State; and thoſe fatal Opportunities, that were afterwards given to the *Republican*, *Preſbyterian* and *Independent Factions*, would have been avoided. But They, who could have *trimm'd*, (for there is a *wiſe* and *honeſt*, as well as a *ſilly* and *corrupt Trimming*) or have mediated with Succeſs, loſt the Power of doing either; ſome by abetting the *Crown* ſo long, for Fear of the *Commons*, and others by concurring with the *Commons* ſo far, for Fear of the *Crown*, that the *People* in general had no Confidence in the *former*, and that the *latter* were afraid to truſt their *Prince* after all They had done againſt Him. If any Men had truſted to the plauſible Profeſſions of the *Court* at that Time, and the *Court* had ſubdued the *oppoſite Party*, We may judge, without any Breach of Charity, that theſe Men would have found Themſelves deceived. Juſt ſo, if any Men, who meant the Reformation, not the Deſtruction of the State, believed in the *canting Reformers of that Age*, ſuch Men were no Doubt

Doubt egregiouſly deceived. But I confeſs myſelf of Opinion, and ſurely upon no improbable Grounds, that there were few, or no ſuch Men. The good Intentions of the *Court* were diſtruſted even by Thoſe, who took Arms for the *King*; and the ill Intentions of many of the Leaders on the *other Side* were ſuſpected, no Doubt, by many, who took Arms for the *Parliament*. But *two* of the *three Eſtates* being ripe for the raſheſt Enterprizes, and the *third* being in no Condition to mediate, the Extremes claſh'd without any Power ſufficient to interpoſe; and when the Sword was drawn, the Sword could alone decide. I conclude therefore, from theſe two Examples, that as there cannot be a greater Error in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, who aſſiſt a *Prince* to take away the Liberties and Privileges of the *Commons*; (which was the Caſe in *Caſtile*;) ſo the ſureſt Way of preventing that terrible Dilemma, wherein Men are obliged to chuſe either Submiſſion to *tyrannical Government*, or Concurrence with an *enraged and no longer governable People*, (which hath been the Caſe in *Caſtile* and *Britain* both,) is for the *Nobility*, and the principal Men amongſt the *Commons*, to engage ſo early in the Cauſe of *Liberty*, that the *former* may be always in Condition to mediate with Effect, and the *latter* have always Power to allay the intemperate Heat of their own Body.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XV.

SIR,

BUT to reſume the Compariſon of *other Conſtitutions of Government with our own*, I ſay that if the *Gothick Conſtitution* in *Spain*, either by original Defects, or by deviating from, and not being reduced again in Time to its firſt Principles, was deſtroyed through the *Corruption of Parliaments*, and by the Force of an *Army*, *one* of which betray'd, and the *other* conquered the *Commons of Caſtile*; the *Commons of France* ſeem either not to have had, or to have loſt, in the dark Beginnings of that Monarchy, all Share in the *ſupreme, legiſlative Power*. The great, original Defect of having but *two Eſtates* to ſhare the *ſupreme Power* is an Objection common to the *Roman*, and to the *French Conſtitutions*, with this Difference; of the *three, ſimple Forms of Government*, the *Monarchical*, the *Ariſtocratical*, and the *Democratical*, *Rome* wanted the *firſt*, and *France* hath always wanted the *laſt*. *Rome* had a *Nobility* and a *Commonalty*, but no Magiſtracy fitted by its Inſtitution to anſwer the Purpoſes of that ſupreme Magiſtrate, who is called *King*, even in limited Monarchies. *France* hath always had a *King* and a *Nobility*, and hath felt in their Turns all the Evils of *Monarchical* and *Ariſtocratical Tyranny*. But the *People* have not had, I preſume, ſince the Government of the *Franks* was

fully

fully eſtabliſhed on this Side of the *Rhine*, and the Form of their Monarchy ſettled, any Share in the *ſupreme Power*, either collectively or repreſentatively, how much ſoever a contrary Notion may have been countenanced by ſome Writers, and have been generally entertained, at leaſt in other Countries.

There is no Nation in the World, ſays *Mezerai*, more *illuſtrious*, nor any, whoſe Original is more *obſcure* than That of the *French*. They, who would diſpute the *firſt*, could hardly diſpute the *laſt*; and it is no Buſineſs of mine to controvert *either*. As dark as their Original is, We may diſcover enough to eſtabliſh what hath been ſaid, and to carry on the Compariſon We are making.

The *Franks* were a Nation of *Germany*, ſeated at one Time between the *Elbe*, *Rhine* and *Neckar*, and at another (That is, in the Reign of *Theodoſius* the younger) extending Themſelves on the *German* Side of the *Rhine*, from *Cologne* down to *Nimighen*, and ſtill lower. What is known therefore of the Governments of the *antient Germans*, either from *Tacitus*, or any other good Authority, may be properly apply'd to their Government, whilſt They continued in *Germany*, and even after They ſettled in *Gaul*, till ſuch Times as We find, by Relations more modern, that a *different Form of Government* prevail'd amongſt Them. Now, it ſeems to me extremely plain that a *different Form of Government* did prevail amongſt Them even from the Time of *Clovis*, the Conqueror of *Gaul*. Thus, for Inſtance, that Paſſage in *Tacitus*, where He ſays * *that the*

* *Reges ex Nobilitate, Duces ex Virtute ſumunt; nec Regibus infinita, nec libera Poteſtas; & Duces Exemplo potiùs quam Imperio præſunt.* De Mor. Germ.

antient

antient Germans *took their* Kings *on Account of* Nobility, *and their* Generals *on Account of* Valour; *that the Power of their* Kings *was not abſolute and unlimited*; *and that their* Generals *commanded by the Authority, which their* Example *rather than their* Power *gave Them*; that Paſſage, I ſay, is properly enough apply'd to the *Franks* before, and perhaps during the Conqueſt of *Gaul*; but very improperly afterwards, when † *Clovis*, both King and General of *that People*, had founded the Monarchy, which He tranſmitted to his Poſterity. That the Nation of the *Franks* was divided into ſeveral *Tribes*, or *Clans*, and that Theſe were governed by ſeveral *little Princes*, cannot be doubted.——— *Habebat quot Pagos, tot pæne Duces.* That a *General* was choſen to command the whole with ſovereign Authority, but according to certain Rules made by common Conſent, whenever any great Enterprize was undertaken, and that *Clovis* Himſelf, though He ſucceeded his Father *Childeric* in commanding over a Part of the *Franks*, was choſen in this Manner, and for this Purpoſe, is certain. In his firſt Expedition, He led an Army of *Freebooters*, and was obliged by Compact to divide the Spoil by Lots amongſt Them. The Story, which ſo many Authors have told, after *Gregory* of *Tours*, of a private Soldier, who refuſed to leave to his Diſpoſition a Veſſel of Gold, that had been taken out of a Church at *Rheims*, and broke it before his Face, is a Proof that He was nothing more at firſt than I have repreſented Him, the *Head of a Troop of Adventurers*, who choſe Him to lead Them, but made their Conditions with Him. The *Franks*

† *Boulainv. Mem. Hiſt.*

therefore

therefore might be at this Time, in ſome Senſe, * *all free, perfectly equal, and independent*; but will it follow from hence that They continued to be ſo, in any Senſe, after *Clovis* had founded their *Monarchy*; had deſtroy'd all their *little Kings*; united in one Body, and under his own Domination, all their *little States*; and changed the *Form of their Government*, by appointing *Dukes*, *Earls*, *Vicars*, and other Magiſtrates, to govern under Him, according to the Model of Government in the latter *Roman* Empire? Certainly not. However *this Change* was brought about, and to whatever it was owing, the *Monarchy of the Franks* in *Gaul* was built on the Ruins of their *former Government*. This *Boulainvilliers* Himſelf confeſſes, when He ſays (though not very accurately, nor conſiſtently, as I imagine, in calling their *former Government a Kind of Ariſtocracy*) that *the Principle of Union, which founded the* Monarchy, *on the Ruins of a* Kind of Ariſtocracy, *was the miſtaken Ambition of particular Men.* In ſhort, Proofs enough may be collected out of *this very Author* to ſhew that the Government of the *Franks*, even under the *firſt Race of their Kings*, was not only different from the *German Governments*, but in ſome Reſpects founded on quite oppoſite Principles. One of theſe Reſpects, which is immediately to my Purpoſe, I ſhall mention.

The *general Aſſemblies*, that were held at firſt in the Month of *March*, and afterwards in the Month of *May*, were *national Aſſemblies*, indeed; but not ſuch as the *antient Germans* held; among whom the

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* *Boulainv. Mem. Hiſt.*

* *principal*

* *principal Men* conſulted and decided about the *leaſt*, and *the whole Body of the People* about the *greateſt Affairs*. In *theſe Aſſemblies of the French* the *People* had nothing to do, unleſs We reckon for ſomething the Function of † *following*, which the *Author* I have juſt now quoted aſſigns Them, and which he ſays that Cuſtom had rendered neceſſary. In one Word, the People had not any Share in the *ſupreme Power*, either collectively or repreſentatively, in the *original Plan of the* French *Government*. Whether They acquired any Share in *this Power* afterwards, let us enquire next. *† *Mezerai* pretends, and indeed the whole Hiſtory of *France* vouches for Him, †† *that no Nation ever honour'd their* Nobility *ſo much as the* French; *amongſt whom the* Nobility *was not only exempt from all Sorts of* Impoſitions *and* Charges, *but commanded abſolutely all* inferior Ranks, *who were almoſt in a State of Servitude*. How could it be otherwiſe, when the *Nobility*, and *chief Magiſtrates*, and the *Clergy*, compos'd alone the *national Councils*, or *Parliaments*, and even exerciſed *diſtributive Juſtice* all over the Kingdom? Their Power increaſed, as That of the *Kings of the firſt Race* diminiſhed. *Charles Martel*, indeed, who truſted to that *Battle-Axe*, which gave Him his *Name*, and to *foreign*

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* *De minoribus Principes, de majoribus omnes.* Tacit.

† *Ills* (That is the *French*) *laiſſerent paſſer aux hauts Magiſtrats, les Ducs, les Comtes, & les Vicaires, le Droit de la Nation entiere; de ſortque le Commun n'eut plus d'autres Fonctions dans les Aſſemblées reelles, que d'y paroître pour les* Acclamations, *que l'Uſage rendoit neceſſaires.*

Boulainv. *Mem. Hiſt.*

*† *L.* 2.

†† *Jamais Nation n'honora tant la Nobleſſe que celle la; car non ſeulement elle etoit exempte de toute ſorte d'Impots, & Corvées, mais commandoit á baguette á ſes Inferieurs, ſur leſquels elle avoit preſque Droit de ſervitude.*

Troops

Troops, laid aſide the *national Aſſemblies*, neglected the *Nobility*, and miſuſed even the *Clergy*, who damned Him for it. But *Pepin* found it neceſſary to regain *Both*, and attach Them to his Intereſt, in order to mount the Throne. By attaching *Them*, He attach'd the whole Nation to him. *Childeric* was depoſed, and He choſen King in a general Aſſembly held at *Soiſſons*, which *Mezerai* calls moſt improperly (ſince the Expreſſion communicates a falſe Idea to his Reader) *the States*, *les Etats*. *Theſe Aſſemblies*, in his Time, in That of his Son *Charles the Great*, and ſo on, conſiſted of the *Nobility* and *Clergy* alone; and once more it is beyond all Diſpute certain, that the *People* had no more Share in theſe *national Councils*, under the *ſecond*, than under the *firſt Race of the Kings of* France.

When the *third Race of theſe Kings* began in *Hugues Capet*, the *Lords* were ſo powerful in their *Eſtates*, and ſo independent in their *Governments*, that he was forced to come to a Kind of Compoſition with Them. They became *Sovereigns*, each in his Territory, but held of the *Crown*, and acknowleged the *King* for the ſupreme Lord. There was ſcarce a *Town*, which had not a *little Sovereign*; ſcarce a *Caſtle* without ſome *little Tyrant*. The *Parliaments*, in theſe Ages, took ſeveral Turns; *Ils prirent divers plis*, as * *Paſquier* expreſſes Himſelf; but ſtill They conſiſted of *Princes*, *great Lords*, *Biſhops* and *Abbots*, who decided in them their Diſputes with *one another*, and with the *King*, and maintained by theſe Means a Sort of national Confederacy, or fœderal Union of *many States*, politically united under *one Head*. *Such Aſſemblies as theſe*, under the *ſecond* and *third Race*, were the original

* *Recherches de la France.*

Inſtitutions, from whence the * *Parliaments of France* have proceeded, as many Alterations as they have received, and as much as they are now chang'd; ſo that We may ſafely affirm the *Parliaments of France* never gave the *People* any Share in the Government of that Kingdom; and whoever entertains a Notion that the *Aſſemblies of the States* did, or that † *theſe Aſſemblies* are of great Antiquity, or that they are the Foundation of the Liberty of the People of that Country, will find Himſelf, on due Examination, groſly deceived.

Theſe Aſſemblies of the *three Eſtates*, the *Nobility*, *Clergy* and *Commons*, were invented firſt by †† *Philip le Bel.* They were intirely unknown before the Year 1301. The *People* had no Right to any *ſuch Aſſemblies*; and when they were inſtituted, they were plainly deſign'd for nothing leſs than the *Good of the People.* Long after the Eſtabliſhment of the *Capetian Race*, when *Taxes* grew heavy, and were laid on and levied very arbitrarily, *† Seditions and Rebellions of an oppreſs'd People, who had no other Recourſe, followed. To prevent Theſe, not only Writs, or Orders, were ſent to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, in the ſeveral Sheriffwicks and Bailywicks, but to the *Commons*, to aſſemble and take into Conſideration how to *redreſs Grievances*, and *ſupport the publick Expences*; and after ſuch Conſideration had amongſt Themſelves, to depute ſome Perſons of *each Order*, or *Eſtate*,

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* *Primitive Origine & Inſtitution des Parlemens. Ib.*

† *Ib.*

†† *L'Aſſemblée des Etats.——fut une Idée toute nouvelle de* Philippe le Bel, *& juſqu' alors entierement inuſitée.*
Boulainv. *Let. ſur les anciens Parl. de France.*

*† *Paſqu. Rech.*

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to confer together in the Place appointed for holding ſuch general Aſſemblies. *The* Commons *were added to theſe Aſſemblies*, * ſays Paſquier, *againſt the antient Order or Practice of* France, *for no other Reaſon than This, that the principal Burthen, or Charge, was to fall upon them.* This was the true Reaſon. *Redreſs of Grievances* had no Part in the Schemes of that *rapacious* and *profuſe Prince*, who was the Author of this Inſtitution; and He, that conſiders the Manner, in which *theſe Aſſemblies* were convened, the Powers They were ſuffer'd to exerciſe, the Subordination, in which the *Commons* particularly were kept, and the habitual, unavoidable Influence, under which They lay, will be eaſily convinced that *ſuch Aſſemblies* were fitted to do the Jobs, and ſanctify the Iniquity of the *Court*, and nothing more. If, at any Time, They make any good Ordinances for the Reformation of the State, † *theſe Ordinances are*, ſays honeſt *Paſquier*, *like fine pieces of Tapeſtry, hung up to make a Shew to Poſterity.* They have no other Effect. But the *Impoſition granted to the King hath its full Effect.* I conclude therefore, and upon ſufficient Grounds, that even ſince the Eſtabliſhment of theſe *Aſſemblies of the Eſtates*, in the Beginning of the 14th Century, the *People of France* have had no real Share in the *ſupreme Power of the Government*, either collectively or repreſentatively.

I might illuſtrate and prove what is here advanced by the Example of *every Aſſembly of the States of France*, of which We have any good Accounts,

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* *Le Roturier fut expres ajouté, contre l'ancien Ordre de la* France, *à cette Aſſemblée*, &c.

† —— *Ces ſont belles Tapiſſeries, qui ſervent ſeulement de Parade à une Poſterité. Cependant l'Impoſt que l'on accorde au Roy eſt fort bien mis à Effet.*

from the *firſt* in 1301 to the *laſt* that was held, as I remember, in 1614. But ſuch a Deduction would carry us too far. I ſhall content myſelf therefore with making two Obſervations.

Firſt, that *theſe Farces* (for ſuch *theſe Aſſemblies* were, and ſuch they were deſigned to be) owe their Inſtitution not only to one of the *worſt Kings*, but to one of the *worſt Miniſters*, that *France* ever ſaw; *Enguerand de Marigny*, who was call'd the *Coadjutor* and the *Governor of the Kingdom*; the moſt inſolent, the moſt avaricious, and the moſt prodigal Man of his Age. The great Ability of *this Miniſter*, on which his whole Merit with a *greedy Maſter* was raiſed, conſiſted in making his Adminiſtration a Syſtem of *Violence* and *Fraud*, in order to plunder and enſlave the *People*. When He durſt not employ *one*, He turned Himſelf to the *other*; and how groſly and impudently He managed even *Fraud*, it may not be improper to take Notice, in one Inſtance; becauſe We ſhall ſee the better, by this Inſtance, what the Nature and Effect of *theſe Aſſemblies* were, of which We ſpeak, and what Uſe the *Court* made of them from their firſt Inſtitution. *Enguerand de Marigny* then, meeting with great Oppoſition to * *ſome Taxes* He had deviſed, propoſed the calling an *Aſſembly of the States*, and hoped probably that He might gain the *Commons* to favour the Intention He had of extending *theſe Taxes* to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*. A great Scaffold was erected. The *King*, the *Lords* and the *Clergy* took their Places on it. The *Commons* attended at the Foot of it. The *Miniſter* made a moſt vehement Declamation, to ſtir the Paſ-

* *Boulainv. Let. ſur les anciens Parl. de France.*

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ſions of the Audience, and made no Scruple of inſinuating in it, what neither *He* nor his *Maſter* intended to perform, a Promiſe of reimburſing, after the Expedition propoſed, what the *People* ſhould give to the *King*. The *King* roſe from his Throne, and advanced to the Extremity of the Scaffold, that He might ſecond by his Looks the Harangue of his *Treaſurer*, and ſee who Thoſe were, that refuſed, or conſented to the Aid He demanded. The *Deputies of Paris* promiſed to give a ſufficient Supply, or to follow the *King* in their Perſons to the War. The *other Deputies* concurred in this general Engagement, and the *Aſſembly* broke up, without any *farther Deliberation*, or any *Ordinance of the Eſtates*. But an *Ordinance of the King* ſoon followed; a † *general Exciſe* was impoſed by his Authority, as if it had been the Grant of the *Eſtates* to Him; and his *Miniſter* had a Number of *Harpies* ready, whom he let looſe to deſolate the Kingdom, by levying this *infamous Tax*, for the Conſideration of ſome little Advance made to the *King*. If you aſk what were the Conſequences of *theſe Proceedings*, it will be ſufficient to mention two. The Tax of a 5th on the *Revenues of the Subject*, which is the Proportion of our *Land Tax of four Shillings in the Pound*, was continued, though the *general Exciſe* had been impoſed; and *† *Enguerand de Marigny* was hang'd in the ſucceeding Reign for This, amongſt other Crimes, though not by an *Aſſembly of the Eſtates*; for the *Eſtates* had neither

† ——— *Six Deniers par Livre de toutes les Marchandiſes, Victuailles, Boiſſons, & Denrées.* ——— *Vendues dans le Royaume.*

Boulainv. Let. ſur les anciens Parl. de France.

*† *Mezerai, Daniel, &c. Sous Louis Hutin.*

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the Opportunity, nor the Power, of reſenting the greateſt Inſult, that could be offered them, and the greateſt Injury, that could be done to the Nation.

The *next Obſervation* I have to make is very ſhort; but I think very pertinent, and very important.——This Example ſhews us clearly how true it is, that no *Inſtruments of Tyranny* can be found ſo ſure and effectual as an *Aſſembly of the Eſtates of a Realm*, when *ſuch an Aſſembly* is ſo conſtituted as to want the *Power*, (which was from the firſt the Caſe of the *three Eſtates* in *France*) and the ſame muſt happen, when They are ſo managed as to want the *Will* (which became at laſt the Caſe of the *Cortes* in *Spain*) to ſecure the Liberty and defend the Property of the *People*, againſt ſuch Kings as *Philip le Bel*, and ſuch *Coadjutors* as *Marigny*. *This Prince* and his *Miniſter* had ſtrain'd *Prerogative* to the utmoſt, and had governed by it very tyrannically. Whilſt *this Expedient* would do, They try'd no *other*; but when They apprehended it might fail Them, They added a *Deputation of the Commons* to the *Aſſembly of the Eſtates*; that, ſeeming to create a *new Controul on the Crown*, They might in Reality give greater Scope and freer Exerciſe to *arbitrary Will*. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore, who live under *limited Monarchies*, cannot be too careful to preſerve their *Conſtitution* in Vigour, nor too fearful leſt their *Repreſentatives* ſhould be ſo influenced as to neglect their *Privileges*, miſapply their *Powers*, and depart from their *Integrity*; ſince theſe *Friends of Liberty* ſee that the *greateſt Maſters of Tyranny* have judg'd the *Form*, without the *Spirit*, *of a free Government* more favourable to their *Schemes of Oppreſſion*, than all the Authority, that *abſolute Monarchy* can give; and

and that They made an Innovation in the *Form of their Government* on this very Motive, and for this very Purpoſe.

I am, S I R, &c.

LETTER XVI.

S I R,

I Have dwelt long, perhaps too long, on the laſt Head. I was induced to it, not only becauſe the Account I have given, according to the Truth of Hiſtory, is contrary to the national Prejudices of many People on this Subject, as I hinted before; but principally becauſe the great Point of Strength and Security, on which the *Freedom of our Conſtitution* reſts, will appear in a fuller Light, by being thus contraſted with the *Conſtitution of the French Government*. Both *their Anceſtors* and *ours* came out of *Germany*, and had probably much the ſame Manners, the ſame Cuſtoms, and the ſame Forms of Government. But as They proceeded differently in the Conqueſts They made, ſo did They in the Eſtabliſhments that followed. The Conqueſt of *Britain* was a Work of Time, and the *Saxon Monarchy* was long in forming. The Conqueſt of *Gaul* was carried on with greater Rapidity, and the *French Monarchy* was ſooner formed. From hence ſome Reaſons might be drawn to account, amongſt others, for that great Difference between the

the *Conſtitutions of the two Monarchies*, which theſe *two German Nations* founded, at no great Diſtance of Time, in *Britain* and in *Gaul*. But I ſhall not indulge myſelf in gueſſing at the Reaſons, or Accidents, that determined the *Franks* to the Diviſion They made of their People, and to the Form of Government They eſtabliſhed. Whatever Reaſons, or Accidents, determined Them, This is certain; that the Diſtinction of *Lord* and *Vaſſal* became the general Diſtinction of the whole Nation; that the * *Commons* amongſt Them were little better than *Slaves*, whatever They had been in *Germany*; and that they were ſo inured to Servitude under their *Kings*, *Prelates* and *Lords*, that they look'd on Themſelves at laſt, not *juſtly*, but *unjuſtly*, as Men, who had no Right, no not even a Right by Nature, to any Share in the Government of that Community, whereof They made ſo vaſtly the principal Part.

In *Britain* another Conſtitution was formed, and another Spirit prevail'd. The *Saxons* had a † *Nobility* too, ariſing from perſonal Valour, or Wiſdom, continued by Blood, and ſometimes conferred by the Prince, however legally at firſt it matters not to enquire, on ſuch as held great Offices about his Perſon. All theſe were the *Adelings*, or *Nobles*, an Handful in Compariſon of the *Frilingi*, or *Free-born*, who made the Body of the *Saxon People*. The Freedom of this People was erected on two Columns, that have proved more durable than Braſs.

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* *Le Peuple, d'un autre Coté, ſe fait Juſtice, reconnoiſſant combien la Condition naturelle le Doit eloigner du Concours du Government, & dans ſe ſentiment ne ſe fait entendre que par Requete.*

Boulainv. Let. ſur les an. Parl.

† *Nat. Bacon. Hiſt. & Pol. Diſ.*

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They were Parties to the making, and to the executing all the general Laws of the Kingdom. They ſhared the *legiſlative Power*; were joined to the *Lords* in the Adminiſtration of Juſtice; and no Magiſtrate, or Officer, could exerciſe Juriſdiction, nor Authority over Them, no not Eccleſiaſtical, without their Conſent and Election. The *Comites ex Plebe*, who were choſen for this laſt Function, the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, made one Rank amongſt the *Saxon Commonalty*. The *Cuſtodes Pagani*, ſuch as had an Helmet, a Coat of Mail, and a gilt Sword, for their ordinary Arms, whether They fought on Foot, or on Horſeback, made another Rank; and the plain *Pagani*, or *Ceorles*, made the loweſt. But even Theſe were totally diſtinct from, and far ſuperior to the *Lazzi*, or *Slaves*, nay to the *free Lazzi*, ſuch as had been *Slaves*, and were become free. The *Ceorles* were *Freemen* to all Intents and Purpoſes, and in all the Eſſentials of *Liberty*, as much as the *Saxons* of any ſuperior Rank, and were capable of riſing to any ſuperior Rank by Merit, or by Favour.

Theſe are the Sources, from which all the Diſtinction of Rank and Degree, that exiſt at this Day amongſt us, have flow'd. Theſe are the general Principles of all our *Liberties*. That this *Saxon Conſtitution* hath vary'd in many Particulars, and at ſeveral Periods of Time, I am far from denying. That it did ſo, for Inſtance, on the Entry of the *Normans*, though certainly not near ſo much as many have been willing to believe, and to make others believe, is allowed. Nay, let it be allow'd for Argument's Sake, and not otherwiſe, that during the firſt Confuſion, and the ſubſequent Diſorders, which neceſſarily accompany and follow ſo great, and ſo violent a Revolution, the Scheme of the *Saxon Conſtitution* was broken, and the *Liberties*

of the People invaded, as well as the *Crown* uſurp'd. Let us even agree that *Laws* were made, without the Conſent of the *People*; that *Officers* and *Magiſtrates*, civil, military and eccleſiaſtical, were impoſed without their Election; in one Word, that theſe *Norman Kings*, and the *Lords had mounted each other too high to be Lords over Freemen*, and that the Government was intirely *Monarchical* and *Ariſtocratical*, without any Exerciſe of *Democratical Power*. Let all This be granted, and the utmoſt that can be made of it will amount to This; that Confuſion and Violence at the Entry, and for ſome Time after, under the Government of a *foreign Race*, introduc'd many illegal Practices, and ſome foreign Principles of Policy, contrary to the Spirit, and Letter too, of the *antient Conſtitution*; and that *theſe Kings* and the *Lords abuſed their Power over the Freemen, by Extortion and Oppreſſion, as Lords over Tenants*. But it will remain true that neither *Kings* nor *Lords*, nor both together, * *could prevail over Them, or gain their Conſent to give their Right, or the Law, up to the King's Beck. But ſtill the* Law *remain'd Arbiter both of* King *and* People, *and the* Parliament *ſupreme Expounder and Judge both of it and Them.* Tho' the Branches were lopped, and the Tree loſt its Beauty for a Time, yet the Root remain'd untouch'd, was ſet in a good Soil, and had taken ſtrong Hold in it; ſo that Care and Culture, and Time were indeed required, and our Anceſtors were forced to water it, if I may uſe ſuch an Expreſſion, with their Blood; but with this Care, and Culture, and Time, and Blood, it ſhot again with greater

* *Nat. Bacon Summary Concluſ. of the firſt Part of Hiſt. and Pol. Diſc.*

Strength

Strength than ever, that We might ſit quiet and happy under the Shade of it; for if the ſame Form was not exactly reſtored in every Part, a Tree of the ſame Kind, and as beautiful, and as luxuriant as the former, grew up from the ſame Root.

To bring our Diſcourſe to that Point, which is here immediately concern'd; *Parliaments* were never interrupted, nor the Right of *any Eſtate* taken away, however the Exerciſe of it might be diſturb'd. Nay, they ſoon took the Forms They ſtill preſerve, were conſtituted *almoſt* as they now are, and were *intirely* built on the ſame general Principles, as well as directed to the ſame Purpoſes.

When I ſay that *they were conſtituted almoſt as they now are*, I do not mean to enter into any of thoſe minute Queſtions, about which a Man may employ much Time and Study, and have as little true and uſeful Knowledge of our *Conſtitution* as the moſt ignorant Man alive. But I propoſe to make a ſhort Reflection or two on the *Property* and *Power* of the *three Eſtates*, that compoſe our *Parliament*, as they ſtood formerly, and as they now ſtand; becauſe although our *Parliaments* were compoſed of *King*, *Lords* and *Commons* in thoſe Days, as well as theſe, yet the Difference of the Weight, which each of *theſe Eſtates* hath caſt into the Scale of Government, at different Periods, does in Effect make ſome Difference in the Conſtitution of *Parliaments*; and by conſidering this Difference, our Thoughts will be led the better to judge of the true Poiſe of our *Conſtitution*, on maintaining which our All depends; ſince the nearer We keep to it, the ſafer our *Liberty* is, and ſince every Variation from it is dangerous to our *Liberty*, in a Degree proportionable to ſuch Variation. *Property* then, and *Power* by Conſequence, have changed Hands, or rather have ſhifted much in the ſame

Hands, ſince the *Norman* Æra. *Kings*, *Lords* and the *Church* were in thoſe Days, and long afterwards, the great Proprietors, and by the Nature of Tenures, as well as by the Bulk of their Eſtates, They held the *Commons* in no ſmall Subjection, and ſeem to have governed without much Regard to Them, or to their Concurrence, in many Caſes. But the Regard, that was not paid Them at firſt, the *Kings*, the *Lords* and the *Church* found it neceſſary to pay Them in a ſhort Time; and that Authority, that Weight in the Ballance of Power, which *Property* did not give Them, They ſoon acquired, or rather reſumed by their *Numbers*, and by the *Circumſtances*, that followed. By the *Circumſtances*, that followed, I mean the great Diſorders in the State, and the civil Wars, which the Ambition of *Princes*, of the *Nobility*, and of the *Church* too, created. In all theſe Conflicts, ſome of the Commons † *holding for the* King, *who promiſed Liberty from the* Lords, *and others ſiding with the* Lords, *who promiſed Them Liberty from the* King, They came off better in the End than their *Principals*, and an Example rarely to be parallel'd was ſet; for *general Liberty* was nurſed by theſe Means, under the Wings of *particular Ambition*. In later Days, when the Nation, haraſſed and ſpent by the long Wars of *York* and *Lancaſter*, ſeem'd glad to ſettle under any ſtable Government; and in this Temper gave many Advantages to the Cunning of *Henry* the 7th, which the Violence of his *Son* improved; it is certain that the *Commons* ſuffered extremely from the Avarice of *one*, the Profuſion of the *other*, and the high-ſtrain'd Prerogative of *both*. But then their Sufferings were tem-

† *Nat. Bacon Hiſt. and Pol. Diſc. Concluſ. of the 2d Part*, porary,

porary, and may be ſaid to have ended with theſe Reigns; whereas the Sufferings of the *Nobility* and the *Church* were permanent and irretrievable. *The King and his Council*, ſays the Author I quoted laſt, *under Colour of Liveries and Retainders, brought the whole Kingdom to be of their Livery.* It was ſo. But ſtill the *Commons* loſt nothing, and gain'd much. They were more under Subjection to the *Crown*; but They were leſs under Subjection to the *Lords* and the *Church*. Not only the Dependencies on *Theſe* were broken, but the *Lords* and the *Church* were made more dependent on the *Crown* than the *Commons* had been on *Them*. The *Lords* were obliged to attend the *Court* at their own Expence, and might alienate their Eſtates to defray this Expence. A great Part of the Lands of the *Church* were confiſcated and parcell'd out to Thoſe, who could buy, at very cheap Rates; and the Increaſe of *Trade*, which begun about this Time to be very conſiderable, put the *Commons* into a Condition of being the Buyers. Thus were the old Foundations of *Property* and *Power* ſapped on one Side, and new Foundations laid on the other. Some of the Weight of the *Church* continued in the Scale of the *Lords*, and ſome of it hath gone ſince into That of the *Commons*. The *Parliamentary Controul of the Crown* did not become leſs, but it became more equally and more uſefully plac'd. *Democracy* was ſo well poiſed with *Ariſtocracy*, after this great Change, that if They divided, They could not invade one another; and if They united, They could not be invaded by the *Monarchy*. Far different was the Caſe in other Countries, where the *Crown* got the better of the *Lords*, and baffled, at leaſt in ſome Degree, the monſtrous Attempts of *Eccleſiaſtical Uſurpation*. In *France*, for Inſtance, when the Incroachments of the *Papal Power* were check'd, the

Church

Church compounded with the *Crown*, and an Allyance ſucceeded of the *Monarchy* with the *Hierarchy*. But if the *Church* was able to compound, the *Nobility* was forced to ſubmit in that Kingdom; ſo that the Authority and Wealth of the *Church* being fix'd on the Side of the *Crown*, the whole Strength and Influence of the *Nobility* being taken from Them, and incorporated with the Power of the *Crown*, and the *Commons* having nothing to do in that Government, but to pay Taxes, and carry Arms, the Kings of *France* are become *abſolute Monarchs*; and whatever *Liberty*, or *Appearance of Liberty*, there was in *that Conſtitution*, it is totally deſtroyed.

When I ſay *that Parliaments were intirely built on the ſame general Principles, as well as directed to the ſame Purpoſes, as they ſtill are*, I ſhall be juſtify'd by the whole Tenor of our *Hiſtory*, and of our *Law*. Let us conſider This in a Caſe the plaineſt imaginable, tho' it ſuffers ſo much Debate through the Effrontery of *ſome Men*. Let us conſider it relatively to that great Principle, *that Parliaments ought to be independent of the Crown*, in all Reſpects, except ſuch as are ſettled by the Law and Cuſtom of *Parliament*, and concerning which there is no Diſpute. Now, this *general Principle* hath not only been always the ſame, but it hath been always ſo declared, in the moſt authentick and ſolemn Manner; and *Parliaments* have not been more intent on any national Concern whatever, than on maintaining *this Principle*, and ſecuring the Effects of it. I ſay *Parliaments* have been conſtantly thus intent, and eſpecially in the beſt Times, during more than *three Centuries* at leaſt; for I would not go back too far, nor grope unneceſſarily in the dark. What elſe did thoſe Laws mean, that were made in the Time of the *Lancaſter Kings*, to regulate the *Elections*,

tions, and to prevent the Influence, which *Richard* the 2d had illegally and arbitrarily employ'd, and which there was Room to fear that *other Princes* might employ? What elſe do all thoſe Reſolutions, all thoſe Declarations, all thoſe Remonſtrances, all thoſe Acts of Parliament mean, that have been made ſo often, and enforced ſo ſtrongly, from Time to Time, and from thoſe Days to theſe, againſt the Influence of the *Crown*, either on the *Elections*, or on the *Members of Parliament*? I ſhould be aſhamed to aſk any more Queſtions of this Kind, or to deſcend into any Detail, in order to prove what every *Clerk of a Juſtice of Peace*, nay almoſt every *Day-Labourer* knows. But there is another Queſtion, which I muſt aſk. If This be ſo, what do *thoſe Men* mean, who are employ'd, or rather what does *He* mean, who employs Them, to plead in all Places, and on all Occaſions, even the moſt ſolemn, in Favour of *this very Influence*, nay of the very worſt Sort of it; of *that Influence*, which is created immediately by *Corruption*; for to That their Arguments reach by undeniable Conſequences? *Reaſon* is againſt Him and Them; ſince it is a plain Abſurdity to ſuppoſe a *Controul on the Crown*, (and They have not yet ventured to ſuppoſe the contrary, that I know of) and to eſtabliſh at the ſame Time a Power, and even a Right, in the *Crown* to render *this Controul* uſeleſs. *Experience* is againſt Them; ſince the Examples of other Countries, and at ſome Times (former Times I mean) of our own, have proved that a Prince may govern according to his *arbitrary Will*, or That of his more *arbitrary Miniſter*, as abſolutely and much more ſecurely with, than without the Concurrence of a *Parliament*. *Authority*, even the uniform Authority of our whole Legiſlature, is againſt Them. The *Voice of our Law* gives

gives them the Lye. How then ſhall We account for this Proceeding; this open and deſperate Attack upon our *Conſtitution*, and therefore upon our *Liberty?* Have theſe *great Men* made any nice Diſcovery, that eſcaped the blunt Sagacity of our Anceſtors formerly, and is above the narrow Conceptions of all other Men, except Themſelves, at this Time? Is it leſs fit that the Wiſdom of this Nation hath judged it to be, for ſo many Ages, that Kings ſhould govern under the *conſtitutional Controul* of *two other Eſtates?* Or is it leſs fit that They ſhould govern ſo, for the Time to come, than it was for the Time paſt? We ſhall hear, for aught I know, even in this Age, that *Kings are God's Vicegerents*; that They are, next to *Him* and his Son *Chriſt Jeſus*, *ſupreme Moderators and Governors.* We ſhall hear again, perhaps, of their *hereditary*, their *divine*, their *indefiezable Right*, and the reſt of that ſilly Cant, which was invented to make the Uſurpations of *Prerogative* go down the better. But will even This alter the Caſe? Will This make it unworthy of Them to ſubmit to the full Controul of ſuch a *Conſtitution* as God Himſelf approved, in the Inſtitution of the *Jewiſh Senate*. *Moſes* was undoubtedly *God's Vicegerent*. He was, if ever Man was ſo, next and immediately under God, a *ſupreme Moderator and Governor*. He was * inſpired, and aſſiſted in a ſupernatural Manner; and yet He took the Advice of his Father-in-law *Jethro*, the Prieſt of *Midian*. He aſſociated to Himſelf in the Government of the Common-Wealth, or He bad the People take, as He ſays in † another Place, or chuſe, *wiſe Men and underſtanding, and known among the Tribes*, that They might be

* *Exod.* 18. † *Deut.* 1.

aſſociated

aſſociated to Him. He found Himſelf unequal to the Taſk of governing alone, and He expoſtulated with God upon it. * *I am not able to bear all this People alone. Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten Them? If Thou deal thus with me, kill me, I pray Thee, out of Hand.* Whether They, who deduce from hence the Inſtitution of *Sanhedrins*, are in the Right, or They, who aſſign them a more modern Date, againſt the Opinion of the *Jewiſh Doctors* Themſelves, whoſe Authority *our Doctors* receive implicitly enough in ſome Caſes, and reject as arbitrarily in others, it matters not to enquire. Let us leave the Diſpute to the Partiſans of *Joſeph Scaliger* and *Petavius*, of Father *Simon* and *Le Clerc*. Thus much is certain. A *great Sanhedrin* ſubſiſted at *Jeruſalem* even at the coming of the *Meſſiah*, as well as *inferior Sanhedrins* in ſeveral Parts of *Paleſtine*; which Form of Government bore ſome Reſemblance to our old *Saxon Conſtitution*; and He, who takes the Trouble of looking into Mr. † *Selden*, will find that the *great Sanhedrin* had as much Authority, and exerciſed as much Power, as ever *Parliaments* did, or *Wittenagemots* could claim. That God approved a Kind of *Parliamentary Eſtabliſhment*, and a Diviſion of the ſupreme Power between his Vicegerent *Moſes* and the *ſeventy Elders*, to whom He gave ſome of the *Spirit*, *that was on Moſes*, the Quotations I refer to from holy Writ do ſufficiently prove. After This, it cannot be ſaid, I think, to derogate from the Majeſty of any Prince, let us entertain as high Notions of this Majeſty as We pleaſe, that

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* *Numb.* 11. † *Seld. de Syned. & Præf. Invid. vet. Ebræorum.*

He is relieved from the Burthen of governing *alone*; that He is obliged to ſhare the ſupreme Power with the *Nobility* and *Commonalty* of the Realm; and that He is hindered from deſtroying, either directly or indirectly, that Independency of *thoſe other Eſtates*, which can alone preſerve this Diviſion of the ſupreme Power, really, as well as apparently. But, perhaps, theſe *great* and *honeſt Men* have diſcovered a Neceſſity of putting the *Members*, or a *Majority of the Members of Parliament*, under the Influence of the *Crown*, in order to preſerve this very *Conſtitution*. Let us ſee therefore what Dangers *this Expedient* is fitted to prevent. Are We afraid that an *Houſe of Commons*, unleſs reſtrain'd by *Places* and *Penſions*, ſhould give up the Conſtitution to the *Lords*, and eſtabliſh an *Ariſtocracy?* This Fear would be ridiculous ſurely; and He, who ſhould argue againſt ſuch a Suppoſition, would make Himſelf ſo. Are We afraid that an *Houſe of Commons*, unleſs reſtrain'd in this Manner, ſhould uſurp more Power than belongs to Them, and eſtabliſh a Kind of *Democratical Tyranny?* But They would have in Oppoſition to Them a Power ſufficient to defeat their Deſigns; the united Power of the *Crown* and of the *Houſe of Lords*. Formerly, indeed, They ſucceeded in an Attempt of this Kind; and the *King* and the *Lords* may at any Time throw too much Power into their Scale, and ſet the Senſe and Spirit of the People on their Side, as was done at that Time. But This neither hath been, nor can be done, unleſs both *King* and *Lords* conduct Themſelves ſo ill, that the Miſchiefs to be apprehended from their Prevalency appear as great, or greater than Thoſe, which are to be apprehended from the Prevalency of the *Commons*. Let it be remember'd

ber'd too that as the *King* and *Lords* may give too much Power and Popularity to the *Commons*, ſo the *Lords* and *Commons* may give too much Power to the *Crown*. The Difference will lye only here; that the *King* and *Lords* will never do the firſt deſignedly; whereas there is a Poſſibility that the *Lords* and *Commons* may be induced, in ſome Age leſs virtuous than the preſent, by *Places*, *Penſions*, and *other Gratifications*, beſtowed on a Majority of *thoſe Aſſemblies*, to do the laſt deſignedly. What now remains to be urg'd, in Favour of *this Expedient?* From what Danger are We to be protected by it? Shall We be told that *Parliaments* will not purſue the national Intereſt, unleſs their Members are bought into it by the *Crown?* Something like This hath been advanced, I have heard, and nothing more impudent, nor more ſilly could be advanced. A *Court*, that is truly in the Intereſt of the Nation, will have, nay muſt have a Concurrence of *Parliament*, as it would be eaſy, if it was needful, to ſhew. Time and Trouble, indeed, may be ſometimes required to lead *independent Men*, who judge for Themſelves, and comply becauſe They are convinced; whereas neither one nor the other are wanting to determine ſuch as hold to a Court by a *corrupt Dependency* on it; for They are ſoon diſciplin'd and ready to perform the whole Exerciſe of *Parliamentary Mercenaries* at the beat of a Drum. Some Inconveniencies may likewiſe ariſe, (for That, which I have juſt mentioned, does not deſerve the Name) from the *Independency of Parliaments*. *Miniſters*, for Inſtance, may be called to Account by the Paſſion, by the Prejudice, if you will, of *ſuch Aſſemblies*, oftner perhaps than They deſerve to be; or their Errors may be cenſur'd, or their Faults

be puniſhed, in a greater Degree, and with more Rigour, not only than true *political Juſtice* requires, which ſhould always be temper'd with *Mercy*, but even than *ſtrict Juſtice* exacts. But as one of Theſe is a Fault, if it be a Fault, on the beſt Side, and as the other will certainly happen very ſeldom, it does not ſeem reaſonable that a Door ſhould be opened to *Corruption* and *Dependency*, in order to prevent them. Nay farther, this Vigilance, and this Severity of *Parliaments*, which We here ſuppoſe, will not fail to have ſome very good Effects, that are more than ſufficient to ballance the ſuppoſed ill Effects. Among the reſt, they may render the Raſh, who are in Power, more cautious, and the Bold more modeſt. They may render Fools leſs fond of Power, and awe even Knaves into Honeſty. It were better ſurely that able and good Men ſhould now and then ſuffer, (nay the good Man, who ſuffer'd, would be Himſelf of this Opinion) than that the Adulation and Servility of *Parliaments*, which are the neceſſary Conſequences of *Corruption* and *Dependency*, ſhould ever contribute to make the *Court* become, in any future Age, a Sanctuary for *Pickpockets*, and an Hoſpital for *Changelings*.

I am, S I R, &c.

LETTER XVII.

SIR,

THE great Alteration We have ſpoken of, in *Property*, and *Power*, brought our *Conſtitution*, by ſlow Degrees, and through many Struggles and Dangers, ſo near the moſt perfect Idea of a *free Syſtem of Government*, that nothing would be now wanting to compleat it, if effectual Means were found of ſecuring the Independency of Parliament againſt *Corruption*, as well as it is ſecur'd againſt *Prerogative*. Our *Kings* have loſt little of the gaudy Plumage of the Crown. Some of their ſuperfluous Power, indeed, hath been bought, and more hath been wreſted from Them. Notwithſtanding which, it is a very demonſtrable Truth, that the *Crown* muſt ſit lighter, and more ſecure, on the Head of a *wiſe Prince*, (and no Conſtitution provides for, though every Conſtitution ſhould provide againſt, a *weak Prince*) ſince the great Change of *Property* and *Power*, in Favour of the *Commons*, than ever it did before. Our *Kings* are no longer expoſed, as ſome of the greateſt of Them have been, to the Inſults of *turbulent*, *ambitious Lords*, or *haughty Prelates*. It is no longer in the Power of a *few Factious Noblemen* to draw Armies into the Field, and oblige their *Prince* to fight for his Crown, to fight to gain it, and to fight to keep it; as *Edward* the 4th did, I think, in nine pitch'd

pitch'd Battles. To make the *Prince* uneaſy, or inſecure, as We are now conſtituted, the *whole Body of the People* muſt be uneaſy under his Government. A *popular King of Great Britain* will be always not only eaſy and ſecure, but in Effect abſolute. He will be, what the *Britiſh Conſtitution* alone can make any *Prince*, the *abſolute Monarch of a free People*; and this *Popularity* is ſo eaſily acquired, a *King* gains the publick Confidence and Affection at ſo cheap a Rate, that He muſt be poor indeed in all the *Kingly Virtues*, who does not purchaſe them, and eſtabliſh *true Popularity* upon them.

If the Condition of our *Kings* is mended in many Reſpects, and made worſe in none, That of the *Nation* is mended in every Reſpect, by the great Improvements of our *Conſtitution*; which are due principally to the *Change* I have mentioned, as the Advances We have made in *Trade*, and in *national Wealth and Power*, are due principally to theſe Improvements. It is by *Theſe*, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* enjoy hitherto ſuch a Freedom of their *Perſons*, and ſuch a Security of their *Property*, as no other People can boaſt. Hence that great Encouragement of *Induſtry*; hence that broad and ſolid Foundation of *Credit*, which muſt always continue, unleſs the Weight of *Taxes*, and the Oppreſſion of *Tax-Gatherers* make it worth no Man's while to be induſtrious any longer, and unleſs *national Credit* be reduced, by Length of Time, and private Management, to reſt no longer on its *natural and original Foundation*, but on the feeble Props of *yearly Expedients*, and *daily Tricks*; by which a *Syſtem*, that ought to be the *plaineſt* and *faireſt* imaginable, will become of Courſe a *dark, intricate, and wicked Myſtery of* STOCKJOBBING.

But

But the great Advantage We are to inſiſt upon here, which hath ariſen to the *whole Nation* from the Alteration in the State of *Property* and *Power*, is This; that We have been brought by it to the true Poiſe of a *mix'd Government*, conſtituted like ours on the *three ſimple Forms*. The *Democratical Power* is no longer kept under the ſame *Dependencies*; and if an *Houſe of Commons* ſhould now fail to aſſert that *independent Share in the ſupreme, legiſlative Power*, which the Conſtitution aſſigns to *this Aſſembly*, it could not proceed, as it might and ſometimes did formerly, from the Nature of *Tenures*, and many other unavoidable Reſtraints; it could proceed alone from the *Corruption of particular Men*, who threw Themſelves into a *voluntary Dependency*. The *Democratical Power of our Conſtitution* is not ſufficient to overtop the *Monarchical* and *Ariſtocratical*; but it is ſufficient to counterwork and ballance any *other Power* by its own Strength, and without the fatal Neceſſity of favouring the Ambition of the *Crown* againſt the *Lords*, or That of the *Lords* againſt the *Crown*. Nay more, as our Government is now conſtituted, the *three Eſtates* have not only one common Intereſt, which They always had; but They have, conſidered as *Eſtates*, no ſeparate, contradictory Intereſt. Our *Conſtitution* gives ſo much Grandeur, ſo much Authority and Power to the *Crown*, and our *Parliaments* give ſo immenſe a Revenue, that no *Prince* hath any real Intereſt to deſire more, who looks on Himſelf as the *ſupreme Magiſtrate of a free People*; for if We ſuppoſe inordinate Ambition, or Avarice, to make Part of his Character, theſe Paſſions are inſatiable; but then for this very Reaſon, becauſe they are ſo, there ought to be no Account held of them; and though a *Prince* may meaſure

ſure his *Demands*, a *People*, who are in their Senſes, will never meaſure their *Conceſſions* by them.

The Property of the *Commons* is not only becomie far ſuperior to That of the *Lords* upon the whole, but in the Detail there are few, very few, Inſtances to be produced of greater Shares of private Property amongſt the *latter*, than amongſt the *former*; and as the Property of the *Commons* is greater, ſo it is equally *free*. There are no Badges of Servitude on *one Side*; no Pretence of any Superiority, except Thoſe of *Title* and *Rank*, on the *other*. The *Peers* are, in ſome Points, (I ſpeak it with all the Reſpect due to Them) *Commoners with Coronets on their Coats of Arms*; and affecting to act as ſuch, it is plain They deſire very wiſely to be taken for ſuch, on many Occaſions. The Intereſts of *theſe two Eſtates* then, with Regard to *Property*, are the ſame; and their *particular Rights* and *Privileges* are now ſo well aſcertain'd, and ſo diſtinguiſhed, that as the Proximity of their Intereſts of *one Sort* ſhould always unite Them, ſo the Diſtance of Thoſe of *another Sort* cannot eaſily make Them claſh. In ſhort, *theſe two Orders*, according to the *preſent Conſtitution*, (and how different is it from That of *Rome*, or, in the laſt Reſpect, even from That of *Spain*, not to mention That of *France?*) have no Temptation, and ſcarce the Means, of invading *each other*; ſo that They may the better, and the more effectually, employ their Vigilance, and unite their Efforts, whenever it ſhall be neceſſary, againſt the Encroachments of the *Crown*, from whoſe Shackles They have both emancipated Themſelves, whether the Attempts to impoſe theſe Shackles again are carried on by *Prerogative*, or by the more formidable Enemy of Liberty, *Corruption*.

It

It hath been obſerved already that although the *Crown* hath the ſole Power of creating *Peers*, yet the Independency of the *Peerage* on the *Crown* is ſecured by This, that their Rights and Privileges cannot be taken from Them, at the Will of the *Crown*. Could the *Crown* unmake, as well as make *Peers*, it would be a Jeſt to talk of *three Eſtates*, ſince there would be virtually, and in Effect, but *two*; and therefore our *Conſtitution* hath provided againſt it. But the *Commons of Great Britain* can make, and, at proper Seaſons, and in a proper Manner, unmake their *Repreſentatives*; by which Means many Inconveniencies and Miſchiefs are avoided, and many wiſe and juſt Ends obtain'd. The *Peers of the Realm* can, the *Commons* cannot, aſſemble in their *collective Body*, without exceeding thoſe Numbers, amongſt whom the Quiet, Order, Decency and Solemnity of a *Senate* may be preſerved. The *Peers* therefore ſit in Parliament in their *collective*, the *Commons* in their *repreſentative Body*. The *Peers* have an inherent, the *Commons* a delegated Right. The *Peers* are therefore accountable for their Conduct, as all other Men are, to *God*, to their *own Conſciences*, to the Tribunal of *publick Fame*, and to no other. But the *Commons* are accountable to *another Tribunal*, as well as to *Theſe*; to That of their *Conſtituents*, before which They muſt frequently appear, according to the true Intent of our *Conſtitution*, to have a Cenſure, or Approbation, paſſed on their Conduct, by the Refuſal, or Grant of *new Powers* to the particular Members. Thus the *collective Body of the People of Great Britain* delegate, but do not give up, truſt, but do not alienate their Right and their Power, and cannot be undone, by having *Beggary*, or *Slavery* brought upon them, unleſs They co-operate to their own Undoing, and in one Word betray Themſelves.

We cannot therefore ſubſcribe to thoſe two Sayings of my Lord *Bacon*, which are quoted to this Effect; *that* England *can never be undone, unleſs by* Parliaments; *and that there is nothing, which a* Parliament *cannot do. Great Britain*, according to our *preſent Conſtitution*, cannot be undone by *Parliaments*; for *there is ſomething, which a* Parliament *cannot do.* A *Parliament* cannot annul the *Conſtitution*; and whilſt That is preſerved, though our Condition may be bad, it cannot be irretrievably ſo. The *Legiſlative* is a *ſupreme*, and may be call'd, in one Senſe, an *abſolute*, but in none an *arbitrary Power*, * *It is limited to the* publick Good of the Society. *It is a Power, that hath no other End but* Preſervation, *and therefore can never have a Right to* deſtroy, enſlave, *or deſignedly to* impoveriſh *the Subjects*; *for the Obligations of the* Law of Nature *ceaſe not in* Society, *&c.*——If you therefore put ſo extravagant a Caſe, as to ſuppoſe the *two Houſes of Parliament* concurring to make at once a formal Ceſſion of their *own Rights* and *Privileges*, and of Thoſe of the *whole Nation* to the *Crown*, and aſk who hath the *Right*, and the *Means*, to reſiſt the *ſupreme legiſlative Power*; I anſwer, the *whole Nation* hath the *Right*, and a *People*, who deſerve to enjoy *Liberty*, will find the *Means*. An Attempt of this Kind would break the Bargain between the *King* and the *Nation*, between the *repreſentative* and *collective Body of the People*, and would diſſolve the *Conſtitution*. From hence it follows that the *Nation*, which hath a Right to preſerve *this Conſtitu-*

* Lock's *Eſſay on civil Government*, C. 11. *of the Extent of the* Legiſlative Power.

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tion, hath a Right to reſiſt an *Attempt*, that leaves no other Means of preſerving it but Thoſe of *Reſiſtance*. From hence it follows that if the *Conſtitution* was actually diſſolved, as it would be by ſuch an Attempt of the *three Eſtates*, the *People* would return to their original, their natural Right, the Right of reſtoring the *ſame Conſtitution*, or of making a *new one*. No Power on Earth could claim any Right of impoſing a *Conſtitution* upon Them; and leſs than any *that King*, *thoſe Lords*, and *thoſe Commons*, who, having been intruſted to preſerve, had deſtroy'd the *former*.——But to ſuppoſe a Caſe more within the Bounds of Poſſibility, though one would be tempted to think it as little within Thoſe of Probability; let us ſuppoſe our *Parliaments*, in ſome future Generation, to grow ſo *corrupt*, and the *Crown* ſo *rich*, that a *pecuniary Influence* conſtantly prevailing over the *Majority*, They ſhould aſſemble for little elſe than to eſtabliſh *Grievances*, inſtead of redreſſing them; to approve the *Meaſures of the Court*, without Information; to engage their Country in *Allyances*, in *Treaties*, in *Wars*, without Examination; and to give *Money* without *Account*, and almoſt without *Stint*. The Caſe would be deplorable. Our *Conſtitution* itſelf would become our *Grievance*, whilſt *this Corruption* prevailed; and if it prevailed long, our *Conſtitution* could not laſt long; becauſe this ſlow Progreſs would lead to the Deſtruction of it as ſurely as the more conciſe Method of giving it up at once. But, in this Caſe, the *Conſtitution* would help itſelf, and effectually too, unleſs the *whole Maſs of the People* was tainted, and the *Electors* were become no honeſter than the *Elected*. Much Time would be required to beggar and enſlave the Nation in this Manner. It could ſcarce be the Work of *one Parliament*,

though *Parliaments* ſhould continue to be *ſeptennial*. It could not be the Work of a *triennial Parliament* moſt certainly; and the People of *Great Britain* would have none to blame but Themſelves; becauſe, as the *Conſtitution* is a ſure Rule of Action to *Thoſe*, whom They chuſe to act for Them, ſo it is likewiſe a ſure Rule of Judgment to Them, in the Choice of their *Truſtees*, and particularly of ſuch as have *repreſented Them already*. In ſhort, nothing can deſtroy the *Conſtitution of Britain*, but the *People of Britain*; and whenever the *People of Britain* become ſo degenerate and baſe, as to be induced by *Corruption* (for They are no longer in Danger of being awed by *Prerogative*) to chuſe *Perſons* to repreſent Them in Parliament, whom They have found by Experience to be under an *Influence*, ariſing from *private Intereſt*, *Dependents on a Court*, and the *Creatures of a Miniſter*; or *others*, who are unknown to the *People*, that elect Them, and bring no Recommendation but That, which They carry in their *Purſes*; then may the *Enemies of our Conſtitution* boaſt that They have got the better of it, and that it is no longer able to preſerve itſelf, nor to defend *Liberty*. Then will that trite, proverbial Speech be verify'd in our Caſe, *that the Corruptions of the beſt Things are the worſt*; for then will that very Change in the State of *Property* and *Power*, which improved our *Conſtitution* ſo much, contribute to the Deſtruction of it; and We may even wiſh for thoſe little Tyrants, the *great Lords* and the *great Prelates* again, to oppoſe the Encroachments of the *Crown*. How preferable will Subjection to *thoſe powerful Landlords*, (whom the *Commonalty* were accuſtomed to ſerve; and by whom, if They ſuffered on one Hand, They had conſiderable Advantages on the other)

other) how preferable, indeed, will this Subjection appear to Them, when They ſhall ſee the whole Nation oppreſſed by a *few Upſtarts in Power*; often by the *meaneſt*, always by the *worſt of their Fellow Subjects*; by *Men*, who owe their Elevation and Riches neither to *Merit* nor *Birth*, but to the Favour of *weak Princes*, and to the *Spoils of their Country*, beggar'd by their Rapine. Then will the Fate of *Rome* be renew'd, in ſome Sort, in *Britain*. The Grandeur of *Rome* was the work of many Centuries, the Effect of much Wiſdom, and the Price of much Blood. She maintained her *Grandeur*, whilſt ſhe preſerved her *Virtue*; but when *Luxury* grew up to favour *Corruption*, and *Corruption* to nouriſh *Luxury*; then *Rome* grew venal; the Election of her *Magiſtrates*, the Sentences of her *Judges*, the Decrees of her *Senate*, all was ſold; for her *Liberty* was ſold, when *Theſe* were ſold; and her *Riches*, her *Power*, her *Glory*, could not long ſurvive her *Liberty*. She, who had been the Envy, as well as the Miſtreſs of Nations, fell to be an Object of their Scorn, or their Pity. They had ſeen and felt that ſhe governed other People by *Will*, and her own by *Law*. They beheld Her governed Herſelf by *Will*; by the *arbitrary Will* of the worſt of her own Citizens, of the worſt of both Sexes, of the worſt of Humankind; by *Caligula*, by *Claudius*, by *Nero*, by *Meſſalina*, by *Agrippina*, by *Poppæa*, by *Narciſſus*, by *Calliſtus*, by *Pallas*; by *Princes*, that were ſtupid, or mad; by *Women*, that were abandon'd to Ambition and to Luſt; by *Miniſters*, that were emancipated Slaves, Paraſites and Pandars, inſolent and rapacious. In this miſerable State, the Few, that retained ſome Sparks of the old *Roman* Spirit, had double Cauſe to mourn in Private; for it was not ſafe even

to

to *mourn* in publick. They mourn'd the Loſs of the Liberty and Grandeur of *Rome*; and They mourn'd that both ſhould be ſacrificed to *Wretches*, whoſe *Crimes* would have been *puniſhed*, and whoſe *Talents* would ſcarce have recommended Them to the *meaneſt Offices*, in the virtuous and proſperous Ages of the Commonwealth. Into ſuch a State, (the Difference of Times, and of other Circumſtances conſidered) at leaſt, into a State as miſerable as This, will the People of *Britain* both fall, and deſerve to fall, if They ſuffer, under any Pretence, or by any Hands, *that Conſtitution* to be deſtroyed, which cannot be deſtroyed, unleſs They ſuffer it; unleſs They co-operate with the *Enemies of it*, by renewing an exploded Diſtinction of *Parties*; by electing *Thoſe* to repreſent Them, who are hired to betray Them; or by ſubmitting tamely, when the *Maſk* is taken off, or falls off, and the Attempt to bring *Beggary* and *Slavery* is avowed, or can be no longer conceal'd. If ever This happens, the *Friends of Liberty*, ſhould any ſuch remain, will have one Option ſtill left; and They will rather chuſe, no Doubt, to dye the *laſt of* Britiſh *Freemen*, than bear to live the *firſt of* Britiſh *Slaves*.

I am, S I R, &c.

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LETTER XVIII.

SIR,

IF We had propoſed nothing more to ourſelves in writing *this Diſſertation on Parties* than the Entertainment, ſuch as it is, of your Readers, and our own Amuſement, We ſhould not have dwelt, perhaps, ſo much on the Nature of the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, nor have recurred ſo often to aſſert the *neceſſary Independency of Parliaments on the Crown*. But we had another Motive, which We are neither afraid, nor aſhamed to avow. This *neceſſary Independency of Parliaments*, in which the Eſſence of our *Conſtitution*, and by Conſequence of our *Liberty* conſiſts, ſeems to be in great, not to ſay, in imminent Danger of being loſt. They, who are alarm'd at every Thing, that is ſaid in Favour of our *Conſtitution*, and of *Britiſh Liberty*, and who are prejudiced againſt every Man, who writes or ſpeaks in Defence of them, may take, or affect to take, and try to give, Offence at this Expreſſion. But We deſire to be underſtood, as We have explained our Meaning upon ſome former Occaſion. We underſtand our *Conſtitution to be in Danger*, not only when it is *attacked*, but as ſoon as a *Breach* is made, by which it may be *attacked*; and We underſtand *this Danger* to be greater, or leſs, in Proportion to the *Breach*, that is made, and without any Regard to the Probability, or Improbabilty

probability of an *Attack*. This Explanation of our Meaning is the better founded, becauſe the Nation hath an undoubted Right to preſerve the *Conſtitution* not only inviolate, but ſecure from Violations. Should *Corruption* prevail among the *Members*, which We truſt will never happen, as notoriouſly as it does in the *Elections of Parliament*, We all know how much the Magnanimity of our *preſent King* would ſcorn to take ſo mean an Advantage over the Nation; how much, on the contrary, his heroical Spirit would prompt Him to maintain the Liberty even of a *degenerate People*, who might deſerve no longer the Enjoyment of ſo invaluable a Bleſſing, but who could never deſerve to have it taken from Them by a *Prince of that Family*, which was raiſed by Them to the Throne, for no other Reaſon but to preſerve it. All This We know; and the Nation may have, no Doubt, the ſame Confidence in every *future King*, *of the ſame illuſtrious and royal Houſe*. But This will not alter the Caſe; nor make That, which I call *Danger*, ceaſe to be ſuch. Should *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* come down from Heaven to govern us, the *ſame Danger* would exiſt until the *Springs*, from whence it ariſes, were cut off; not becauſe ſome *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* have fallen, and from being the *Guardians* have become the *Tempters* and *Tormentors of Mankind*, and others therefore may fall; but becauſe as *private Liberty* cannot be deem'd ſecure under a Government, wherein *Law*, the proper and ſole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; ſo *publick Liberty* muſt be in Danger, whenever a *free Conſtitution*, the proper and ſole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; and a *free Conſtitution* like ours is dependent on *Will*, whenever the *Will of one Eſtate* can direct the Conduct of *all Three*.

Having

Having thus explain'd what I mean by *Danger*, and taken away all Colour for Cavil, it remains that I prove *this Danger* to be real, and not the Phantom of a crazy Imagination, or a prejudic'd Mind. This ſhall be done therefore as ſhortly as I am able, and by an undeniable Deduction of Facts.

He, who undertakes to govern a free People by *Corruption*, and to lead Them by a *falſe Intereſt*, againſt their *true Intereſt*, cannot boaſt the Honour of the Invention. The Expedient is as old as the World, and He can pretend to no other Honour than That of being an humble Imitator of the *Devil*. To *corrupt our Parliaments* hath been often attempted, as well as to *divide our People*, in Favour of *Prerogative*, and in order to let the arbitrary Will of our *Princes* looſe from the Reſtraints of *Law*. We obſerved This, in ſpeaking of the Reign of *Charles* the 2d; but the Efforts then made were ineffectual. The frugal Habits of the former Age were not intirely loſt in That; and This, I preſume, may be reckon'd as one Cauſe of the noble Stands, that were then made by our *Parliaments*, in Oppoſition to the *Court*. But not to aſcribe more Honour than is due, perhaps, to our Fathers, the *Revenue of the Crown* was at that Time ſo ſmall, (I ſpeak comparatively; for, in every other Reſpect, it was very ample) and the Profuſion of *that Prince* on his Pleaſures was ſo great, that no Miniſter of King *Charles* the 2d could find Sums ſufficient to buy a *Parliament*. He ſtood therefore on his *Prerogative*, ſtrain'd it as far as He durſt, and made all the Uſe of it he could. The *Revenue of the Crown* was greatly increas'd in the Reign of King *James* the 2d, and was given moſt unwiſely *for Life*. I ſay *moſt unwiſely*; for as a *Prince*, who hath an Heart and Head to govern well, cannot ſtand in Need of *ſuch a Grant*;

ſo a *Prince*, who hath neither, does not deſerve it; and therefore whatever the Generoſity of our Countrymen to their *Princes* may carry Them to do at any Time, They might leave This undone at all Times, without any Reflection on their Prudence, or even their Generoſity. The Reign of King *James* was ſhort; and, during this ſhort Reign, He reſted on that *Prerogative*, which he knew was a cheaper Expedient than *Corruption*, and which He vainly flatter'd Himſelf was enough confirm'd to ſupport the Meaſures He took, for ſubverting the Religion, the Laws, and the Liberty of *Britain*. Thus were Men brought, by the Conduct of *theſe two Princes*, to fix their Eyes on *Prerogative*, as the ſole Inſtrument of Tyranny, and to forget that *Corruption* had been employ'd, though unſucceſsfully, by King *Charles*, and might have been employ'd with greater Force, and perhaps more Succeſs, by King *James*. The Cry of the Nation was for a *free Parliament*, and no Man ſeem'd to doubt, in that Ferment, but that a *Parliament muſt be free*, when the *Influence*, which the *Crown* had uſurp'd, in the precedent Reigns, over the *Elections* was removed, as it was by the *Revolution*. But this general Inadvertency, as well as the particular Neglect of Thoſe, who took the Lead in national Affairs at that Time, is the more ſurprizing, becauſe *Corruption* having been ſo lately employed, among other Means, to render *Parliaments dependent on the Crown;* the Danger of *Corruption* was by Conſequence one of thoſe Dangers, againſt which the Nation had a Right to be ſecur'd, as well as a Promiſe of being ſo, according to the Terms of the *Prince of Orange's Declaration*. Thoſe Perſons eſpecially, who had exclaim'd ſo loudly againſt *Placemen* and *Penſioners* in the Reign of King *Charles*, and who complain'd at this Inſtant ſo bitterly

of

of the *undue Influence*, that had been employ'd, in ſmall Boroughs chiefly, to promote the *Elections of the Parliament*, which ſate in the Reign of King *James*, ought to have been attentive, one would think, to take the glorious Opportunity, that was furniſhed Them by a *new Settlement of the Crown*, and of the *Conſtitution*, to ſecure the *Independency of Parliaments* effectually for the future. *Machiavel* obſerves, and makes it the Title of one of his Diſcourſes, *that a free Government, in order to maintain it ſelf free, hath Need every Day of ſome new Proviſions*, in Favour of Liberty. The Truth of this Obſervation, and the Reaſons that ſupport it, are obvious. But as every Day may not furniſh Opportunities of making ſome of thoſe *new and neceſſary Proviſions*, no Day, that does furniſh the Opportunity, ought to be neglected. The *Romans* had been ſo liberal in beſtowing the Right of Citizens on *Strangers*, that the Power of their *Elections* began to fall into ſuch Hands as the *Conſtitution* had not intended to truſt with them. *Quintus Fabius* ſaw the growing Evil; and, being *Cenſor*, He took the Opportunity; confin'd all theſe *new Electors* into four Tribes; put it out of their Power to turn the *Elections*, as They had done, whilſt their Numbers were divided among all the Tribes; free'd his Country from this Danger; reſtor'd the Conſtitution, according to the true Intent and Meaning of it; and obtain'd, by univerſal Suffrage, the Title of *Maximus*. If a Spirit like This had prevail'd among us, at the Time We ſpeak of, ſomething like This would have been done; and ſurely ſomething like it ought to have been done; for the *Revolution* was, in many Inſtances, and it ought to have been ſo in all, one of thoſe *Renewals of our Conſtitution*, that We have often mentioned. If it had been ſuch, with

Reſpect to the *Elections of Members to ſerve in Parliament*, theſe Elections might have been drawn back to the *antient Principle*, on which they had been eſtabliſhed; and the Rule of *Property*, which was followed antiently, and was perverted by innumerable Changes, that Length of Time produced, might have been reſtored; by which the *Communities*, to whom the *Right of electing* was truſted, as well as the Qualifications of the *Electors* and the *Elected*, might have been ſettled in Proportion to the preſent State of Things. Such a Remedy might have wrought a radical Cure of the *Evil*, that threatens our *Conſtitution*; whereas it is much to be apprehended, even from Experience, that all others are meerly *Palliative*; and yet the *Palliative* muſt be employed, no Doubt till the *Specifick* can be procured.

But nothing of this Kind was done at the *Revolution*. Pleas'd that the *open Attacks on our Conſtitution* were defeated and prevented, Men entertain'd no Thought of the *ſecret Attacks*, that might be carried on againſt the *Independency of Parliaments*; as if our Dangers could be but of *one Kind*, and could ariſe but from *one Family*. Soon after the *Revolution*, indeed, Men of all Sides, and of all Denominations, (for it was not a *Party Cauſe*, though it was endeavoured to be made ſuch) began to perceive not only that nothing effectual had been done to hinder the *undue Influence of the Crown in Elections*, and an *Over-Ballance of the Creatures of the Court in Parliament*, but that the Means of exerciſing *ſuch an Influence*, at the Will of the *Crown*, were unawares and inſenſibly increas'd, and every Day increaſing. In a Word, They began to ſee that the Foundations were laid of giving as great Power to the *Crown* indirectly, as the *Prerogative* They had formerly dreaded ſo much could give directly,

directly, and of eſtabliſhing *univerſal Corruption*. The *firſt* hath happened, and We pray that the *laſt* never may.

The *Net Revenue of the Crown*, at the Abdication of King *James*, amounted to ſomewhat more than *two Millions*, without any Tax on *Land*, or *Malt*, and without a Multitude of *grievous Impoſitions* and *Exciſes*, that have been ſince heap'd on the Nation. It is plain, and it was ſo then, that *this Revenue* might have been ſo increas'd, as to anſwer annually the great annual Expences, in which We engaged ſoon afterwards. In this Caſe, the People would not have had a greater, nay nor ſo great a Burthen to bear, as They had in the Courſe of the *two Wars*, that followed; and, at the End of *theſe Wars*, They would have found Themſelves with little or no load upon Them, inſtead of crouching under a Debt of *fifty Millions*. That *this Method* was not taken, furniſhes Matter of very melancholy Reflection to the preſent, and will do ſo to future Generations. But theſe Reflections are no Part of my Subject. How it came to paſs that a *Method* ſo practicable, and ſo eligible, was not taken, (whether This was owing to *private Intereſt*, to *Party-Cunning* of different and oppoſite Kinds, or to an unhappy Refinement in Politicks that contracting *national Debts*, under a *new Eſtabliſhment*, was an effectual Expedient to attach Men to *this Eſtabliſhment*) I ſhall not preſume to ſay. All *three* might have their Share, perhaps, in determining for *another Meaſure*. At leaſt, it is a Point, on which the Men of that Time have ſpoken with much Prejudice, and little Candour. But however That might be, certain it is that We began to borrow at high Intereſt, to anticipate and mortgage, immediately after the *Revolution*; and having once begun, there was no Remedy; We were

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forced to proceed in the ſame Manner thro' the Courſe of *two mighty Wars*. Formerly, the whole Expence of the State was borne by the *Crown*; and when this Expence grew, upon extraordinary Occaſions, too great for the *Revenue of the Crown* to bear, the People aided the *Crown*, if They approved the Occaſions of the Expence. Theſe Grants were properly *Aids*, no more; for the *Revenue of the Crown* was engaged in the firſt Place, and therefore it might ſeem reaſonable that the *Crown* ſhould have the Levying and Management of the *whole*; of *theſe Aids*, as well as of the *ſtanding Revenue*. But it happened in this Caſe, as it does in many; the *Reaſon of the Thing* ceas'd, and the *Thing* continued. A *ſeparate, private Revenue*, or a *Civil-Liſt*, as We commonly call it, was aſſign'd to the *Crown*. From that Time, the former Order hath been revers'd. Our *Kings*, inſtead of contributing moſt, have contributed nothing to the publick Charge; and the People of *Britain*, inſtead of giving occaſionally *Aids* to the *Crown*, have taken upon Themſelves the whole Load of *ordinary* and *extraordinary Expences*, for which they annually provide. Notwithſtanding this vaſt Alteration in the State of the *Revenue*, and the Intereſt of the *King* and the *People*, in the Management of it, the ſame Forms of granting *Aids to the Crown*, and of levying *Taxes*, and of managing the *publick Treaſure*, have been continued; ſo that the *People* ſtand obliged (for the *Crown*, that is truſted with the whole, is bound for nothing) to make good all *Deficiencies*, though They have no Share in the Management of the *Revenue*. Our *Kings*, ſince the Eſtabliſhment of the *Civil-Liſt*, have not only a *private* and *ſeparate Eſtate*, but receive a Kind of *Rent-Charge* out of the *publick Eſtate*, to maintain their *Honour* and *Dignity*, nothing elſe; and whether the *publick Eſtate*

Eſtate thrive, or not, *this Rent-Charge* muſt be made good to Them; as leaſt, as it hath been ſettled on *our preſent, moſt gracious Monarch*, if the Funds appropriated produce the double of that immenſe Revenue of 800,000 *l.* a Year, which hath been ſo liberally given Him for Life, the whole is his, without Account; but if they fail in any Degree to produce it, the *intire, national Fund* is engaged to make up the Difference. But although our *Kings* have thus no longer any immediate Intereſt in the *publick Eſtate*, They are truſted with the intire Management of it. They are not only *Stewards for the Publick*, but They condeſcend to be ſuch for *all thoſe private Perſons*, who are the *Creditors of the Publick*, and have the additional Trouble of managing about *three Millions a Year*, on this Head.

Now this *new Settlement*, which appears abſurd in Speculation, how wiſe ſoever it may have been thought contrived for Practice, hath had this evident and inevitable Conſequence. As We have annually increas'd our *Funds*, and our *Taxes*, We have annually increas'd the *Power of the Crown*; and *theſe Funds* and *Taxes* being eſtabliſhed and laid for *Perpetuity*, or for Terms equivalent to *Perpetuity*, in the Senſe here intended, this *Increaſe of Power* muſt not only continue, but ſtill increaſe, as long as *this Syſtem of Œconomy* ſubſiſts. How this *Increaſe of Power* ariſes from the *Increaſe of Funds* and *Taxes*, and the *Influence of the Crown* grows, in Proportion to the *Burthen on the People*, heavier, hath been explain'd ſo much in the Debates on a *late, deteſtable Occaſion*, that the leſs needs to be ſaid on the Subject here. If We conſider in the *Increaſe of Taxes* nothing more than the *Increaſe of Officers* firſt, by which a vaſt Number of *new Dependents on the Crown* are created in every Part of the Kingdom; (*Dependents* as numerous, and certainly more prevalent

prevalent than all the *Tenants* and *Wards of the Crown* were antiently;) and ſecondly the Powers given to the *Treaſury*, and *other inferior Officers*, on Account of *theſe Taxes*, which are at leaſt as great and as grievous, in this *free Government of ours*, as any that are exercis'd in the moſt *arbitrary Government*, on the ſame Occaſions; if We conſider This alone, We ſhall find Reaſon ſufficient to conclude that although the *Power of Prerogative* was more open, and more noiſy in its Operations; yet the *Power thus acquir'd* is more real and may prove more dangerous for this very Reaſon, becauſe it is more cover'd, and more ſilent. That Men began to ſee, very ſoon after the *Revolution*, the Danger ariſing from hence to our *Conſtitution*, as I ſaid above, is moſt certain. No leſs than *ſeven Acts* were made, in King *William*'s Reign, to prevent *undue Influences on Elections*; and one of the Acts, as I remember, for I have it not before me, is grounded on this Fact, * *that the Officers of the* Exciſe *had frequently, by Threats, and Promiſes, prevail'd on Electors, and abſolutely debarr'd Them of the Freedom of voting.* What hath been done, or attempted to be done, ſince that Time, in the ſame View, and what hath been done, or attempted to be done, both in the Reign of King *William* and ſince, to prevent an *undue Influence on the Elected*, as well as on the *Electors*, I need not recapitulate. They are Matters of freſh Date, and enough known. Upon the whole, this Change in the State and Property of the *publick Revenue* hath made a Change in our *Conſtitution*, not yet perhaps attended to ſufficiently, but ſuch an one however as deſerves our utmoſt Attention; ſince it gives a *Power*, unknown

* *Tertio Gul. & Mar.*

in

in former Times, to *one of the three Eſtates*; and ſince *publick Liberty* is not guarded againſt the Dangers, that may ariſe from *this Power*, as it was, and as it is now more than ever, againſt the Dangers, that uſed to ariſe from the *Powers* formerly poſſeſs'd, or claimed by the *Crown*. Formerly, *Prerogative* was kept in Sight, and Proviſions were made againſt the Effects and Encroachments of it, as often as Occaſion required, and Opportunity offered. They, who called Themſelves *Friends to the Government*, in thoſe Days, oppoſed theſe Proviſions. They, who were *Friends to the Conſtitution*, promoted them. That the ſame Thing ſhould happen again, in a ſimilar Caſe, We muſt expect. But as the *Friends of the Conſtitution*, in Times paſt, were not deterred, tempted, nor wearied, whilſt They defended it againſt Dangers of *one Kind*, and by their honeſt Perſeverance delivered it down, not only ſafe, but more improved, to Poſterity; let us flatter our ſelves with this agreeable Hope, that the *Friends of the Conſtitution*, at this Time, and in all Times to come, will be neither deterred, tempted, nor wearied in the ſame generous Cauſe, in watching and guarding it againſt Dangers of *another Kind*; and that They will deliver it down, in like Manner, to future Generations. Sure I am there are Reaſons, and Thoſe of no ſmall Moment, why They ſhould be more watchful, more upon their Guard, more bold, and more inceſſant in their Endeavours, if poſſible, even than the *Aſſertors of Britiſh Liberty* were formerly; and the Enumeration of ſome of theſe Reaſons is an Article not to be omitted on this Occaſion.

I am, SIR, &c.

LETTER XIX.

SIR,

AS the Means then of influencing by *Prerogative*, and of governing by *Force*, were conſider'd to be increas'd formerly, upon every Increaſe of Power to the Crown, ſo are the Means of influencing by *Money*, and of governing by *Corruption*, to be conſider'd as increas'd now, upon that Increaſe of Power, which hath accrued to the Crown by the *new Conſtitution of the Revenue*, ſince the *Revolution*. Nay farther. Not only the Means of corrupting are increas'd, on the Part of the *Crown*, but the Facility of employing theſe Means with Succeſs is increas'd, on the Part of the *People*, on the Part of the *Electors*, and of the *Elected*. Nay, farther ſtill. Theſe Means, and this Facility are not only increas'd, but the Power of the *Crown* to corrupt, as I have hinted already, and the Proneneſs of the *People* to be corrupted, muſt continue to increaſe on the ſame Principles, unleſs a Stop be put to the growing Wealth and Power of *one*, and the growing Depravity of the *other*. We are, to be ſure, in no Danger from any Advantage his Majeſty will take of this Situation; but if Advantage be not taken, in Favour of our *Conſtitution*, of the preſent moſt happy Reign, of the mild and beneficent Temper of our heroical Monarch, of the generous Principle, inſtill'd by Nature, and improv'd

improved by Philoſophy, of his royal Conſort; it may be ſuppoſed, (for We ſpeak hypothetically all along, as the Reader will pleaſe to remember, even where the Precaution is not uſed) it may be ſuppoſed, I ſay, that *pretended Friends to the Government*, and *real Enemies to this Conſtitution*, no Matter whether They are ſuch by *Principle*, or become ſuch by their *Crimes*, will get into ſuperior Power, in ſome future Time, and under ſome weak or wicked Prince; and whenever This happens, the Subverſion of our *Conſtitution*, and of our *Liberty* by Conſequence, will be the moſt eaſy Enterprize imaginable; becauſe nothing can be more eaſy than the Creation of an *anti-conſtitutional Dependency of the two Houſes of Parliament on the Crown* will be in that Caſe; and becauſe *ſuch a Dependency of the two Houſes* is as real a Subverſion of our Conſtitution as an *abſolute Aboliſhment of Parliaments* would be.

The firſt of thoſe Means of *Corruption*, that have grown up, or been increas'd, ſince the *Revolution*, which I ſhall mention, is the Eſtabliſhment of the *Civil-Liſt*; not ſo much on Account of the Manner, in which it was originally given, as on Account of That, in which it hath been ſince given, and of the vaſt Augmentations, that have been made to it; Augmentations, that may be doubled, or trebled, in Times to come, upon the ſame Motives, under the ſame and other Pretences, in ſhort, juſt as ſpeciouſly as they have been made. The Revenue of King *James* the 2d, as it ſtood at his Abdication, hath been mentioned; and it would not be hard to ſhew, by indiſputable Computations, that They, who apprehended He might be able to govern without *Parliaments*, or to buy *Parliaments*, if He wanted their Aſſiſtance, had good Reaſon for ſuch Apprehenſions, notwithſtanding the

Expence He was at, over and above all the *ordinary Charges of the Government*, in maintaining againſt Law a great ſtanding Army of *ſixteen*, or *eighteen thouſand Men*. But to go back to the Reign of King *Charles* the 2d, whoſe Revenue was much leſs. The Patriots of that Age, even when this Revenue was computed at no more than 1,200,000 *l.* a Year, took great Alarm at the *pecuniary Influence* it might create, and look'd upon it, and ſpoke of it, as a *Fund for Corruption*. Now, if this Revenue could afford a *Fund for Corruption*, when, beſides maintaining the Honour and Dignity of the *Crown*, it was to defray all the other Expences of the *State*, and among the reſt Thoſe of a *ſmall Army*, and a *great Fleet*; what would the *ſame Patriots* think of a Revenue of 800,000 *l.* or a *Million* a Year, applicable to the particular Expences of the *Crown alone*, and not one Farthing of which ſacred Treaſure was ever diverted to any *national Uſe*? They would have the ſame juſt Confidence, no Doubt, as We have, in his preſent Majeſty; but They would ſay, as We do, that ſo *immenſe a private*, or *ſeparate Revenue*, may become hereafter an *inexhauſtible Fund of Corruption*; and therefore that the *Independency of Parliaments* is, and muſt be in real Danger, till ſome Remedies, as effectual againſt the *pecuniary Influence*, as have been found againſt the *Prerogative*, of the *Crown*, are provided. They would ſhew that a ſmall Sum, in Aid of *Places*, and *Penſions*, of *Fears* and *Expectations*, might ſerve for the ordinary Charge of *annual Corruption*; and that a ſmall Saving reſerved every Year might produce, at the End of Seven, a Fund ſufficient for the extraordinary Charge of *ſeptennial* and *national Corruption*.

But

But again. If We ſuppoſe the *Civil-Liſt* to become an inſufficient Fund for theſe Purpoſes, by the Profuſion of ſome future King; (and nothing leſs than the moſt extravagant Profuſion can make it ſo;) or if We ſuppoſe that ſome future King may join to ſo many ill Qualities, as leave Him no Means of governing but by *Corruption*, a ſordid Avarice, that renders Him unable to open his Coffers even for this Uſe; yet will a very little iniquitous Cunning ſuffice to create *Funds for Corruption*, that may come in Aid of the *Civil-Liſt*. It is natural for Men to be leſs frugal, when others are to pay for their Want of Frugality. Our *Kings* therefore may become more apt to take, and our *Miniſters* to adviſe ſuch Engagements, as plunge the Nation at every Turn into vaſt Expence; ſince the Load, which fell, in Part at leaſt, on the *Crown* formerly, falls intire on the *People* now. But beſides this general Reaſon to promote a Want of Frugality, there may ariſe particular Reaſons of more poſitive, and more pernicious Effect. A *weak Adminiſtration*, for Inſtance, may pretend *publick Neceſſity*, when *private Inability* alone hath form'd the Conjuncture; and frequent and extravagant Supplies may be aſk'd and obtain'd, to do, or to undo, by the Weight of *Money*, what might have been attain'd, or prevented, by a *little Foreſight*, and by a *prudent Conduct*. A *wicked Adminiſtration* may propoſe to impoveriſh the *People*; to render Them as ſubmiſſive and as abject as the Subjects, the Boors, or the Slaves, in ſome foreign Countries, and to *beggar* Them out of their *Sturdineſs*. But there is another View, that may be common to a *weak* and a *wicked Adminiſtration* both. In ſuch an Age as We ſuppoſe, *publick Money* will be eaſily granted, and *publick Accounts* rarely, or incuriouſly inſpected. The *Miniſters* therefore, tho'

never

never ſo weak, may be impudent enough to aſk, and able enough to get, *frequent Supplies*, on *national Pretences*, for *private Purpoſes*. The Conſequences of This are manifold; for, in general, the more *Money* paſſes thro' their Hands, the more Opportunities They have of *Gain*; and, in particular, They may ſhare, if They pleaſe, in every *bad Bargain* They make for the Publick; and the worſe their Bargain, the better their Share will be. Thus an *immenſe Subſidy* given to ſome *little Prince*, who deals in *Soldiers*, or an *immenſe Arrear* ſtated in Favour of theſe *little Merchants of human Fleſh*, may be ſo ordered as to ſteal enough from the Publick to repleniſh the *royal Coffers*, to glut the *Miniſters*, to feed ſome of their *hungry Creatures*, and to bribe a *Parliament* beſides. Several of theſe *occaſional Jobs* may be, and no Doubt will be contrived, in ſuch an Age, and by ſuch Means as We here ſuppoſe, and may be juſtly reckoned as ſo many *auxiliary Funds*, belonging to the *great aggregate Fund of Corruption*. Let us however break off from diſcourſing of Theſe, which may be more eaſily and more frequently contrived under the *preſent*, but might have been contrived under the *former Conſtitution of the Revenue*; and let us turn our Diſcourſe to ſpeak of that *great Source of Corruption*, which was opened ſoon after the *Revolution*; which was unknown before it; and which hath ſpread, ſince it was opened, like the Box of *Pandora*, innumerable Evils over this unhappy Country.

The Increaſe and Continuance of *Taxes* acquire to the *Crown*, by multiplying *Officers of the Revenue*, and by arming Them with formidable Powers againſt the reſt of their Fellow-Subjects, a Degree of *Power*, whoſe Weight the inferior Ranks of our People have long felt, and They moſt,

moſt, who are moſt uſeful to the Commonwealth, and which even the ſuperior Ranks may feel one Time or other; for I preſume it would not be difficult to ſhew how a full Exerciſe of the *Powers*, that are in being, with or even without ſome little Additions to them, for the *Improvement of the Revenue*, (that ſtale Pretence for *Oppreſſion*) might oblige the greateſt Lord in the Land to bow as low to a *Commiſſioner of the Cuſtoms*, or *Exciſe*, or to ſome *ſubaltern Harpy*, as any Nobleman, or Gentleman in *France* can be obliged to bow to the *Intendant of his Province*. But the Eſtabliſhment of *publick Funds*, on the Credit of *theſe Taxes*, hath been productive of more and greater Miſchiefs than the *Taxes* themſelves, not only by increaſing the Means of *Corruption*, and the *Power of the Crown*, but by the Effect it hath had on the *Spirit of the Nation*, on our *Manners*, and our *Morals*. It is impoſſible to look back, without Grief, on the neceſſary and unavoidable Conſequences of *this Eſtabliſhment*; or, without Indignation, on that *Myſtery of Iniquity*, to which *this Eſtabliſhment* gave Occaſion, which hath been rais'd upon it, and carried on, for almoſt half a Century, by Means of it. It is impoſſible to look forward, without Horror, on the Conſequences, that may ſtill follow. The *ordinary Expences of our Government* are defrayed, in great Meaſure, by *Anticipations* and *Mortgages*. In Times of Peace, in Days of Proſperity, as We boaſt them to be, We contract *new Debts*, and We create *new Funds*. What muſt We do in War, and in national Diſtreſs? What will happen, when We have *mortgaged*, and *funded* all We have to *mortgage*, and to *fund*; when We have mortgaged to new Creditors that *ſinking Fund*, which was mortgaged to other Creditors not yet paid off; when We have mortgaged

all

all the *Product of our Land*, and even our *Land itſelf?* Who can anſwer that when We come to ſuch Extremities, or have them more nearly in Proſpect, *ten Millions of People* will bear any longer to be *Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water*, to maintain the two hundredth Part of that Number, at Eaſe and in Plenty? Who can anſwer that the *whole Body of the People* will ſuffer Themſelves to be treated, in Favour of an Handful of Men, (for *They*, who monopolize the whole Power, and may in Time monopolize the whole Property of the *Funds*, are indeed but an Handful) who can anſwer that the *whole Body of the People* will ſuffer Themſelves to be treated, in Favour of ſuch an Handful, as the poor *Indians* are, in Favour of the *Spaniards*; to be parcell'd out in Lots, as it were; and to be aſſigned, like theſe *Indians* to the *Spaniſh Planters*, to toil and ſtarve for the *Proprietors of the ſeveral Funds?* Who can anſwer that a *Scheme*, which oppreſſes the *Farmer*, ruins the *Manufacturer*, breaks the *Merchant*, diſcourages *Induſtry*, and reduces *Fraud* into Syſtem; which beggars ſo often the *fair Adventurer* and *innocent Proprietor*; which drains continually a Portion of our national Wealth away to *Foreigners*, and draws moſt perniciouſly the reſt of that immenſe Property, that was diffus'd among Thouſands, into the Pockets of a *Few*; who can anſwer that *ſuch a Scheme* will be always endured?——— But I have run, before I was aware, from my Subject, which requires no more than that I ſhould take Notice of the Eſtabliſhment of the *publick Funds*, as it furniſhes *new Means of Corruption*, on the Part of the *Crown*, and new Facilities to theſe Means, on the Part of the *People*.

Now This, I ſuppoſe, hath Need of no Proof, and of little Explanation; for, *firſt*, the whole Art

Art of *Stockjobbing*, the whole *Myſtery of Iniquity*, mentioned above, ariſes from *this Eſtabliſhment*, and is employed about the *Funds*; and, *ſecondly*, the main Springs, that turn, or may turn, the artificial Wheel of *Credit*, and make the *Paper Eſtates*, that are faſtened to it, riſe or fall, lurk behind the Veil of the *Treaſury*. From hence it follows, that if *this Office* ſhould be ever unrighteouſly adminiſter'd; if there ſhould ever be, at the Head of it, one of thoſe *veteran Sharpers*, who hath learned by Experience how to improve the Folly, and aggravate the Misfortunes, of his Fellow-Subjects, of the Innocent, of the Poor, of the Widow, and of the Orphan, to his own, or any other private Advantage; it follows, I ſay, that He muſt have it in his Power, and there can be no Doubt of his Will, to employ *two Methods of Corruption*, without any Incumbrance to the *Civil Liſt*. Such a *miniſterial Jobber* may employ the Opportunities of gaining on the *Funds*, that He can frequently create, by a thouſand various Artifices, (notwithſtanding the excellent Proviſions, that have been lately made againſt the *infamous Practice of Stockjobbing*, by the Wiſdom of the Legiſlature, and which We promiſe ourſelves will be ſtill improved) and He may apply the *Gains*, that are thus made, to *Corruption*, in Aid of the *Civil Liſt*. He may corrupt Men with their *own Spoils*, and bribe even *Thoſe*, whom He reduced by his clandeſtine *Practices* to that Penury, which could alone make Them capable of being bribed; or, when He hath to do with Men of another Character; (for no Rank alone will be ſufficient to raiſe Them, in ſuch an Age, above the moſt direct and proſtitute Corruption) He may bribe Them by a *Whiſper*, initiate Them into his *Myſ-*

tery to gain Them, and then ſecure Them by a Participation of the *ſame Fraud*, and the *ſame Profit*.

Though this Reaſoning be hypothetical, yet the Suppoſitions are not ſtrain'd, nor unnatural; for as the meaneſt Grubs on Earth have rais'd Themſelves by *Stockjobbing* to the Rank and Port of Noblemen and Gentlemen; ſo may Noblemen and Gentlemen debaſe Themſelves to their Meanneſs, and acquire the ſame Spirit, by following the ſame Trade. That *Luxury*, which began to ſpread after the Reſtoration of King *Charles* the 2d, hath increas'd ever ſince, hath deſcended from the higheſt to the loweſt Ranks of our People, and is become national. Now nothing can be more certain than This, that *national Luxury* and *national Poverty*, may in Time eſtabliſh *national Proſtitution*. Beſides This, it is to be conſider'd that the *immenſe Wealth of particular Men* is a Circumſtance, which always attends *national Poverty*, and is in a great Meaſure the Cauſe of it. We may apply already to our Country thus much at leaſt of That, which *Saluſt* makes *Cato* ſay of the State of *Rome*; and I wiſh We could apply no more, —— *Habemus Luxuriam, atque Avaritiam; publicè Egeſtatem, privatim Opulentiam*; *Luxury and Avarice, publick Want and private Wealth abound.* Now, as *publick Want*, or *general Poverty*, (for in that Senſe I take it here) will lay Numbers of Men open to the Attacks of *Corruption*; ſo *private Wealth* will have the ſame Effect, eſpecially where *Luxury* prevails, on ſome of Thoſe, who do not feel the *publick Want*; for there is *imaginary*, as well as *real Poverty*. He, who thought Himſelf rich before, may begin to think Himſelf poor, when He compares his Wealth, and the Expence he is able to make

make, with Thoſe of Men, whom He hath been uſed to eſteem, and perhaps juſtly, far inferior to Himſelf in all Reſpects. He, who would have been aſhamed to participate in *Fraud*, or to yield to *Corruption*, may begin to think the Faults venial, when he ſees Men, who were far below Him, riſe above Him by *Fraud* and by *Corruption*; when He ſees Them maintain Themſelves by *theſe Means* in an Elevation, which They could not have acquired by the *contrary Virtues*, if They had had them. Thus may *Contraries* unite in their Effect, and *Poverty* and *Wealth* combine to facilitate the Means and the Progreſs of *Corruption*. Thus may the *great Thieves of the Nation* do more, and leſs reparable Miſchief, by the *Practices* They introduce, and the *Examples* They ſet, than by the *actual Robberies* They commit. *Pluſque Exemplo quàm Peccato nocent*, to uſe an Expreſſion of *Tully*, in one of his Books of Laws.

Much more might be ſaid, concerning the *Increaſe of Power*, that the *Crown* hath acquired, and muſt continue to acquire, according to the *preſent Conſtitution and Management of the Revenue*. Much more might be ſaid to ſhew that the *Power of Money*, as the World is now conſtituted, is *real Power*, and that *all Power*, without This, is *imaginary*; that the Prince, who gets *Prerogative* alone, gets a *Phantom*; but that He, who gets *Money*, even without *Prerogative*, gets ſomething *real*, and will be as much ſtronger than his *Neighbours*, and his *People* too, as He hath a greater Command of *Money*. In Fine, a great deal more might be ſaid to ſhew how much *Corruption* is a more deadly Weapon than the *higheſt Prerogative*, in the Hands of Men, who are *Ene-*

mies to ſuch a Conſtitution of Government as ours is. ——— But I haſten to a Concluſion.

If then a *Spirit of Rapine* and *Venality*, of *Fraud* and *Corruption* continue to diffuſe Themſelves, not only *Luxury* and *Avarice*, but every Kind of *Immorality* will follow; and the whole may be improved by ſuch Ways as have been ſketch'd out, and by others, whenever the Nation falls under a *bad Government*, till the *Prince* on the Throne ſhall not be able to ſay, ſpeaking of his whole People, even That, which *Philip* the 2d ſaid, ſpeaking of the Corruption of his own Court; *They all take Money, except* MY SELF *and* SAPENA. *Britain* will then be in that very condition, in which, and in which alone, her *Conſtitution*, and her *Liberty* by Conſequence, may be deſtroyed; becauſe the *People* may, in a State of *univerſal Corruption*, and will in no other, either ſuffer others to betray Them, or betray Themſelves. How near a Progreſs We have made towards *this State*, I determine not. This I ſay; it is Time for every Man, who is deſirous to preſerve the *Britiſh Conſtitution*, and to preſerve it ſecure, to contribute all He can to prevent the ill Effects of that *new Influence* and *Power*, which have gained Strength in every Reign ſince the *Revolution*; of thoſe *Means of Corruption*, that may be employed, one Time or other, on the Part of the *Crown*, and of that *Proneneſs to Corruption*, on the Part of the *People*, that hath been long growing, and ſtill grows. It may otherwiſe happen that *theſe Cauſes* remaining in Force, their *Effects* will become too ſtrong to be check'd, and will enſure the Ruin of the beſt Conſtitution upon Earth, whenever the *Men in Power* ſhall think their Grandeur, or their Safety, concerned in the Ruin of it. We are not expoſed, at preſent,

moſt

moſt certainly to any ſuch Contingency; but the bare Poſſibility of being ſo is a Reaſon ſufficient to awaken, and alarm every honeſt Man. Hath not every ſuch Man, indeed, Reaſon to be alarmed, when He hears the Cauſe of *Corruption* publickly pleaded, and when Men are ſuffered, nay paid by ſomebody or other, to plead this unrighteous Cauſe, as if it was That of our moſt righteous Government. Had We lived when the *Star-Chamber* tyrannized, and many other extravagant Powers were exerciſed, under the Authority of the *Crown*, We ſhould have found Fault as much as We dared, no Doubt, and yet have waited patiently, perhaps, for ſome favourable Opportunity of redreſſing the Grievances. But when We heard theſe *Acts of Power* juſtify'd as *legal* and *conſtitutional*, and the *Prerogative*, by virtue of which They were done, claim'd as a *Right in the Crown*, We ſhould have taken the Alarm, I preſume, as hot as our Predeceſſors did. Thus, in the Caſe now before us, *Corruption* may have been practiſed in ſome Degree, perhaps, at all Times. But then it hath been always kept under by the Shame and Danger, that attended both the *Corrupter* and the *Corrupted*. It hath been always complained of, never defended, and Endeavours have been uſed, from Time to Time, with general Applauſe, to prevent it. But according to the *Principles* now avowed, theſe Endeavours were unjuſt; they ought to be repented of; and the Acts made in Conſequence of them ought to be repeal'd; for the *conſtitutional Independency of the Crown* cannot be ſupported, unleſs the *Crown* have the Right and the Means of taking their Independency from the *other Parts of the Legiſlature*, by keeping the Members of thoſe Aſſemblies under a *pecuniary Influence*. Let no Man think

think that the Abſurdity and Profligacy of *theſe Doctrines* ſecure us againſt the Effect of them. They may ſoon grow into Vogue, and be reputed as ſacred Truths as any of thoſe Falſhoods, that are eſtabliſhed by the Syſtems of Policy and Religion, in many other Countries. What can be too abſurd, or too profligate, for an abſurd and profligate, or for a ſuperſtitious People?

But if We ſhould apprehend the Effects of *this Doctrine* as little, as we eſteem the *Doctors*, who preach it; yet ſtill the Alarm is given by Them, and it would be Stupidity, or ſomewhat much worſe than Stupidity, not to take it. We deſpiſe the *Drummers and Trumpeters of an Enemy's Army*; (for I reſume the Alluſion, that I apply'd in the firſt of theſe Diſcourſes;) but when We hear the Noiſe of their *Drums* and *Trumpets*, We take the Alarm, and conclude the Enemy is near. The *Friends of our Conſtitution* therefore are in the Right to join Iſſue upon this Point with the *Enemies of it*, and to fix upon this principal and real Diſtinction, and Difference, the preſent Diviſion of *Parties*; ſince *Parties* We muſt have; and ſince Thoſe, which ſubſiſted formerly, are quite extinguiſhed, notwithſtanding all the wicked Endeavours of *ſome Men*, who can have no Merit but *Party Merit*, nor Safety but in *Faction*, to revive them. If there was Merit, and ſurely there was great Merit, in oppoſing the Aſſertors of *Prerogative* formerly, when it roſe ſo high as to endanger our *Liberty*; there is great Merit in oppoſing the Aſſertors of *Corruption* now, and in expoſing the Means, by which *this Expedient* may be improved to the Ruin of our *Conſtitution*, and therefore of our *Liberty*. Nay, the Merit is greater in ſome Reſpects, if *Corruption* be, in itſelf, in its own Nature, and in the preſent

preſent Circumſtances of the Nation, and Diſpoſitions of the People, more dangerous than *Prerogative* ever was; and if the Means of eſtabliſhing a Government of arbitrary Will, by *Corruption*, be more likely to prove effectual, than Thoſe of doing it by *Prerogative* ever were. That it ſhould ever become harder to ſave our Country from the Effects of *Corruption*, than it was to defeat the Efforts of *Prerogative*, God forbid. —— On the whole Matter, a *Diſſertation upon Parties* could not wind itſelf up more properly, We think, than by ſhewing that the *Britiſh Conſtitution of Government* deſerves, above all others, the conſtant Attention, and Care to maintain it, of the *People*, who are ſo happy as to live under it; that it may be weakened for Want of Attention, which is a Degree of Danger; but that it cannot be deſtroyed, unleſs the *Peers* and the *Commons*, (That is, the *whole Body of the People*) unite to deſtroy it, which is a Degree of Madneſs, and ſuch a monſtrous Iniquity, as nothing but *confirmed* and *univerſal Corruption* can produce; that ſince the Time, when all our Dangers from *Prerogative* ceas'd, *new Dangers to this Conſtitution*, more ſilent and leſs obſerved, are ariſen; and, finally, that as nothing can be more ridiculous than to preſerve the nominal Diviſion of *Whig* and *Tory Parties*, which ſubſiſted before the *Revolution*, when the Difference of *Principles*, that could alone make the Diſtinction real, exiſts no longer; ſo nothing can be more reaſonable than to admit the nominal Diviſion of *Conſtitutioniſts* and *Anti-conſtitutioniſts*, or of a *Court* and a *Country Party*, at this Time, when an avow'd Difference of *Principles* makes this Diſtinction real. That this Diſtinction is real cannot be denied, as long as there are Men amongſt us, who argue for, and

and who promote even a *corrupt Dependency of the Members of the two Houſes of Parliament on the Crown*; and others, who maintain that *ſuch a Dependency of the Members* takes away the *conſtitutional Independency of the two Houſes*, and that, *this Independency* loſt, our *Conſtitution* is a dead Letter, and We ſhall be only in a worſe Condition by preſerving the *Forms* of it.

To reduce therefore our preſent Parties to *this ſingle Diviſion*, our preſent Diſputes to this *ſingle Conteſt*, and to fix our principal Attention on *this Object of Danger*, too long and too much neglected, hath been and is the ſole Deſign of theſe Diſcourſes. The Deſign may have been inſufficiently executed; but it is honeſt; but it is of the laſt Importance; and whatever the *Enemies of our Conſtitution*, who call Themſelves the *Friends of the Government*, may ſay, to amuſe and impoſe on the weak, ignorant, and trifling Part of Mankind, the Importance of it will be felt every Day, and every Hour, more and more, till it be felt by every Man in *Britain*. Let us hope, and endeavour by all poſſible Means, that it may not be felt too late; and to encourage the *Conſtitutioniſts*, or *Country Party*, in this Attempt, let us conſider from whom an Oppoſition to it is to be expected. —— Shall it be expected then from Thoſe, who have paſſed under the Denomination of TORIES? Certainly not. They feel as much as any Men in *Britain* the Preference, that ought to be given to that Syſtem of Government, which was eſtabliſhed by the *Revolution*, and in which They took ſo great a Share, and ſhew Themſelves as ready to render that *great Work*, which was left and ſtill continues imperfect, compleat. ——Shall this Oppoſition be expected from the DISSENTERS? It cannot be. Shall They, who pretend to greater

Purity

Purity than others, become the Advocates of *Corruption?* Shall They contribute their Endeavours to undermine the beſt Conſtitution of Government They can hope to enjoy, unleſs They hope to riſe on the Ruins of it, and to form another on their own Model? As *religious Sects*, They deſerve Indulgence, and They have it; but They are too wiſe not to ſee that, as a *Faction in the State*, They would deſerve none.———In Fine, ſhall this Oppoſition be expected from Thoſe, who have been called WHIGS? That too is impoſſible. Their Predeceſſors aſſerted the *Independency of Parliaments*, and ſtruggled hard againſt *Corruption*, in former Reigns. When the reſt of Mankind embrace the *ſame Principles*, and purſue the *ſame Ends*, ſhall They renounce *one*, and run counter to the *other?* Shall They own Themſelves againſt ONE METHOD *of deſtroying our Conſtitution*, but for ANOTHER? againſt making KINGS *independent on* PARLIAMENTS *by* PREROGATIVE, but for making PARLIAMENTS *dependent on* KINGS *by* CORRUPTION; Shall They give the *Enemies of the Revolution* a plauſible Pretence to ſay that nothing more was meant, by *Them* at leaſt, than a *Change of Government*, in which They hoped to find their *particular* and *Party Account?* This would be to *caſt black and odious Colours on the Revolution*, indeed; more *black*, and more *odious* than any, that it was in the Power of a *vain, forward, turbulent Preacher* to caſt, by his frothy Declamations. But the *Whigs* are ſo far from oppoſing the Endeavours to preſerve our *Conſtitution*, that they co-operate to promote the Succeſs of them; and that, however *perſonal Prejudices, perſonal Partialities*, and *old Habits*, that are daily wearing off, may be ſtill entertained by ſome amongſt Them, all the *independent Men*,

who paſs under that Name, unite in the common Cauſe of *Liberty* and their *Country*.———It remains therefore that no NATIONAL PARTY can be formed in Oppoſition to Thoſe, who endeavour to ſecure the *Independency of Parliaments* againſt the *new Influence of the Crown*, and againſt *Corruption*; nor any Strength be exerted, except That of a *Faction*, compoſed of the *Refuſe of all Parties*, gleaned up by *One*, who hath none for Him.———I would willingly carry This farther; and, in doing ſo, I ſhall not advance a Paradox, unleſs it be ſuppoſed, which I think would be a greater Paradox, that a Man may have Abilities to deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, and yet not Senſe enough to ſee his *remote*, as well as *immediate*, his *Family*, as well as *perſonal Intereſt*. I ſay then that if a Deſign of raiſing the *Power of the Crown* above any Pitch of *Prerogative*, and of reducing *Parliaments* to an *abſolute Dependency*, as well as a *Faction* to ſupport this Deſign, be form'd; the very Man, who forms *ſuch a Deſign*, and *ſuch a Faction*, muſt be infatuated, if he can wiſh very ſincerely his own Succeſs. His firſt Deſign, We are ſure, will be That of raiſing a *great Family*, and heaping upon it *Riches* and *Honours*. Shall his ſecond Deſign be That of rendering *theſe Riches* and *Honours* precarious and inſecure, and of entailing Servitude on his *own Race*; for it will be impoſſible to exempt them from the common Calamity? Nothing but Deſpair, (That is Fear void of Hope,) ariſing from a Conciouſneſs of Guilt, can drive any Man into ſuch a Deſign. But, in this Caſe, there will be Fear oppoſed to Fear, and one of theſe Fears may be allayed by Hope. The Fear of being called to a ſevere Account may be mitigated by the Hope of eſcaping. Where is the *inſolent*, *rapacious*, *odious Miniſter*, that may not entertain

ſome

ſome Hope, as well as Fear, when He ſets before his Eyes the Examples of Thoſe, who have gone before Him? *Pallas* was the Favourite of *Agrippina*; He governed like the Maſter of the Empire, and ſupported her Pride and Ambition by his Councils and Services, as he had been raiſed to Power, and was maintained in it, by her Credit, whilſt her Credit laſted. * *Nero* diſmiſs'd him; and, ſeeing him go from Court with a Croud at his Heels, ſaid pleaſantly enough, as if it had been ſpoken of a *Dictator*, that He went to *abdicate*. But *Pallas* carried off the Spoils of the Empire with Him; all Scores were quitted between Him and the Publick; and, according to the Bargain He had made, he was called to no Account. Many ſuch Examples might be cited to comfort with Hope the *moſt guilty Miniſter*, who is wiſe, if not honeſt enough, to ſtop in the Career of Iniquity, before the Meaſure of it be intirely filled, preſs'd down, and running over. But if one of thoſe *Bubbles of Fortune*, who thinks He always ſhall eſcape, becauſe He always hath eſcaped, not content to wound a *free Conſtitution of Government*, ſhould reſolve to make it expire under his Adminiſtration; the Condition of *ſuch an one*, however He may flatter Himſelf, or be flattered by others, muſt be ten Times more wretched and forlorn than the worſt of Thoſe, to which his Cruelty

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* Nero *infenſius iis, quibus ſuperbia muliebris innitebatur, demovet* Pallantem *Curâ Rerum, quîs a* Claudio *impoſitus, velut Arbitrum Regni agebat; ferebaturque, digrediente Eo, magnâ Proſequentium Multitudine, non abſurdè dixiſſe, ire* Pallantem *ut ejuraret. Sanè pepigerat* Pallas, *ne cujus Facti in præteritum interrogaretur, pareſque Rationes cum Republicâ haberet.* Tacit. An. L. 13.

hath reduced Multitudes——For what?—— If he ſucceeds in his ſacrilegious Deſigns, (They are of as deep a Dye, at leaſt) He may hope for Impunity, perhaps, to his grey Hairs, and be ſuffered to languiſh through the Infirmities of old Age, with an inward Remorſe more pungent than any of them; but He is ſure to entail Servitude on his whole Race, and indelible Infamy on his Memory. If he fails, He miſſes of that Impunity, to which He ſacrificed his Country; He draws triple Vengeance on his own Head; and expoſes his innocent Family to a thouſand Misfortunes, of which it will not be the leaſt (whether He ſucceeds, or fails) that They deſcended from *Him*.——But whatever *Miniſters* may govern, whatever *Factions* may ariſe, let the *Friends of Liberty* lay aſide the groundleſs Diſtinctions, which are employed to amuſe and betray Them; let Them continue to coalite; let Them hold faſt their Integrity, and ſupport with Spirit and Perſeverance the Cauſe of their *Country*, and They will confirm the good, reclaim the bad, vanquiſh the incorrigible, and make the *Britiſh Conſtitution* triumph, even over CORRUPTION.

I have now gone through the Taſk I impoſed on myſelf, and ſhall only add theſe few Words. There was an Engagement taken, in the Beginning of theſe Diſcourſes, not to flatter. I have kept this Engagement, and have ſpoken with great Freedom; but I hope with the Juſtice and Moderation, and Decency, that I intended, of Perſons and of Things. This Freedom intitles me to expect that no *Parallels*, no *Innuendo's* ſhould be ſuppoſed, to carry my Senſe farther than I have expreſs'd it. The reaſonable Part of Mankind will not diſappoint ſo reaſonable an Expectation. But there are a *Set of Creatures*, who have *no Mercy on Paper*,

to

to uſe an Expreſſion of * *Juvenal*, and who are ready to *anſwer*, even when They are abſolute Strangers to the *Subject*. Unable to follow a Thread of *Fact* and *Argument*, They play with *Words*, and turn and wreſt *particular Paſſages*. They have done mine that Honour, as I am told, and have once or twice ſeen. They may do the ſame again, whenever They pleaſe, ſecure from any *Reply*, unleſs They have Senſe enough, or their *Patron* for Them, to take for a *Reply* the Story I am going to tell You, and which You may find related a little differently in one of the *Spectators*. The Story is This.

A certain pragmatical Fellow, in a certain Village, took it into his Head to write the Names of the *Squire*, of *all his Family*, of the *principal Pariſh Officers*, and of ſome of the *notable Members of the Veſtry*, in the Margin of the *whole Duty of Man*, over-againſt every Sin, which he found mentioned in that moſt excellent Treatiſe. The Clamour was great, and all the Neighbourhood was in an Uproar. At laſt, the *Miniſter* was called in, upon this great Emergency; a pious and prudent Divine, and the ſame, for aught I know, who was a Member of the *Spectator's Club*. He heard Them with Patience; with ſo much, that He brought Them to talk one after the other. When he had heard Them, He pronounced that They were all in the wrong; that the *Book* was written againſt *Sins of all Kinds*, whoever ſhould be guilty of them; but that the *innocent* would give Occaſion to unjuſt Suſpicions by all this Clamour, and that

* ——*ſtulta eſt Clementia*——
——*perituræ parcere Chartæ*.

the

the *guilty* would convict Themſelves. They took his Advice. The *whole Duty of Man* hath been read ever ſince, with much Edification, by all the Pariſhioners. The *innocent* have been moſt certainly confirmed in *Virtue*, and We hope the *guilty* have been reformed from *Vice*.

I am, *S I R*, &c.

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